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From the Editor in Chief

W

elcome to the Summer issue of Parameters. This issue consists of two
In Focus commentaries concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, three
forums, and the SRAD Director’s Corner.

In our first In Focus essay, “Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of
Ukraine,” Rob Johnson traces Russian dysfunctionality in the conduct of the
war. He also discusses how the war on Ukraine underscores six factors vital to
armed conflict: adroit strategy, logistics, fighting spirit and motivation, mass,
greater firepower, and technological superiority. In our second In Focus essay,
“Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies,”
I discuss how some of the key dilemmas in strategic studies—such as the decline
of major wars, the limitations of strategic coercion, the utility of the paradigm
“War amongst the People,” and our current understanding of the relationship
between war’s character and its nature—are either challenged or refined by
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The issue’s first forum, Russia and China, includes two articles exploring
important areas of strategic concern for the United States. In “Economic
Statecraft and US-Russian Policy,” Ryan Orsini offers a comprehensive assessment
of the US-Russian economic relationship, identifying how Russia exploits
strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the so-called gray zone and how the
United States can modernize its economic statecraft to sustain its ongoing
economic coercion. In “Strengthen Arctic Governance to Stop Russian and
Chinese Overreach,” Mark Vicik examines the history of Arctic governance and
demonstrates the weakness of the current rules-based order; he then provides
policy recommendations for securing US interests in the region.

Our second forum, Beyond Conventional War, features two articles proposing
different ways to think about warfare. In “Defining and Deterring Faits
Accomplis,” Brandon Colas describes faits accomplis, offers suggestions for how
to deter them, and suggests Department of Defense leaders frame territorial
disputes as a real estate market they can analyze and manipulate. In “InfoSwarms:
Drone Swarms and Information Warfare,” Zachary Kallenborn explores the
dependence of drone swarms on information and offers insights into how this
important emerging technology fits into the broader defense ecosystem.
The third forum, Lessons from History, consists of two essays providing
historical perspectives on the character traits of successful leaders and the
military-media relationship. In “Character Traits Strategic Leaders Need,”
TOC
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Tami Davis Biddle identifies key leaders of World War II and highlights the
qualities that helped them achieve success in the challenging roles they performed.
In “Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media,” Alexander Lovelace uses military history to
offer practical guidelines for how the press can be used successfully by military leaders
in future conflicts.
In the final section, the second installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner,
George Shatzer focuses on Russia’s strategy and its war on Ukraine. He reviews The
Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace by Oscar
Jonsson and Learning from Russia’s Recent Wars: Why, Where, and When Russia Might
Strike Next by Neal G. Jesse and shows how these books might help readers better
understand Russian motivations and willingness to wage war. The books also provide
insights for strategists attempting to deal with Russian aggression. ~AJE

TOC
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Dysfunctional Warfare:
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Rob Johnson

©2022 Rob Johnson

ABSTRACT: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was based on false premises, faulty
assumptions, and a weak strategy. As the conflict has unfolded, heavy losses have
imposed a strain on available Russian manpower. The Russian army reached a
culminating point outside Kyiv and has exhibited little sign of operational learning.
By contrast, Ukrainians have fought an existential war, making good use of
dispersed light infantry tactics with high motivation levels. Western support has
allowed them to compensate for their deficiencies in armaments and munitions.
This commentary also shows military and policy leaders how the political context
continues to impose limitations on the Ukrainians.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin, Volodymyr Zelensky,
dysfunctional warfare

A

s early as February 28, 2022, just four days into the war, RIA Novosti
accidentally leaked Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stated objectives.1
It seems Putin intended to secure Kyiv in just two days and
announce on February 26 that a new world order had been ushered in. The rapid
takeover of Ukraine was supposed to have presented the West with a fait accompli,
like operations in Belarus and Kazakhstan, but also a new, more robust Russian
foreign policy. Putin aimed to end Western global domination and abolish its rules
and claimed “Anglo-Saxons” rule the West, so the “German project” to run Europe
represented a challenge to them. He forecast a split between Europe and the
Anglo-Saxons was inevitable, stated Russia was in a conflict with the West, and argued
in the planned statement that “Greater Russia” (including Ukraine and Belarus) had
returned to its “rightful position” as a world power. He believed the challenge to the
West would prove irresistible.
The statement seems to confirm that Putin aims to conquer Ukraine in its entirety,
annex the territory, and position conventional forces on the borders of Ukraine and
Belarus before moving nuclear forces into Belarus to counter NATO. At this point,
some pundits think Putin is unhinged, however, a long-term analysis of his motives
indicates he is consistently aggressive. His actions, in his estimation, are the culmination
of brinkmanship and military preparations that have paid dividends over 20 years:
1. Alistair Coleman, “Ukraine Crisis: Russian News Agency Deletes Victory Editorial,” BBC News (website),
February 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-60562240; Peter Akopov, “The New World Order,”
Frontier Post (website), n.d., https://thefrontierpost.com/the-new-world-order/; and https://web.archive.org
/web/20220226051154/https://ria.ru/20220226/Rossiya-1775162336.htm.
TOC
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subduing Chechnya, preventing Georgia from joining NATO, intimidating the
Baltic countries, seizing Crimea and the Donbas, crushing democratic movements
in Belarus and Kazakhstan, and persuading the West not to interfere with his
“near abroad,” including his ally Bashar al-Assad of Syria.
The Russian leader and his elites think in terms of geography and military strength,
not public opinion or international diplomacy. To Putin, only elite opinions matter.
The masses and small countries are expected to fall into line with the Great Powers.
In his interpretation of the world, status is measured only by size and strength.2
Putin believes the West has “expanded’’ geographically at Russia’s expense,
and he does not accept that Eastern Europe popular opinion voluntarily joined
NATO. For him, democratic movements are the orchestration of covert forces.
For Russian leaders, “color revolutions” are not genuine public uprisings. They
are the products of US and Western operations and information warfare, a view
they hold because that is how they would use them. For Putin, the West has been
dismantling threats to its global domination (including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and
Syria) through revolution, invasion, and economic tools—and he believed Russia
was the next target. In his calculus, Russia and China are the only powers that can
stand against the West.3
This outlook explains Putin’s demands to the United States and the Europeans
on December 17, 2021. He called for the establishment of a Russian sphere of
influence over Eastern and Southeastern Europe; the suppression of the Caucasus
and Central Asia; and the construction of a new global order, where Russia and
China act as replacements for the West and the Western world is confined to the
Atlantic. These grandiose ambitions were supposed to be expressions of power, but
they looked like statements of fear. Putin, fearful of popular, democratic protests
and movements and globalization, favors autarky. He fears Western technological
advances that threaten to leave Russia as a declining state. After the humiliating
end of the Cold War, he is afraid of losing the chance to resurrect Russia’s power.4
The result is an unnecessary, illegal, and immoral war that serves no purpose
and deprives Putin of achieving his ambitions. Far from a demilitarized Eastern
Europe to “guarantee security” for Russia, European countries have announced
their desire for greater security through rearmament. If stability at home had been
2. Keir Giles, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West (Chatham House Insights Series,
Brookings Institution, 2018); and Mark Galeotti, We Need to Talk about Putin: How the West Gets Him
Wrong (London: Ebury, 2019).
3. Bruno Maçães, “ ‘Russia Cannot Afford to Lose, So We Need a Kind of a Victory’: Sergey Karaganov on
What Putin Wants,” New Statesman (website), April 6, 2022, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe
/ ukraine / 2022 / 04/ russia-cannot-afford-to-lose-so-we-need-a-kind-of-a-victory-sergey-karaganov-on-what
-putin-wants.
4. Vladimir Putin, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2022,” Executive
Intelligence Review 49, no. 9 (March 4, 2022): 5–17, https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2022/
eirv49n09-20220304/eirv49n09-20220304_005-address_by_the_president_of_the.pdf.
TOC
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the objective, Putin failed. He faces the most significant wave of protests of his
entire administration. If he wanted to make Russia a great and respected power,
then the economic consequences of his decision have proven disastrous, and the
country’s reputation lies in tatters. Even if he can win battles in Ukraine, the war
has been a strategic failure from the start.

Dysfunctionality in the Tactical-Operational Dimension
The initial Russian plan to seize Kyiv in a lightning coup de main air assault
operation at Hostomel Airport, reinforced by the rapid drive of armored columns
from the Belarusian border, failed because of the quick reactions and determined
resistance of the Ukrainian forces and Russia’s failure to neutralize Ukrainian air
defense.5 The expected blitzkrieg faltered as the Ukrainians destroyed vehicles at
a significant rate along predictable routes. The forward elements of the Russian
army outstripped their logistics. Some vehicles broke down, others ran out of
fuel, and troops began looting to find food. Attempts to move into Ukraine along
multiple axes left each element deficient in air defense, close-air support, and
electronic warfare capabilities. In some cases, communications at the battalion
level were dependent on civilian commercial equipment. The Russian army stalled
despite a year of preparations, and the initial offensive failed.
There are a host of other more significant problems in the functioning of
the Russian army. Ukraine is winning the information war in the West, which
is not surprising given Russia’s breach of international law. At the UN, despite
holding the chair of the Security Council, Russia was humiliated, its justification
of a “special military operation” exposed as a blatant rupture of jus ad bellum. Its
subsequent conduct has trampled over customary international law, the law of
armed conflict, and jus in bello. The UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly
to condemn Russia’s actions.6 Only a handful of states abstained. Significantly,
one of those states was China, which appears to have been complicit insofar
as Beijing knew in advance of Putin’s plans.
On the ground, the Ukrainian resistance and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s
dignified yet impassioned leadership drew global admiration. The Ukrainian
troops at Chernihiv prevented the capture of the main route toward Kyiv for a
week. Kharkiv’s resistance also proved effective. One or two Russian units that
penetrated the city were practically wiped out, and commentators remarked
5. Natasha Bertrand (@NatashaBertrand), “Breaking: @mchancecnn with Russian Forces at the Antonov
Airport about 15 Miles outside of Kyiv. ‘These Troops You Can See over Here, They Are Russian Airborne
Forces. They Have Taken This Airport,’ ” video clip, Twitter, February 24, 2022, 9:06 AM, https://twitter.com
/i/status/1496849053824471041.
6. “General Assembly Resolution Demands End to Russian Offensive in Ukraine,” United Nations (website),
March 2, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152; and ‘‘UN General Assembly Votes to Suspend
Russia from the Human Rights Council,’’ United Nations (website), April 7, 2022, https://news.un.org/en
/story/2022/04/1115782.
TOC
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how similar the Russian setbacks were to the fate of their forces in the First
Chechen War.7
Russia had pinned so much hope on the success of its coup de main that it did
not open the offensive with overwhelming fires, as its military doctrine requires.
This decision was a political gamble to seize the capital rapidly and decapitate the
Zelensky government, just as the Soviets had done in Czechoslovakia in 1968
and Kabul in 1979. Russia’s failure to use considerable firepower, except to create
confusion, meant even the poorly prepared Ukrainian defenses, including air
defenses, remained intact. What emerged was that the Russian air force close-air
support had either failed or was inadequate.8 Subsequently, it appears there was a
lack of coordination capabilities with ground forces and suggestions that Russian
pilots either could not communicate with ground elements or were concerned
their side might shoot them down.
The assembly of battalion tactical groups was too weak to penetrate far.9
The attrition of losses or breakdowns caused much-smaller units to arrive
piecemeal at their objectives, with disastrous results. The vast columns of
road-bound vehicles heading toward Kyiv were thus halted, offering a ripe
target for Ukrainian drone or air attacks. It took more than a week to sort out
the confusion, bring up fuel and supplies, and reorganize the column to permit
access to armor and artillery. There was evident confusion and frustration on the
Russian side, and their solution was to use massive volumes of firepower to clear
routes and reduce urban areas.
The Ukrainian resistance has come as a shock. Russian prisoners and
intercepted communications revealed they thought the Ukrainians would greet
them as liberators. Western military specialists have been surprised by another
factor. Russian drills at the tactical level were of a lower standard than expected.10
Basic battle skills (such as alertness, logistics management, and moving tactically
across the terrain to avoid casualties) were substandard, and evidence suggests a
significant lack of discipline. Observers noted Russian troops remained mounted
7. Mariya Petkova, ‘‘Will Ukraine Be the Next Chechnya?,” Al Jazeera (website), March 29, 2022, https://www
.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/29/will-ukraine-be-the-next-chechnya; and see also David P. Dilegge, ‘‘View
from the Wolves’ Den: The Chechens and Urban Operations,” Small Wars Journal (website), n.d. (2005–07
content), https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/wolvesden.htm.
8. Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force,” RUSI (website),
February 28, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mysterious-case-missing
-russian-air-force.
9. For strengths and weaknesses, see Nicolas J. Fiore, “Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical
Group,” ARMOR, Spring 2017, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017
/Spring/2Fiore17.pdf#:~:text=The % 20Russian%20battalion%20tactical%20group%20%28BTG%29%20is%2
0a,firepower % 2C % 20electronic % 20warfare % 20 % 28EW% 29% 20and% 20air-defense% 20artillery% 20 % 28A
DA%29.
10. Fred Kaplan, ‘‘No, You’re Not Imagining It: Russia’s Army Is Inept,” Slate (website), February 28, 2022,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/02/no-youre-not-imagining-it-russias-army-is-inept.html.
TOC
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in vehicles and did not dismount to support their tanks.11 This failure meant the
Ukrainians, with both advanced antitank guided weapons and basic antitank
weapons, were effective.
Russian tactical errors have assisted Ukraine’s ‘‘defense in depth,’’ absorbing
Russian strength by fighting deeper inside their territory. Ukrainian forces have
chosen to contest every axis, and in the north, they have been successful, though
it has proven harder to hold on in the south. Ordinarily, the Russian army would
pulverize any resistance with artillery, but its attempt to thrust deep into the
country has given the Ukrainians the opportunity to slow the advance.
Against the greater number of Russian forces, the Ukrainian strategy has
become reliant on resistance in urban areas where its forces can inflict heavy
losses. Held up, Russian commanders have tried surrounding and bombarding
cities, leaving supply lines vulnerable to rural interdiction by smaller groups of
Ukrainian troops. It is evident the Russian response, as they have done in Syria,
will be the deliberate destruction of cities and towns. The humanitarian
consequences have been harrowing and have deepened Ukrainian determination
and Western empathy.
Russia has been surprised by the spirited public protests and unhappy
receptions from formerly pro-Russian Ukrainians its occupation forces have met.
There have been two responses by Moscow. First, Rosgvardiya troops, whose sole
task is robust internal security, have moved to occupy eastern provinces. Second,
Russia attempted to stage a fake popular “welcome” in Kherson soon after it
fell. As in other false-flag operations, the action failed because it was exposed.
On March 13, Russian forces detained Kherson’s mayor and staged a declaration
of a Kherson People’s Republic to emulate the Luhansk and Donetsk model.
This act has reinforced suspicions that Putin intended to overrun and expunge
Ukraine as a state, with the statelets incorporated into Russia. The Duma has
already proposed Luhansk and Donetsk, like Crimea, should be incorporated,
a request Putin was only too glad to accept.12
Russian Special Forces then launched assaults, air attacks, and missile strikes
on Ukrainian gas, oil, and energy installations located around the country to
degrade resistance. There was considerable alarm when the fighting led to the
bombardment of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant.13 The International Atomic
Energy Agency and the UN held emergency sessions as the threat of radiation
11. Mark Antonio Wright, ‘‘Why the Russian Military Is Floundering in Ukraine,” New York Post
(website), March 9, 2022, https://nypost.com/2022/03/09/why-the-russian-military-is-floundering-in
-ukraine/.
12. ‘‘Ukraine: Putin Announces Donetsk and Luhansk Recognition,” BBC News (website), February 21,
2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-60470900.
13. “Ukraine Nuclear Plant: Russia in Control after Shelling,” BBC News (website), March 4, 2022,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60613438.
TOC
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leaks intensified. Nevertheless, the Russians continued shelling and airstrikes,
believing concerns for civilian safety would weaken Ukrainian resolve.
Ukrainians, however, continue to put up fierce resistance, particularly at Sumy,
Irpin, and Chernihiv. In one episode, Ukrainian troops infiltrated Russian lines
and used handheld antitank missiles against a train carrying fuel for Russian
armored vehicles.14 A surface-to-surface missile struck a military airfield just
inside Russia.15 Audacious helicopter attacks hit Belgorod oil storage facilities
twice in two weeks.16 Zelensky has continued to urge more vociferously than ever
that the West should supply antiaircraft systems, provide more munitions, and
prevent Russia’s use of the skies.17
Russia conducted amphibious landings 18 miles (30 kilometers) from Mariupol
to secure the Black Sea coast, one of its early operational objectives. Resistance,
however, continued though the Russians surrounded the city at the end of the
first week. Russia is subsequently in breach of the law of armed conflict—shutting
off electricity and, therefore, water supply and power generation for hospitals.
The Russians have conducted intensive bombardments of civilian areas. Several
attempts to provide a safe evacuation for civilians have failed because shelling has
continued, destroying evacuation transport. A particularly tragic case, Mariupol
points to the intimidatory optics Putin has tried to use to force the Ukrainians
into capitulation. The decision to destroy and cut off the means to survive and
bombard the civilian population was deliberate and indicates how Russia will
treat other urban areas.18 By contrast, 19 years earlier in Iraq, US forces had
been far more precise and efficient than the Russians. The Russian model of
urban warfare appears to be a rerun of the war in Syria, with similar levels
of destruction.

14. ‘‘Russia – Ukraine. The Ukrainians Have Destroyed the Fuel Shipment for the Russian Army.
They Also Blew Up Railway Junctions,’’ Polish News (website), February 27, 2022, https://polishnews.co.uk
/ russia- ukraine- the- ukrainians- have- destroyed- the- fuel- shipment- for- the- russian- army- they- also-blew-up
-railway-junctions/.
15. ‘‘Ukraine ‘Hits Airfield in Russia’ in Missile Strike in Blow to Putin after Downing Six Helicopters,’’
News Nation USA (website), February 25, 2022, https://newsnationusa.com/news/world/australia
/ ukraine- hits- airfield- in- russia- in- missile- strike- in- blow- to- putin- after- downing- six- helicopters / # :~: text=
Ukraine %20%E2% 80%98hits%20airfield% 20 in%20Russia%E2%80%99%20in%20missile%20strike,%E2%
80%93%20the%20latest%20blow%20to%20Vladimir%20Putin%E2%80%99s%20forces.
16. Jake Kwon et al., ‘‘Russia Accuses Ukraine of Helicopter Strikes on Fuel Depot in Russian Territory,’’
CNN (website) April 1, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/01/europe/russia-ukraine-belgorod-fire-intl
/index.html.
17. Ellen Mitchell and Joseph Choi, ‘‘Zelensky Pushes for More Weapons to Fight Russia,’’ Hill (website),
April 13, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3266420-zelensky-pushes-for-more-weapons-to-fight
-russia/.
18. Pavel Polityuk and Elizabeth Piper, ‘‘Ukraine Says Fighting Rages in Mariupol, Blasts Rattle Kyiv,’’
Reuters (website), April 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/powerful-explosions-heard-kyiv
-after-russian-warship-sinks-2022-04-15/; and Aaron Patrick, ‘‘Why Russia’s Military Strategy Is Failing,’’
Financial Review (website), March 4, 2022, https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/why-russia
-s-military-strategy-is-failing-20220304-p5a1ov.
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Despite Putin’s ability to overrun a territory, analysts have noted he lacks the
manpower to secure his gains.19 Moreover, he cannot simultaneously garrison and
suppress Ukraine while posing a threat to NATO unless he intends to complete
his plans in stages separated by long intervals of consolidation.
Time has become a critical factor. The deterioration of the Russian economy
and the resupply of the Ukrainian resistance will strengthen over time, which
means Putin is in a race to reduce major cities and take Kyiv, in particular,
before the economic damage at home worsens. To thwart this strategy, the
Ukrainians need to hold on and draw as much support as they can from the
West, particularly in air-defense technologies, intelligence feeds, and financial
support. By the beginning of April, exhaustion and attrition had forced Russian
troops to withdraw from around Kyiv.20

Russian Miscalculations
Fear of NATO intervention is undoubtedly growing in Russia. Putin has
threatened nuclear escalation as a “response to Western economic measures”
and hinted the financial squeeze placed on Russia could be construed as an act
of war. While such threats have deterred some Western intervention, the damage
to the Russian economy has been severe. The ruble plunged to half its value in
a day and continues to dive. While the Europeans and British have debated
the importance of sanctioning oligarchs, the sanctions placed on the Russian
central bank by the Western powers, especially the United States, created the
most significant impact.
The Kremlin’s response to growing international criticism has been to cut off
social media and sever the Internet to isolate the Russian public and force them to
depend on RusNet and a diet of pro-Putin television.21 Maria Ovsyannikova, an
editor at Channel One (a state broadcaster), protested during a live broadcast.The
government placed subsequent doubt on her motives as she urged the European
Union to abandon its sanctions.22 Like so many others, the Russian government
swept her from public view.
19. Alison Durkee, ‘‘Russia’s Soldier Shortage: Here’s Why It’s Recruiting Foreign Fighters,’’
Forbes (website), March 10, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2022/03/10/does-russia
- have- enough- troops - to - take- ukraine- heres- where- its -manpower-stands -  -  - and -why-its- recruiting -foreign
-soldiers/?sh=7f55bffc4d82.
20. David Martin, “Up to 6,000 Russians May Have Been Killed in Ukraine So Far, U.S. Official
Estimates,” CBS News (website), updated March 10, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia
-death-toll-invasion/.
21. “Putin Hails Crimea Annexation and War with Lessons on Heroism,” BBC News (website),
March 18, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60793319.
22. “Russian Protester Marina Osvyannikova Fined £200 after Interrupting Live News Bulletin,” itvNews
(website), March 15, 2022, https://www.itv.com/news/2022-03-15/lawyers-for-russian-no-war-protestor-say
-nobody-knows-where-she-is.
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Some 13,000 protestors had been arrested by March 7, 2022.23 Putin held a
nationalist rally, and Russian state broadcasters have indulged in an evermore
bizarre alternate universe of Kremlin propaganda. Russia claims it is ‘‘rescuing’’
Ukraine from Nazis, that there is no war going on, and that the Russian-speaking
eastern Ukrainians are being subjected to ‘‘genocide’’ and makes no mention
of the massacres conducted by Russian troops at Bucha or the indiscriminate
bombardments of cities. Arrests continued until the “no war” protests started to
dry up. The Russian police applied their usual heavy-handed tactics, and the litany
of the Kremlin’s repressive measures has brought back the Soviet Union in spirit
and practice.24
Putin’s objectives to improve Russia’s security in the region and at home have
become counterproductive despite attempts to conceal his miscalculated invasion.
Stubbornly, Putin believes he can win in the face of setbacks. He intends to
cow the West, survive through China’s potential economic assistance, and crush
all opposition with dictatorial measures he could then justify. He calculates he
can withstand public opposition at home and thinks the West cannot sanction
oil without crippling itself. He believes he can use threats to prevent NATO
intervention, including Western calls for the provision of combat aircraft, No-Fly
Zones for Ukraine, or even defensive weapons.25 Putin believes it is a matter of
time before he can defeat Ukrainian resistance, and there is no doubt it is in his
officers’ interests to convey a positive view of progress. Putin’s arrest of Federal
Security Service chiefs underscored how hazardous it would be to oppose the
Russian leader.26 This action also reveals how he is trying, once again, to ensure he
is not blamed for any failures.
The possibility of an extension of Russian coercion to the Arctic, Mediterranean,
and Atlantic regions, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia is among the less
certain developments. Russian manpower shortages have forced Putin to recall
private-military companies from Africa and the Middle East. By March 11, he
was calling for volunteers from Russia and the former Soviet sphere, suggesting
heavier losses than he expected. To mobilize Russia’s full potential, Putin would
have to admit the “special military operation” failed. Meanwhile, Zelensky has also
23. John Goodwin, ‘‘Protesters in Russia Risk Arrest to Speak Out against Putin’s War,’’ CBS News (website),
March 13, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/protesters-in-russia-risk-arrest-to-speak-out-against-putins
-war/.
24. Richard Cadey, ‘‘Thousands Arrested during Anti-war Protests in Russia, Authorities Say,’’ Euronews
(website), March 6, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/06/thousands-arrested-during-anti-war
-protests-in-russia-authorities-say; and James D. Walsh and Matt Stieb, ‘‘Russia’s Antiwar Protesters
Are Terrified and Still Marching,’’ New York Magazine: The Intelligencer (website), March 9, 2022, https://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/03/russias-antiwar-protesters-are-terrified-and-still-marching.html.
25. Callie Patteson, ‘‘Russia Warns US against Arming Ukraine, Cites ‘Unpredictable Consequences’,”
New York Post (website), April 15, 2022, https://nypost.com/2022/04/15/russia-warns-us-against-arming
-ukraine/.
26. Liz George, ‘‘Putin Arrests Russia’s Own Spy Chiefs, Report Says,” American Military News (website),
March 14, 2022, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2022/03/putin-arrests-russias-own-spy-chiefs-report
-says/.
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called on Ukrainian peacekeeping personnel to return home, and he told men of
fighting age they could not join their escaping families.
NATO’s appetite for military intervention remains nonexistent. The primary
reason for this aversion is to avoid direct conflict with Russia that could
become a nuclear exchange if Putin, for example, actually used weapons of mass
destruction. It is purely a question of avoidance, primarily through inexperience
with how deterrence works in practice, with little consideration given to
escalation control. There are legal and collective security questions, too. If any
single NATO member engages in the conflict, the entire alliance will become
involved. Such a move is dependent on US President Joe Biden, but there is no
sign he will make this decision. Of course, the risk of Russia attacking Poland or
other NATO members is still there, and intensive planning continues. American
and British forces have reinforced the Eastern European flank of NATO, albeit
with modest numbers, and a NATO fleet exercised in the High North. At the
same time, Poland announced a significant increase in defense spending.27
The prevailing hopes heard in Western capitals are for civil unrest in Russia, or
a palace coup, which might lead to a change of government. Both are improbable
since Russian polls indicate the invasion has made Putin more popular as a “strong
leader.”28 Public protests in Russia can be closed down by the repressive tactics
of the police and condemned as Western-inspired attacks on Russia. Sanctions
may take years to have an effect and are used by the Kremlin as “evidence” of
Western aggression. Internal changes in Russia would require a much greater
confluence of setbacks: high inflation, deteriorating services, incompetent
authorities, a succession of policy failures, and, crucially, military defeat. If the
Ukrainians defeat the Russian army, civil unrest might unseat the president.
At this stage, both sides are considering the options and potential outcomes
of the conflict. In Russia, Putin insists he is fighting to prevent genocide against
Russian speakers in Donbas, a fantasy he peddled to justify the invasion.29 Putin
proclaimed his objective of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine, but the existence of far-right
activism was sparse, and there was no evidence Ukraine was under the control
of Nazis. Russian propagandists continue to claim the Ukrainians are welcoming
27. Leander Schaerlaeckens, “Poland Announces $25B Defense Spending Spree,” United Press
International (website), September 15, 2008, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2008/09/15/Poland
- announces -25B -defense- spending- spree/ 57531221511051 /# :~: text= BRUSSELS % 2 C % 20Sept. % 2015 %20
%28UPI%29%20 -- %20Poland% 20announces% 20%2425,missiles%20and%20short-%20and%20medium-ra
nge%20missiles%2C%20Klich%20said.
28. Maxim Alyukov, “In Russia, Opinion Polls Are a Political Weapon,” Open Democracy (website),
March 9, 2022, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-opinion-polls-war-ukraine/; and “Russia’s
Approval of Putin Rises to 81% after Invasion of Ukraine: Survey,” Mint (website), April 8, 2022, https://
www.livemint.com/ news/ world/russias-approval-of-putin-rises-to-81-after-invasion-of-ukraine-survey-1164
9436499493.html.
29. Patricia R. Blanco, ‘‘How to Justify a War: Putin’s Arguments for Invading Ukraine,” El País (website),
February 26, 2022, https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-02-26/how-to-justify-a-war-putins
-arguments-for-invading-ukraine.html.
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“liberation,” but this is nonsense. No one has greeted the Russian troops as
anything more than invaders and oppressors.30
There was an option for talks with Ukraine, but Russia’s offers to negotiate
have not been sincere. Putin has demanded all his objectives be met and
threatens the destruction of Ukraine if they are not met. His only reason for
talks has been to keep NATO, or any UN mission, out of Ukraine. So far, he
has avoided a ceasefire because this action might give other countries the
opportunity to arrive and establish cordons or areas of control that would
deprive Putin of a full military victory and make a resumption of the conflict
more difficult.
Russia has looked to China for munitions and support. The United States
has made it clear to Beijing that supplying the Russians with military assistance
would lead to US sanctions on China. The Chinese are already suffering from
the economic stresses of a real-estate crisis, suppressed Western markets, and
the consequences of an authoritarian approach to COVID-19 restrictions.
Consequently, Beijing has chosen to pretend not to support Putin and has
blamed the United States for the conflict in Ukraine while looking to serve their
national interests.31
Meanwhile, Europeans have refused to impose full sanctions on Russian oil.
The revenues Putin can derive from oil, an estimated $65 billion since the start of
the war, are sufficient for him to continue funding the conflict, despite a fall in the
value of the ruble and a potential decline in overall Russian production.32 Efforts
by European leaders to persuade Middle Eastern producers to pump more oil
have failed as they see no reason to threaten fellow producers or flood the market
and reduce prices when they could profit. Europeans lack the wherewithal to
make the final step that would damage Russia irrevocably because the European
continent has not diversified its fuel supply. After efforts to find alternative sources
were explored (especially from the United States), the German government
admitted it could only reduce to a 65 percent dependence on Russian oil after
12 months. Putin knew this, too. The British are glad with their Brexit decision,
which has reduced UK reliance on Russian and European supplies.

30. Pjotr Sauer, “ ‘Pure Orwell’: How Russian State Media Spins Invasion as Liberation,” Guardian (website),
February 25, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/pure-orwell-how-russian-state-media
-spins-ukraine-invasion-as-liberation.
31. Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Blames U.S. for Inciting Ukraine Conflict: Foreign Ministry Faults Arms Sales to
Kyiv,” Washington Times (website), February 24, 2022, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/feb
/24/china-blames-us-inciting-ukraine-conflict/.
32. ‘‘Putin’s War to Wipe Out 15 Years of Russian Economic Growth,” Bloomberg (website),
March 24, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-24/putin-s-war-seen-wiping-out-15
-years-of-russian-economic-growth.
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Ukraine has fewer options. It can either seek a compromise peace with
Russia, with all the attendant risks, or continue to fight. Ukrainian resilience is
admirable but existential—by the fifth week of the war, for example, Mariupol
was still defending itself despite massive bombardments. Drone footage shows a
city in ruins and a population without water or electricity queuing for dwindling
food supplies. Russian shelling and airstrikes have damaged over 90 percent of
the structures, and survivors talk of bodies littering the streets or buried under
the debris.33
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and France’s President Emmanuel
Macron have urged the Ukrainians to give up Mariupol and end the siege for
“humanitarian” reasons.34 Both leaders favored such a concession as the prelude
to more substantial negotiations on the war’s end. Critics suggest these attempts
had more to do with the Turkish and French domestic situations and the desire
of Erdogan and Macron to appear to be “statesmen.” On March 28, 2022,
another round of tentative talks between Ukraine and Russia produced no results.35
Thus, Zelensky chose to fight on, continue to receive Western defensive
weapons, and even reach out for offensive weapons from other countries. These
weapons include heavier caliber missiles to strike Russia itself, armored vehicles,
and aircraft. Poland could have sold its much-publicized stock of MiG29s to a
third party who then offered them to the Ukrainians. Western powers, however,
are still reluctant to take this step, anxious to avoid escalation. The United States
and the United Kingdom have made it clear they would offer loitering munitions,
such as Switchblades, to the Ukrainian army.
By early April, Ukraine remained open to the idea of talks and offered to
continue its position as a neutral state, which Russia requested, but there is no
sign Putin is going to conclude the conflict. Indeed, analysts regard the talks
as a way for the Russian forces to reposition themselves and prepare for an
envelopment of the Ukrainian troops in the eastern provinces—the anticipated
attempt at a Kesselschlacht.

33. Olga Voitovich et al., ‘‘ ‘Mariupol is Now Just Hell’: Survivors and Drone Footage Reveal the Scale
of Destruction,” CNN (website), March 15, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/15/europe/ukraine
-mariupol-destruction-footage-intl/index.html; and ‘‘Russia Releases Drone Footage Shows Mariupol
Damage,’’ BBC News (website), video, 1:11, April 13, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world
-europe-61096385.
34. Daniel Boffey and Peter Beaumont, “Macron Urges Putin to Allow Ukraine’s Besieged Cities to
Be Evacuated,” Guardian (website), March 6, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06
/mariupol-residents-prepare-to-leave-second-ceasefire-russia-ukraine.
35. Hannah Knowles et al., “European Leaders Reject Putin’s Demand to Buy Gas in Rubles,”
Washington Post (website), March 31, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/21/russia
-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/.
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The Changing Character of War
Much seems conventional in the Russian war in Ukraine. It has been
augmented with unconventional methods and intense fighting and marked by
civilian suffering. Russia has the advantage in terms of mass, but Ukraine has
been forced to overcome this asymmetry by using light infantry tactics to delay
and destroy Russian columns. Russia’s relative advantages have been eroded by
the economic measures imposed by the West, Ukraine’s steady mobilization of its
manpower, and the provision of foreign equipment.
In information warfare, Ukraine has been able to win support from the West
against Russia’s clear breach of international law. In Russia, however, there is
considerable support for the Kremlin’s special military operation.
When assessing the determination to win and the role of leadership, there is
a clear difference between Zelensky’s popular and warm style and Putin’s remote
and cool style. Ukrainian morale and determination have been impressive, while
Russian military morale has suffered amongst some units. Meanwhile, most of
the Russian public appears to be completely unaware of the details of the conflict,
being fed a diet purely of military successes. This withholding of information
creates a potential vulnerability as setbacks come to light, such as the sinking of
the Russian warship Moskva illustrates.36
Technological performance is a key feature of assessing this conflict, and
Ukraine’s anti-armor weapons have been successful. On the other hand, Russia
possesses greater numbers of advanced fighters (like the SU-35), which it can
deploy, and missiles (over 900 had been used by March 15, 2022). Russia also
has more artillery and surface-to-surface missiles. Both forces possess drones
for surveillance and strike. Ukraine maintains an advantage since Russian
formations are easier to find and strike than the dispersed Ukrainians. The
images of Ukrainian drone strikes also give the impression the Russians lack
counter-drone technologies in sufficient numbers at the tactical level and rely
instead on mass to achieve their objectives.
Russia has relied on area bombardments with a few precision-guided systems.
While these bombardments significantly damage urban areas, they are easier to
survive, giving the Ukrainians an advantage in urban warfare. Remarkable war
footage comes from courageous reporting on the ground and drone cameras.
The clips of blackened buildings, scorched windows, heaps of rubble and
debris, and hollow walls from Mariupol resemble scenes from World War II in
Europe or the battle for Mosul in Iraq. Shaken escapees spoke of bodies lying
36. Todd Prince, ‘‘Sinking of Russia’s Flagship Navy Vessel a ‘Huge Psychological Boost’ for Ukraine,’’
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (website), April 16, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-moskva-sinking
-analysis-ukraine/31805559.html.
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in the streets because it was too dangerous to try and recover them because of
the shelling. This operation is a twentieth-century war being fought with
twenty-first-century weapons.
Competence in combined arms operations is evidently mixed in the Russian
forces. The Russian coordination of fire and movement, while achieving progress
along several major axes (such as westward from Kharkiv and north from Kherson),
did not yield results for the advance on Kyiv from the north. The Russian doctrine
of creating a wall of fires behind which its forces can maneuver along the axes of
least resistance was not evident until the end of the first month of the war, perhaps
because of logistical weaknesses. The doctrine of artillery-led operations depends
on a secure, abundant, and efficient logistics chain. Russia’s logistics chain has been
substandard, and it may have shifted attention to operations in eastern Ukraine to
shorten and reduce lines of communication.
Ukraine’s logistics also face challenges. By the beginning of April, Ukraine had
lost over 600 armored vehicles and 15 combat aircraft, but it had the advantage
of being able to depend on local support. If necessary, its dispersed formations
of infantry could forage for supplies. Weapons and ammunition have also flowed
in steadily from the West. The United States has been generous in its supply of
munitions, initially delivering 180 tons of munitions and an aid package worth
$200 million.37 Biden increased this amount in mid-March to $1 billion and
promised to increase aid to $8 billion at a future date. Along with Europe, some
17,000 missiles have been dispatched to Ukraine. This action was significant, as
Zelensky said, because the Ukrainians were using antitank and anti-aircraft missiles
“20 times faster” than they were arriving.38 Furious about the Western supplies,
the Russians targeted a Ukrainian military base located near the city Yavoriv,
60 kilometers from the Polish border, with a missile strike because the location,
an alleged Western munitions depot, had been used by NATO forces in the past
to train Ukrainian soldiers.39
War also demands recovery from setbacks and adaptation. The failure of the
Russian coup de main required a significant adjustment of strategy and tactics.
Russia moved to a slower and more deliberate use of firepower to make progress.
Levels of resistance and logistics challenges made progress even slower, which has
37. Ryan Morgan, US Just Sent 180 Tons of Weapons to Ukraine—More on the Way,” American Military
News (website), January 24, 2022, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2022/01/us-just-sent-180-tons-of
- weapons -to -ukraine -more -on -the -way /# :~:text= According %20to %20Reuters % 2C %20the % 20U.S. % 20is %
20sending % 20a,administration % 20warned % 20Russia % 20could % 20invade % 20 % E2% 80% 9Cat% 20any% 2
0point.%E2%80%9D.
38. Zachary Cohen and Oren Liebermann, ‘‘Ukraine Tells the US It Needs 500 Javelins and 500
Stingers Per Day,’’ CNN (website), March 24, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/24/politics/ukraine-us
-request-javelin-stinger-missiles/index.html.
39. Stuart Lau, “Death Toll Rises to 35 in Russian Missile Strike on Base in Western Ukraine, Close to
Poland’s Border,” Politico (website), March 13, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-missile-ukraine
-base-10-miles-poland-nato/.
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imposed costs on the Russian economy. Additionally, the Russian army’s officer
corps has no tradition of self-critique and is therefore unlikely to change.
We can differentiate the character of war by assessing strategies and their
political purpose. In terms of cost-benefit analyses, Putin’s war is no longer
worth the military success that Russia might have achieved. Putin has failed to
grasp that Ukraine is now in an existential war, and the country will resist. Russia
cannot achieve its strategic ends and risks a stalemate. Putin may be tempted to
break the logjam with weapons of mass destruction. It seems more likely he will
try to achieve a military “success” by capturing Mariupol and securing eastern
Ukraine. He assumes the West will not intervene for fear of nuclear retaliation.
Yet, there is a degree of political desperation in the Kremlin. For Putin, the war is
existential, even if it is not for his countrymen, and full mobilization is an option.
For its part, Ukraine can exhaust the Russian army and impose attrition. It can
also extend the Russian flanks by opening up new threats geographically and
conceptually in cyberspace or against Russia’s hydrocarbons industries. Ultimately,
the Ukrainians may be able to compel the Russians to make a choice: to persist
and suffer irreparable losses or desist and achieve some compensatory peace.
At the time of writing, there are still significant risks in this conflict. The failure
to export grain in the summer of 2022 or access humanitarian aid threatens a food
security crisis in Ukraine, the Middle East, and North Africa. Russia could seek
to exploit the situation by blaming the West. There is also a substantial threat of a
radiological accident since there are nuclear power stations across Ukraine which
Russian missiles could breach. The death tolls of such an accident would be large
and long-term.
Unverified statistics put the figure of civilian deaths in the thousands, with
10 million displaced individuals and over 3 million refugees crossing the border
into Poland and Moldova. These figures were revised to 4.5 million refugees and
11 million displaced internally.40 The actual number is far higher.41 There have
been heart-rending scenes of children and families killed. Ukrainian parents wrote
“children” in paint on their cars and homes, hoping to be spared, often without
success. Columns of refugees passed the remains of cars and buses smashed by
gunfire, their occupants lost. In Mariupol and Kharkiv, the numbers of civilian
casualties rose rapidly. According to UN-verified figures, there were 549 civilian
deaths and 957 injuries in Ukraine as of March 10 (the end of the second week
of the war).
40. “How Many Ukrainians Have Fled Their Homes and Where Have They Gone?,” BBC News (website),
April 7, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60555472.
41. ‘‘UN Records 1,892 Civilian Deaths in Ukraine since Beginning of War,’’ CNN (website),
April 13, 2022, https:// edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-13-22/h_9b1e1a
7797273fc0c3f11d14e88000fd.
TOC

In Focus

Johnson

19

The indiscipline of the Russian army produced another equally predictable
and appalling by-product of war—atrocities. At Bucha, retreating Russian troops
left behind the corpses of civilians they had shot down in the streets.42 Survivors
reported the casual nature of the abuse. Russian soldiers had murdered civilians,
branded civilians with swastikas, raped girls as young as 10 years old, run over
injured civilians with vehicles, and used grenades against terrified inhabitants
sheltering in basements. The outrage was global, but the Kremlin denied it,
inventing claims the United States staged the incidents despite photographic
evidence and verbal testimony to the contrary. These were war crimes, and Biden
was clear in his personal view of the atrocities, and so was the International
Criminal Court, which had begun compiling evidence.43
The Russian war on Ukraine underscores six vital factors of armed conflict.
The first three factors are adroit strategy, adapted to the context and changing
conditions; the paramount importance of logistics; the criticality of fighting spirit
and motivation. The second three factors—mass, greater firepower, and apparent
technological superiority—have not conferred upon Russia the advantages it
expected in the operational dimension. While Russia’s operational dysfunctionality
has prevented military success, the political miscalculations made by the Kremlin
have been even more significant. Whether the Russian armed forces can correct
their mistakes, the war remains an example of supreme folly conducted with
shameful brutality.
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42. “Ukraine War: Bucha Massacre Is a Game Changer – Ukraine Foreign Minister,” BBC News (website),
video, 2:21, April 4, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-60989413.
43. “Ukraine War: Russian Soldiers Accused of Carrying Out ‘Genocide’ in Bucha as Zelenskyy Says
Concentrated Evil Has Visited Our Land’,” Sky News (website), April 4, 2022, https://news.sky.com/story
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Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022:
Implications for Strategic Studies
Antulio J. Echevarria II

ABSTRACT: This special commentary examines critical issues for the field of
strategic studies raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the waning of
major war, strategic coercion, and “War Amongst the People.” Drawing on previous
scholarship and current events, this commentary considers the questions raised by
the first major war of the twenty-first century. It provides recommendations for
scholars and senior leaders on how to work together to address the questions of
strategy and policy that have and continue to arise as the war progresses.
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hatever its outcome will be, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on
February 24, 2022, has the potential to shape the defense policies of
the United States, its strategic partners, and their rivals in decisive
ways. It is, after all, the first major war of the twenty-first century, one that involves
large numbers of conventional and irregular forces, and which has displaced millions
of civilians. At the time of this writing, the unofficial second phase of the invasion—
the battle for the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts—has only just begun. Yet many
research efforts have already begun to discern whether, or how, the operational
methods, the weapons, and tactics employed by the combatants will affect the future
of warfare. While these efforts will employ similar methodologies—interviewing key
Ukrainian (and some Russian) and other officials, gathering evidence of unit actions,
assessing damage to personnel and combat vehicles—the better analyses will probe
further than “Russian ineptitude” as the primary explanation for operational outcomes
and will explore whether any new military technologies or techniques have irrevocably
changed the conduct of war. Russian ineptitude, in any case, does not preclude an
eventual victory for Moscow. The campaigns in Chechnya, Syria, and Georgia show
the Russians can stumble initially but ultimately “win ugly” if given enough time and
moral space.1

Besides informing contemporary defense policies, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
will offer an intriguing case study for the rather broad field of strategic studies.
To begin with, analyses of the war in Ukraine and all its preludes will shed light on the six
principal explanations for the apparent decline in the incidence of major war since 1945.
It will also add to the growing body of literature on strategic coercion, particularly with
1. On the latter conflict, see Robert E. Hamilton and Ariel Cohen, The Russian Military and the Georgia
War: Lessons and Implications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), https://press.armywarcollege.edu
/monographs/576.
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respect to the criticality of information flow as well as the effectiveness of extensive
financial and cultural sanctions. Similarly, the war may reveal much about the
continued usefulness of the popular paradigm, “war amongst the people,” advanced
by British General Rupert Smith some two decades ago. Furthermore, it could tell
us a great deal about those forces—enmity, chance, political purpose—commonly
associated with the Clausewitzian model of war’s nature, especially the power
of enmity as a strategic multiplier. This special commentary offers some initial
thoughts about each topic in turn. But it is important to make clear this list is
hardly exhaustive.

The Waning of Major War
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most recent invasion of Ukraine undermines
the popular notion that large-scale, interstate wars have become passé. Some
pundits have argued the declining occurrence of major wars since World War II is
evidence that armed conflict itself is disappearing altogether.2 While few scholars
seem willing to go to that extreme, they do offer six explanations (discussed
below) for what on the surface appears to be a marked decline in the frequency of
large-scale conflicts.3 But the interesting implication for strategic studies is half of
these explanations functioned as accelerants rather than as deterrents for Putin’s
act of aggression against Ukraine.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to this explanation,
major wars have declined in number due to the risk such wars pose of nuclear
escalation, which could well lead to unparalleled devastation if not mutual
annihilation. Instead, states have opted to pursue limited conflicts that do not
present existential threats to other regimes or to compete within the so-called
gray zone, the realm of aggression short of war. As some sources have noted,
however, Putin chose to launch large-scale operations against Ukraine precisely
because his previous invasions led only to “frozen conflicts” in the Donbas
and Luhansk oblasts and his gray-zone activities have not yielded the results
he desired.4
The spread of democracies and democratic values. This explanation suggests
the decline of major wars has occurred because the number of democracies
worldwide is increasing, and democracies purportedly do not go to war with
2. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011);
and for a critique, see Bear F. Braumoeller, Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
3. For a summary of the main arguments, see Raimo Väyrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War: Theories and
Debates (New York: Routledge, 2006).
4. Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Interpreting the First Few Days of the Russo-Ukrainian War,”
War on the Rocks (website), podcast, 25:07, February 28, 2022; and on frozen conflicts, see Erik J. Grossman,
“Russia’s Frozen Conflicts and the Donbas,” Parameters 48, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 51–62.
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one another.5 Yet, as multiple accounts have indicated, Putin perceived Ukraine’s
movement toward a fully democratic and representative government as a threat
to his style of autocratic rule. Thus, he opted to arrest that progress with military
force. In this case, therefore, the spread of democracy and democratic values
increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood of a major war. Given the fact
that autocratic regimes frequently see democracies as threats, the spread of
democracy itself appears likely to cause more wars before it can be said to cause
fewer of them.
The growth of multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions, such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN),
and the European Union (EU), are believed to have reduced both the number
and scale of armed conflicts by increasing security more collectively and by
creating “new normative standards, communication channels, and institutional
practices.”6 These new alternatives and customs have provided states with
opportunities to enhance their security and to channel their competitiveness in
less belligerent ways. Unfortunately, Putin saw at least one of those multilateral
organizations, namely NATO, as a threat to his security. In 1946, George
Kennan described the Russian mind as perennially suspicious and insecure,
a characterization we may hope will one day be overcome by events.7 But that
day is not yet here. In terms familiar to students of Thomas Schelling, even an
alliance built merely to deter must, by definition, be intimidating.8
Increasing economic integration. According to this explanation, governments
refrain from choosing armed conflict to settle their grievances because war
in general and interstate war in particular cause a high degree of economic
disruption. Armed conflict clearly benefits some sectors of the global defense
industry; however, it disrupts commerce and financial markets, driving up prices
and increasing other costs even for parties not directly involved in the conflict.
Even though the Russian economy is relatively small compared to many Western
economies, the sanctions imposed on it by the West have started a ripple effect
that some experts warn might halt globalization and separate the world’s
economy into three spheres: a Chinese-led one, a US-led one, and a European
one divided between the other two.9 Whether or not the effects extend that far,
fears over the negative impact a major war might have on an integrated global
economy are at least partially founded, as second- and third-order economic
5. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
6. Väyrynen, Waning of Major War, 19.
7. X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 566–82.
8. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 174–77.
9. Adam S. Posen, “The End of Globalization? What Russia’s War in Ukraine Means for the World
Economy,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 17, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world
/2022-03-17/end-globalization.
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effects are notoriously difficult to predict. For his part, Putin gambled in two
ways: that Russian financial institutions would find sufficient workarounds
to remain effective and that the campaign in Ukraine would conclude before
sanctions could take full effect. On the first gamble he was correct; however, it
remains to be seen how much longer the Russian economy, the 11th largest in
the world with a GDP of $1.70 trillion in 2019, can endure such pressures as the
conflict becomes more protracted.10
The influence of international law and the law of armed conflict. This rationale
suggests the influence of international law and the law of armed conflict have
restricted the reasons states may legally go to war, and how they may wage it.
To be sure, to have legal restraints on the conduct of war is useful. But for this
explanation to be persuasive, prosecutions of war criminals must occur in a
timely fashion.11 Historically, that has not been the case. For example, “It took
two decades for the Nazi Adolf Eichmann to be called to account. It was
two and-a-half decades for former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, and
four decades for Kang Kek Iew, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan.”12 Clearly,
the existence of the International Criminal Court and the promise of postconflict investigations into possible war crimes neither dissuaded Putin from
invading Ukraine, nor from allowing his troops to attack non-military targets.
In fact, attacking noncombatants appears to be one of the Russian army’s
primary tactics.
The spread of anti-war norms. This explanation says the expansion of
anti-war norms has made it much more difficult to “sell” a contemporary
populace on the need to participate in an armed conflict. To be sure, anti-war
norms have ebbed and flowed throughout modern history. Nonetheless, they
represent an important measure of national will (or international will in some
cases). They also have a critical downside in that aggressors can leverage such
attitudes to bully states into policies of appeasement. Putin has successfully
employed that tactic throughout much of his presidency. Fortunately, the situation
reversed itself after his invasion of Ukraine. Most of the free world, with the
assistance of a brilliant Ukrainian information campaign, bonded emotionally
with President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people and came to see the
Russian state as having brutally victimized its peace-loving neighbor.
10. “Russia GDP 1998–2022, Macrotrends (website), n.d., https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS
/russia/gdp-gross-domestic-product.
11. Oona A. Hathaway, “International Law Goes to War in Ukraine: The Legal Pushback to Russia’s
Invasion,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 15, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine
/2022-03-15/international-law-goes-war-ukraine; and Davida E. Kellogg, “Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of
War Crimes Trials,” Parameters 32, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol32
/iss3/8/.
12. Michael Byers, “Justice Delayed: Why International Law Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs (website),
September 22, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2016-09-22/justice-delayed.
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In theory, all six explanations offer plausible reasons for the alleged decline
of major conflicts since World War II. In practice, however, none dissuaded
Putin from opting to launch a major assault against Ukraine. Indeed, of the six
explanations, the first three functioned more as accelerants or enablers of Putin’s
plans for war rather than as decelerants. The fourth, economic integration, is in
some ways neutral: it affects aggressors, defenders, and nonaligned parties alike,
though certainly not equally. On the one hand, it demonstrates why sanctions and
economic embargoes have become weapons of first resort in the modern era, at
least for pro-Western democracies with robust economies. On the other hand,
these measures require time and the cooperation of other parties to be effective,
and such cooperation cannot be assumed regardless of the severity of the case.
Members of the international community have already begun to experience
adverse effects from the sanctions and embargoes imposed on Russia, turning
the process of economic punishment into a war of attrition and exhaustion in
which all sides must endure some costs. Perhaps not surprisingly, the influence
of international law and the law of armed conflict neither dissuaded Putin nor
his top leaders. But perhaps they offer hope of exacting some form of legal
justice in the future that might influence other actors. The last explanation, the
spread of anti-war norms, clearly offers aggressors advantages during peacetime
but quickly works against them in wartime. Anti-war sentiments transformed
almost overnight into antipathy for the Russians and sympathy for the Ukrainians.
Before the invasion, Putin’s bullying tactics gave him a distinct advantage in
dealing with heads of state who wanted to avoid war. But he lost that edge once the
conflict started and then antipathy grew which led to a host of cultural sanctions,
such as barring Russian athletes from competing in international events.
But this list is also instructive for what it omits. Oddly, a seventh potential
explanation for the low incidence of interstate wars since 1945 is the relative
balance of military power, especially regionally. Heads of state might indeed fear
nuclear escalation and may have avoided armed conflict as a result, but they also
might have been deterred by the fact that they possess little in the way of a decisive
military advantage over their rivals. This contemporary “balance of power” is not
the “balance of nuclear terror” that existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
during the Cold War. But it might be as effective, and it might be one reason
states have decided to compete within the “gray zone,” below the threshold of
war, rather than above it. Obviously, as Putin’s current war in Ukraine proves,
miscalculation is always possible, and deterrence, like any strategy, is only as stable
as the pace of technological innovation permits. Yet something should be said for
the possibility some would-be aggressors have been soberly calculating their odds
of succeeding militarily, and have decided not to take the risk.
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Strategic Coercion—A Closer Look
The conflict in Ukraine offers an important case study regarding the exercise
of strategic coercion—the “deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to
influence another’s strategic choices”—within the context of a major war.13
The literature concerning strategic coercion is substantial and is still growing.
Most of it, however, deals with parties that are not significant economic or military
powers armed with nuclear weapons. Assuming reliable insights will eventually
emerge regarding Putin’s decision making, the concept of strategic coercion
stands to advance in at least three topics: the critical nature of the flow of accurate
information, the integral value of the dynamic of compellence and deterrence,
and the efficacy of short- and long-term financial and economic sanctions.
For controlled coercion to take place, the target must receive reasonably
accurate information about the strategic situation, including combat losses,
and—to borrow Schelling’s words—the “pain yet to come” for noncompliance.
Otherwise, reducing an adversary’s military power and strategic advantages
lacks coercive value. If targets simply reject accurate (but perhaps unpleasant)
information, as irrational actors sometimes do, that is one matter. If the targets
are simply not receiving it, that is another matter, and it requires a different
approach lest the attempt at strategic coercion fail for the wrong reasons.
Research on strategic coercion has been aware of the problem of irrational
actors for some time and has made progress in tackling it. However, it has not
completely separated the irrational actor problem from the “ignorant actor”
problem. We know Putin was not receiving accurate information from his
subordinate commanders and advisers; he eventually took some corrective
measures, but the situation might not be fully resolved. At the same time,
numerous theories surfaced—from “mad man” to “victim of stroke”—claiming
Putin was an irrational actor and had to be treated as such.14 But we would
presumably treat a “mad man” differently than we would someone who is
malevolent but ignorant because the latter would have thresholds he would not
want to cross; whereas the former would not. To further complicate matters,
Putin could be both irrational and ignorant. Nevertheless, the larger point is
strategic coercion theory (and practice) would benefit from more research into
how best to distinguish between the two.
13. Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 3, 15; and Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
14. Michael Krepon, “Putin Plays the Mad Man Card in Ukraine,” Forbes (website),
March 1, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrepon/2022/03/01/putin-plays-the-mad-man-card
-in-ukraine/?sh=6d58ef2a1405; and Maggie Fox, “Why Does Vladimir Putin Walk Like That?,”
NBC News (website), December 15, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/why-does
-vladimir-putin-walk-n480611.
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Research into strategic coercion might also address how the concept’s two
essential components, compellence and deterrence, could function as a synthetic
dynamic. Separating the two has some value, particularly with respect to
education. But it tends to obscure their complementary nature: they are
interrelated counterparts, not complete opposites. Compellence often requires
some form of deterrence, and deterrence typically involves some form of
compellence. Together they round out strategic coercion, the aim of which is
to make our adversaries do what we want—and not something else. Clausewitz
and Schelling saw it the same way. They understood war to be an act of force to
compel our adversaries to do what we want—which also implies denying our
adversaries the ability to do something we do not want.15 For example, an invasion
aimed at compelling the capitulation of a head of state should also include
measures for deterring an insurgency should the first aim be accomplished.
Fortunately, Putin invaded Ukraine with forces insufficient to accomplish the
first objective, and it is unclear he had properly considered the second. For their
part, the Ukrainians and those supporting them want to compel Putin to give up
his aggressive intentions, while also deterring him from escalating.
We find this synthetic, compellence-deterrence dynamic at work in nearly
all conflicts short of Schelling’s notion of “brute force,” that is, those situations
inimical to the bargaining model of war.16 An example is using military force
to perpetrate genocide, which eschews arriving at a negotiated settlement or
a bargain of any sort.17 Campaigns sometimes begin as exercises in brute force
but then transition to the bargaining model if the defenders’ resistance is too
strong. Combining compellence and deterrence into a single dynamic will also
facilitate gaining better control over adversaries and crisis situations. Modern
articulations of strategies of control reach back to the 1950s and 1960s in the
works of J. C. Wylie, Henry Eccles, and Herbert Rosinski; their concept of
control should be reexamined and developed further for application in today’s
strategic environment.18 The conflict in Ukraine will afford opportunities for
strategic theorists and practitioners to study how the two components of
coercion might function together and what their limitations might be. In short,
the conflict in Ukraine, because of its strategic scale and operational scope, will
offer new data which will improve the concept of strategic coercion. These data
should justify fusing compellence and deterrence together more formally, rather
15. Carl von Clausewitz, Hinterlasseneswerk Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Hahlweg, 19th ed. (Frankfurt:
Ferdinand, 1980), bk. 1, chap. 1, 191–92; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 76; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2.
16. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–3.
17. For a broader definition of brute force, see Robert Mandel, Coercing Compliance: State-Initiated Brute
Force in Today’s World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 4, 6–7.
18. On strategy of control, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, War’s Logic: Strategic Thought in the American Way
of War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 130–42.
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than informally or accidentally. Eventually, that process should be routinized in
military training and execution.
Along similar lines, and to return to a topic mentioned above, Putin’s invasion
of Ukraine will shed light on the coercive power of financial sanctions on a
large, modern state with strong economic ties, especially in terms of oil and gas,
to the West. At present, the sanctions consist of a combination of targeted and
comprehensive sanctions, which the West can increase or decrease as necessary
but not without some unwanted secondary or tertiary effects. Research into
the coercive power of sanctions (or economic coercion) suggests they work best
under specific conditions: (1) when costs to the target are significant,
(2) the senders’ costs are minimal, (3) the issue of dispute is of low importance
to the target, (4) the sender and target are closely allied, (5) sanctions are endorsed
by an international institution, and (6) the target state is a democracy.19 As readers
will note, only three of the six conditions obtain with respect to Russia’s current
invasion of Ukraine.
While sanctions have become a weapon of choice for modern democracies,
they also have a long and not entirely successful history.20 They have the advantage
of being flexible, able to serve in a deterrence or compellence role, or both.
The West has used them against Russia in both capacities, including the erosion
of Moscow’s ability to manufacture war material and to resupply its forces
over the long term. (Inept Russian logistical planning also added to the costimposing effects of sanctions in the short term.) By some accounts, the effect
of sanctions may reduce Russia’s GDP by as much as 12 percent in 2022.21 It is
unclear how effective Russian countermeasures will be. Economic sanctions may
remain a weapon of first resort in the future. But, as with any weapon, adversaries
and potential adversaries will have studied its effectiveness and adopted
some countermeasures.

War amongst the People—Still
In the early twenty-first century, British General Rupert Smith attempted to
introduce a new paradigm of armed conflict which he referred to as “War amongst
the People.”22 This paradigm, which was intended to shift defense thinking and
19. Daniel R. Drezner, “Economic Sanctions in Theory and Practice: How Smart Are They?,” in Greenhill
and Krause, eds., Coercion, 251–70; as the author explains, even post–Cold War and other data sets have not
changed the contingent nature of the results.
20. Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022); and Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New
Era of Financial Warfare (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).
21. Elliot Smith, “Russia’s Economy Is Beginning to Crack as Economists Forecast Sharp Contractions,”
CNBC (website), April 4, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/04/russias-economy-is-beginning-to-crack
-as-economists-forecast-sharp-contractions.html.
22. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage Books,
2005, 2007).
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procurement in the West away from its preoccupation with force-on-force conflicts,
or what Smith refers to as “interstate industrial wars,” to contemporary wars. These
wars are characterized by six major trends. First, the ends for which wars were
fought have changed from the “hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial
war to more malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are
not states.” Second, wars were now fought “amongst the people,” as exemplified
by the “central role of the media,” which bring armed conflicts into “every living
room,” even as they are being fought in streets and fields far abroad. Third, modern
conflicts “tend to be timeless,” since they center on establishing conditions that
must be maintained until treaties or peace agreements are reached, which can
require years or decades. Fourth, fighting takes place in a manner designed “not
to lose the force,” rather than employing the force and expending it as necessary
in pursuit of the overall aim of the conflict. Fifth, “old weapons” designed for
industrial war were of necessity being adapted to “new uses,” to accommodate
“war amongst the people.” Sixth, the sides in contemporary conflicts consist
mostly of nonstate actors, meaning multinational groupings, such as alliances or
coalitions, were pitted against parties that were not states.
Smith can be faulted for attempting to use Thomas Kuhn’s framework of
conceptual paradigms to describe different types of wars.23 Paradigms are better
at describing the systems of thought or ways individuals and groups think about
things than the things themselves. Wars are notorious for the “contemporaneity
of the non-contemporaneous,” a phrase once popular among French and German
sociologists to describe generational overlap, that is, when individuals of two or
more generations occupy the same space and time. An example is Western society
in the 1960s, when a younger generation embracing anti-establishment values
clashed with an older, more conservative one hewing to traditionalism.
In short, classifying phenomena according to periods can be problematic
because things can be in an era without being of that era. So, it is with wars.
Industrial-age, interstate conflicts such as World War I and World War II occurred
temporally with many of America’s “Banana Wars,” for instance, in which the US
military often had to deal with violent nonstate actors. Yet the two types clearly
differed. (The two world wars, incidentally, were fought by alliances, which Smith
and others classify as nonstate actors.) The United States has participated in at
least 10 times more noninterstate, nonindustrial-age wars than it has interstate,
industrial-age wars.24 Nothing about the twenty-first century thus far suggests this
ratio will change in favor of interstate wars.
23. Smith, Utility of Force, 4–5; and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1962).
24. Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad,
1798–2022, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R42878, updated March 8, 2022
(Washington, DC: CRS, March 8, 2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R42738.
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While his attempt to classify wars is problematic, Smith should not be faulted
for having tried to persuade defense establishments in the West to develop better
tools for fighting nonindustrial, noninterstate wars. That dream is both a noble
one and a worthwhile goal. Not surprisingly, it remains both. Western defense
establishments continue to resist investing in the requirements needed to deal
with such wars, perhaps because the larger profits come with producing the
military hardware necessary for interstate wars. This is not to say the West should
forgo preparing to fight interstate wars, which have always been high-risk but
low incidence. Rather, the West can, and should, commit itself to prepare for and,
when necessary, to conduct both types of wars.
Most of the trends Smith identified are correct, though one might quibble
about his description of the absolute nature of political aims; the Korean War
and the Vietnam War, for instance, were examples of negotiated settlements.
The salient characteristic Smith rightly ascribes to new wars, such as
counterinsurgencies and peacekeeping operations, is they occur amongst the
people. But as the conflict in Ukraine shows, that characteristic also holds true
for major wars today. As of April 5, 2022, for instance, the UN migration agency
reported some 11 million people had been displaced within Ukraine and more
than 4 million had fled Ukraine.25 Refugees would have impacted any conflict that
might have broken out in Central Europe during the Cold War, though Smith’s
point is military doctrine and training exercises at the time rarely took account of
the refugee flow and how its presence might impede operational maneuver.
In the current conflict in Ukraine, noncombatant populations are not only
refugees but defenseless targets. Video evidence and personal testimonies have
implicated the Russian military in war crimes because it directly targeted civilians
in flagrant disregard of international law and the law of armed conflict. To be
sure, populations across the globe are watching this conflict play out on their
television sets, iPads, and computer screens. The suffering they have witnessed
has caused them to put pressure on their governments to do more to support
the Ukrainian cause. NATO, the European Union, and others have responded
by increasing sanctions, and transferring more arms, money, and other support
to Ukraine.
In sum, noncombatants have become participants in this war just as much as
Ukrainian and Russian military personnel, and despite the law of armed conflict.
This war is, thus, a war amongst the people in every sense, even though it is
interstate and multinational in character. Western military strategy and doctrine
25. Associated Press, “Live Updates: UN Says 11 Million Have Fled Homes in Ukraine, AOL
(website), April 5, 2022, https://www.aol.com/news/live-updates-ukraine-reports-russian-063640006-1220
04857.html.
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must account for this fact as this phenomenon is likely to manifest itself again in
other theaters, regardless of the scale or political aims of the conflict.

War’s Changing Character and Dynamic Nature
The fact that the conflict in Ukraine is also a war amongst the people raises
an important question about the relationship between war’s character and its
nature. To be sure, the US military believes war’s character—the institutions that
participate in armed conflict, the weapons and doctrines employed, and the whole
process of warfare itself—changes over time and varies across cultures. However,
the US military also believes war’s nature is constant because every armed
conflict, no matter how large or small, consists of political motives, human
emotions, and the element of chance. While that point is demonstrably true, it
merely tells us what the common denominators are that unify all wars without
telling us that they, too, fluctuate and interact. They are dynamic, perhaps even
more so than the institutions that make up war’s character.
We can find an important example of that dynamism in the current war in
Ukraine in which human emotions, especially enmity, have motivated the
defenders to resist the superior numbers of the Russian invaders. They are
essentially fighting what Clausewitz would have recognized as a war of national
resistance or national liberation in which the citizenry often takes up arms. But in
this case, the spirit of enmity has more than a tactical significance. It has become
a strategic multiplier thanks in large part to the support most of the free world
is showing toward Ukraine with massive amounts of military and other aid.
The Ukrainians have threatened to continue resisting by means of an
insurgency should their regular military be defeated. Insurrections were one of the
reasons Clausewitz saw the defense as the stronger form of war. By his reasoning
the defender had the easier task, to survive; while the attacker, who must subdue
the defender, had the harder mission. A military force can be defeated, and its
government overthrown, but until its citizenry consents to the aggressor’s terms,
or is subdued, the fighting will not end. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 and the West’s campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan during this century have
shown us what insurgencies can mean for an occupying force.
So, while research efforts into the conflict in Ukraine examine what aspects of
war’s character might have changed, they would do well to consider war’s nature
as well. The result might have serious implications for policies of defense and
deterrence in Eastern Europe where conventional forces backed by trained and
equipped irregulars might prove cost-effective indeed.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
In sum, research into the conflict in Ukraine will offer a wealth of answers to
some fundamental questions in the field of strategic studies. Paradoxically, it will
also create more questions for academics to ponder. Moreover, each of the topics
discussed above informs the general context of the war in Ukraine in important
ways. Three of the explanations for the decline of major war, for instance, also
contributed to shaping Putin’s justifications for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Theories of strategic coercion, in turn, influenced the quality of each side’s thrusts
and parries. “War amongst the people” is still a valid way to frame modern conflict,
though it includes many more dimensions than its author originally conceived.
Finally, the motivational element of war’s nature has proven quite powerful
indeed in favor of one side and to the obvious detriment of the other.
What should military staff colleges, war colleges, and civilian programs for
strategic studies do while research is underway to determine what about the
character of war might have changed? First, they should encourage the further
exploration of these themes and others related to large-scale, interstate conflict by
hosting conferences and seminars where participants can exchange views. Second,
they should promote more research into the topic of major war by seeking funding
for grants and collaboration opportunities; the US Department of Defense can
help immensely by establishing or re-establishing a series of research grants and
fellowship programs, such as the Minerva program. Third, they should encourage
revisions to their core curricula to accommodate what some might describe as the
“return of major war” and find ways to incentivize faculty to offer electives covering
some of the aforementioned topics as well as other related themes. Fourth, all
academic and military educational institutions can increase the value of modern
war-gaming and simulations exercises by sponsoring or facilitating research that
adds to historical databases on armed conflicts; analytics enhanced by artificial
intelligence technologies can augment the cultivation of those databases. Finally,
both academe and military educational institutions should look for ways to bridge
the cultural gaps between them and to foster collaborative research; each has
valuable insights to offer to the study of armed conflict in all its manifestations.
If only the dead have seen the end of war, only the living can study it. And the
study of future war, to include its prevention and mitigation, can only take place in
the present.
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ABSTRACT: This article assesses the American-Russian economic relationship,
identifying how Russia exploits strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the
space below armed conflict and how the United States can modernize its economic
statecraft. It draws upon a wide range of comparative research, from US-Russian
military thought to the American-Eurasian economic interrelationship, to evaluate
the full range of economic statecraft within a single dyad of countries in the context
of coercion theory. This analysis will assist American policymakers in reforming
priorities and processes according to principles of economic statecraft to sustain
ongoing American coercion and set conditions for advantage upon the return to
bilateral competition.

Key words: geo-economics, economic statecraft, Russia, gray-zone
warfare, hybrid warfare, geopolitics

S

ince the 2014 Crimean crisis, American policy has attempted to coerce
Russia into abdicating its gains and to deter it from future aggression. But
from armed intervention and assassination to election meddling and energy
manipulation, American policy has failed to exact fundamental concessions.1 Russia’s
massing of troops and invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are only the most recent
signals of the US government’s inability to effect Russian behavioral change.
Today, the United States finds itself in a state of economic war with Russia.2
The United States has mobilized its economic instruments of power against Russia,
unleashing an unprecedented package of export, debt, banking, and individual
restrictions.3 Alhough the cascading externalities of deploying so many economic
weapons have yet to be determined, American economic action today will play center
stage in future Russo-Ukrainian deescalation, bilateral competition with Russia, and
the global financial system at large.4 The United States must exploit this opportunity
to shape the international and bilateral relationship to return to future competition

1. Thomas Wright, “Russia: What’s Old Is New Again,” in Melanie Sisson, James Siebens, and Barry Blechman,
eds., Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War (New York: Routledge, 2020), 132–45.
2. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020), 35–37.
3. Scott Anderson, Julia Friedlander, and Rachel Zeimba, “The Lawfare Podcast: Making Sense of the
Unprecedented Sanctions on Russia,” Lawfare (blog), March 1, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare
-podcast-making-sense-unprecedented-sanctions-russia.
4. Maxim Mirnov, “Why Strangling Russia’s Economy Could Backfire: Harsh Sanctions Could Make the
Country a Bigger, Badder North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/russia-fsu/2022-03-11/why-strangling-russias-economy-could-backfire; and Zongyuan Liu and Mihaela
Papa, “The Anti-Dollar Axis: Russia and China’s Plan to Evade US Economic Power,” Foreign Affairs (website),
March 7, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-07/anti-dollar-axis.
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on better terms.5 Not since the September 11 attacks has the United States been
presented such an open policy window to remake domestic and partner economic
relationships to improve US national security.6 This article looks to the past to
inform this future competition by examining why the United States has been
unable to translate its economic endowments into capable and credible force
against Russia in gray-zone competition.
This failure stems from a strategic misalignment: The conventional paradigm
of US deterrence policy is fundamentally misaligned with the core, nonmilitary
means of Russia’s gray-zone strategy. Chief among these largely misunderstood
means is an engine of licit and illicit economic interests. The policy of the United
States has largely stagnated in a Cold War paradigm of military and economic
deterrence. Today, though, the dollar and tools of economic statecraft are
mightier than the sword.7 Russian strategies of economic influence have seized
this initiative. Russia’s continued penchant for gray-zone aggression, according
to US intelligence estimates, reflects an assessment the West is either unwilling
or unable to inflict the requisite pain below the threshold of armed conflict.8
Coercion, the alignment of adversary incentives to induce desired behavior, is
akin to a negotiation; threats must evolve to reflect both a target’s interests and
competencies and the coercer’s changing leverage.9 Administrations may change
in the United States, but its Russian gray-zone policy problems remain the same.
Without a more robust counter to its economic statecraft, Russia will continue to
reap gains in future competition with the West.
This article proposes a revised policy program to achieve the coercion the United
States desires vis-à-vis Russia through economic statecraft (or the use of economic
tools as nonmilitary means to promote beneficial geopolitical and domestic
results).10 First, the article identifies shortfalls in US-Russian policy through the
lens of economic statecraft—how Russia achieved its gains, how American policy
stagnated, and how this asymmetry manifests in practice. The article then outlines
how the United States can modernize its economic tools, improving effectiveness
and efficiency to leverage the nation’s capacity for economic statecraft to establish
gray-zone deterrence through a triad of domestic coordination, international
cooperation, and transatlantic transparency.
5. Christopher Kolenda, Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong about War (Lexington: Kentucky
University Press, 2021), 1–17.
6. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs,
2013), 15–45.
7. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2016), 33–48; and Benn Steil and Robert Litan, Financial Statecraft: The Role of
Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 5–30.
8. National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections, ICA 2020-00078D (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, March 2021).
9. Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security
Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020).
10. Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means, 20.
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Translating Economic Coercion in the Gray Zone
The United States’ core problem in combating Russian gray-zone aggression is
one of latency. Despite both relative and absolute economic disadvantage, Russia
is better at mobilizing economic means into capable and credible force for two
reasons. First, the United States has failed to understand the changing nature of
the Russian security dilemma and the resulting emphasis on malign economic
coercion. Second, the United States has not adapted its logic and methods of
economic statecraft. This misalignment carries significant strategic problems
during bilateral, gray-zone competition because the United States has failed to
generate the domestic unity of effort, broad international enforcement, and
necessary measures of success required to deter Russia.

Strategic Misalignment and Economic Statecraft
Since the Cold War, Russian strategy has evolved based on Russia’s assessment
of the American-led threat of forging greater emphasis on nonmilitary means.
Russia observed a pattern of forcible regime change that exploited the changing
nature of war.11 Interventions in Iraq, the former nation of Yugoslavia, Haiti,
Afghanistan, and Libya exemplified how the United States wielded nonmilitary
means, including the use of economic sanctions and isolation to converge on a
state’s external and internal vulnerabilities.12 Consequently, Russian strategy
emphasizes the continuous use of nonmilitary means. Short of conflict, Russian
policy tools leverage licit and illicit methods, particularly in the informational
and financial domains, to establish favorable diplomatic conditions.13 Russian
nonmilitary action constantly seeks to suppress internal conflict from
US exploitation and to manipulate other states’ vulnerabilities.14 During conflicts,
Russia focuses on preemptive action across the country’s instruments of policy to
consolidate political gains.15 This approach increases adversaries’ costs and enables
crisis resolution on Russia’s terms, despite its material disadvantage.16

11. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking
the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January–February
2016): 24.
12. Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no.1 (January–February 2016): 32–34.
13. Heather Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern
Europe (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), 2–4.
14. Timothy Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” Military Review 97, no. 4
(July–August 2017): 38.
15. Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), 23.
16. Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2017), 7; and William Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case
for Its Revival (New York: Random House, 2019), 233.
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Malign economic influence underlies all components of Russian strategy,
particularly below the threshold of armed conflict.17 In practice, Russian strategy
functions along two tracks centered on economic statecraft. First, Russian
patronage networks exert direct and indirect pressure on a target state’s decision
making. Russian state entities and proxies exploit nontransparent economic
structures to influence democracies without attribution; this strategy is known
as “malign finance.”18 Russia exchanges financial, military, and technical support
with targeted individuals and groups for regime loyalty.19 Russia also reserves a
tremendous amount of resources for these networks. The country yields the
world’s largest system of crony capitalism. An estimated $300 billion of
oligarch money has left Russia since 2006, including at least $300 million to
malign finance.20
Second, Russia seeks dominance of strategic sectors—particularly energy,
military industry, and finance—through the manipulation of corporate ownership,
direct investment, bilateral trade, and private holdings.21 Together, these tracks
generate a pronounced information asymmetry, a condition in which one party
possesses superior understanding in one or more transactions, for Russia relative to
the Western free market.22 Russia applies these measures to exploit the preferences,
vulnerabilities, and resiliencies of target states, generating disproportionate
influence at a relatively low cost.23 These licit and illicit measures offer carrots
without the risk of uncertain capital markets or political conditionality. The
measures also form the “stick” that can effectively cripple a state’s sovereignty by
co-opting a target country’s sociopolitical elites.24 Russia has increasingly leveraged
these tools to destabilize target countries over time, perpetrating the vast majority
of world malign finance cases since 2013.25
17. Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement
of Peter B. Doran, president and chief executive officer of the Center for European Policy Analysis).
18. Josh Rudolph, Regulating the Enablers: How the US Treasury Should Prioritize Imposing Rules on
Professionals Who Endanger National Security by Handling Dirty Money (Washington, DC: Alliance for
Securing Democracy, September 2021), 9–10.
19. Conley et al., Kremlin Playbook, 13.
20. Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley, Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by
Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies (Washington, DC: Alliance for Securing
Democracy, August 2020), 61; and “Our Crony-Capitalism Index Offers a Window into Russia’s
Billionaire Wealth,” Economist (website), March 12, 2022, https://www.economist.com/finance-and
-economics/2022/03/12/our-crony-capitalism-index-offers-a-window-into-russias-billionaire-wealth.
21. Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Michael Carpenter, senior director of the Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement).
22. Nicholas Poitiers et al., “The Kremlin’s Gas Wars: How Europe Can Protect Itself from Russian
Blackmail,” Foreign Affairs (website), February 27, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/slovenia/2022-02-27/kremlins-gas-wars.
23. Ryan Orsini, “Guns, Butter, and Tweets: The Effectiveness of Modern Russian Statecraft” (master’s
thesis, Georgetown University, 2020), 13.
24. Conley et al., Kremlin Playbook, 2.
25. Rudolph and Morley, Covert Foreign Money, 65.
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These Russian tools counter two of the West’s main nonmilitary advantages:
economically interdependent alliance networks and the dollar-based sanction.
Russian economic statecraft generates “underbalancing” against the country
among Western allies.26 As a result, bilateral economic interests with Russia
attenuate the tendency for smaller states to band together in the face of Moscow’s
aggression. These interests also insulate Russian actors and systems targeted by
Western sanctions. Cyprus exemplifies how geopolitical underbalancing generates
perverse cycles of Russian influence. Russia dominates Cypriot investment inflow,
securing a financial foothold that shields oligarch assets and proliferates influence
across transatlantic political systems through offshore accounts.27 Russian
nonmilitary means exploit gaps in the international hierarchy and authority to
which the United States has grown accustomed, magnifying an ongoing decline in
American financial, military, technological, and informational power advantages.
In addition, the American deterrence policy has largely extended the
Cold War–era paradigms of coercion, misjudging and discounting Russia’s
changing security dilemma, and emphasizing nonmilitary means.28 The Cold
War emphasized military deterrence and the complementary means of economic
statecraft centered on sanction—actions designed for an era of limited economic
interdependence between the Soviet Union and NATO.29 The Cold War also
emphasized a linear conception of the political utility of force between nonmilitary
and military means along horizontal and vertical dimensions of escalation.30
Following the Soviet collapse, this paradigm drove a flawed deterrence strategy and
unnecessarily isolated Russia through predominantly military instruments.31 This
conceptual stagnation is even more damaging in the Putin era, in which Russia’s
malign economic activity exploits gaps in detection, attribution, and response.32
Further, gray-zone aggression during this era is often misattributed in Western
studies as a uniquely Russian way of war, resulting in a lack of critical review of
26. Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma, “Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The Case of Russia’s
Geostrategy and Its Effects on the EU,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 605.
27. Michael Peel, “Moscow on the Med: Cyprus and Its Russians,” Financial Times (website), updated
May 15, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/67918012-9403-11ea-abcd-371e24b679ed; and Paul Massaro
and Amelie Rausing, “Russia’s Weaponization of Corruption and Western Complicity,” Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (website), updated June 6, 2017, https://www.csce.gov/international
-impact/russia-s-weaponization-corruption-and-western-complicity?page=2.
28. Andrew Monaghan, Dealing with the Russians (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019), 93.
29. Robert Gates, “The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy: The United States Must Recover
the Full Range of Its Power,” Foreign Affairs (website), July/August 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/united-states/2020-06-02/robert-gates-overmilitarization-american-foreign-policy.
30. Forrest Morgan et al., Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2008), 18–23.
31. Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War
Can—and Can’t—Do Now,” Foreign Affairs (website), March/April 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/united-states/2013-02-11/lost-logic-deterrence.
32. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2022), 150–64.
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the United States’ nonmilitary weaponry during competition.33 Without strategic
empathy for Russia and the larger geopolitical context, the United States lacked
the ability to sequence and vary military and nonmilitary force combinations
appropriately.34 Thus, the sanction, one of the United States’ primary weapons in
gray-zone competition, has become overused, despite the tool’s ineffectiveness,
which results from its lack of precision.35 Unable and unwilling to adapt, the
United States yielded many of the post–Cold War advantages the nation could
have used in its coercion policy against Russia.
Since the 2013–14 Ukraine crisis, this outdated concept has increasingly led
to a misunderstanding of Russia’s means and an overestimation of American
actions. Western sanctions negatively impacted Russian gross domestic product,
international reserves, and concentrated losses within the Russian defense, energy,
and equity markets following the 2013–14 crisis.36 The purpose of sanctions
is always multifaceted in practice, and US-led action raised the cost of Russian
noncompliance by removing resources available for various Kremlin objectives.37
However, the direct effect of American sanctions on Russia after the Crimean
crisis, has been overstated.38
Commonly used measures of pain inflicted by sanctions (such as damage to
Russian markets and gross domestic product) now appear to be driven primarily
by modern oil-price volatility.39 Meanwhile, other tools of economic statecraft,
including a wealth of financial and monetary tools (such as cross-border flows),
continue to receive little attention in American literature and policy. Thus, although
overt military aggression subsided, Russia continues to implement its asymmetric
strategy. If coercion truly occurs “in the mind of the potential aggressor,” then
American policy has fallen short.40 For Russia, economic sanctions, military
posturing, and diplomatic isolation are modest costs compared to the strategic
benefit of aggression.

33. Ilmari Käihkö, “The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the Military
Profession,” Parameters 51, no. 3 (2021): 117–20, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/11/.
34. H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper Collins,
2020), 15–16.
35. Daniel Drezner, “The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion,”
Foreign Affairs 100, no. 5 (September/October 2021): 142–54.
36. Giorgio Castagneto-Gissey and Eugene Nivorozhkin, “No Contagion from Russia toward
Global Equity Markets after the 2015 International Sanctions,” Economic Analysis and Policy 52,
issue C (2016): 79; and Cory Welt et al., US Sanctions on Russia, RL45415 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, updated January 2022), 46–52.
37. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 20–23.
38. Evsey Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy, “The Impact of Financial Sanctions on the Russian Economy,”
Russian Journal of Economics 1, no. 4 (2015): 359.
39. Christian Dreger et al., “Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and
Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble,” Journal of Comparative Economics 44, no. 2 (May 2016): 295.
40. Karl P. Mueller, “Conventional Deterrence Redux: Avoiding Great Power Conflict in the 21st
Century,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 78.
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Bleeding Coercion: Manifestations of the Problem in Practice
American misalignment manifests in a policy that lacks domestic unity of
effort, broad international enforcement, and necessary measures of success, each of
which is an important component of effective economic statecraft.41 Despite the
country’s raw economic potential, the United States’ chronic inability to organize
and deploy economic statecraft has continued to undercut the desired coercive
effect during gray-zone conflict.
First, American policy has lacked unity of effort, resulting in reactionary and
convoluted economic actions. Economic coercion for both short-term compellence
and long-term containment works best if the conditions that trigger and remove
sanctions are known.42 But as American policy consensus has evolved, US strategy
has been applied inconsistently in response to discrete Russian behavior.43 Before
February 2022, ambitious sanction packages showed all signs of political mission
creep, penalizing an ever-expanding range of behaviors from Ukraine to humanrights violations and rogue regime support.44 Unlike other policy tools, such as
diplomatic pressure and military deployment, economic sanction rollout has often
been piecemeal.45
Additionally, the implementation of the policy has suffered from competing
goals and expectations among branches and agencies of the US government,
particularly between Congress and the president.46 Though desynchronization
across agencies may typify US policy, the effect of this desynchronization has been
particularly insidious given the persistent nature of Russia’s malign influence. This
asymmetry has allowed Russia to allocate its economic means over time more
efficiently. The asymmetry has also reduced the United States’ overall coercive
effect, convoluting desired objectives and drawing resources away from Russia’s
most significant vulnerabilities.
A lack of broad international enforcement has also marred American policy.
International cooperation enables economic coercion by minimizing third-party
actors’ ability to offset or nullify intended effects.47 American unilateralism,
however, is first and foremost limited in terms of modality. Although tools of
41. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 143–49.
42. Drezner, “United States of Sanctions,” 152–53.
43. Michael Carpenter, “How to Make Sanctions on Russia Work,” National Interest (website),
December 18, 2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/18/how-to-make-sanctions-on-russia
-work/.
44. Welt et al., US Sanctions on Russia, 29–35.
45. Eugene Rumer and Richard Soklosky, Thirty Years of US Policy toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle
Be Broken? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), 33.
46. Edward Fishman, “How to Fix America’s Failing Sanctions Policy,” Lawfare (blog), updated
June 4, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-fix-americas-failing-sanctions-policy#.
47. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 143–49.
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economic statecraft cover a wide area of financial, fiscal, trade, and monetary
policy, US-Russian policy has been limited to direct economic sanctions.48
American unilateralism has also been defined by limited international
cooperation. The United States’ economic actions have been increasingly
independent of the initial response to the Crimean crisis. Russian economic
interdependence and statecraft have exploited the unanimous consent
requirements of the EU, producing collective underbalancing against Russia
as states have sought to protect national energy and patronage interests.49
Multinational coordination has largely been isolated to the military sphere,
centering on the NATO European Deterrence Initiative and expenditure
requirements.50 Countries have fed upon each other via this unilateralism,
generating further deleterious effects. Reliance on sanctions threatens
partner-country sovereignty and reduces the range of cooperative policy options.
Reliance on independent action reduces domestic political willingness for more
substantive economic tools beyond sanctions. These fractures have weakened
the intended coercive effect by reducing the breadth and depth of overall
Western capability and signaling collective hesitance to use available means.
Finally, American economic coercion has lacked a nuanced method of
measuring success. The confounding nature of economic coercion, among
other nonmilitary means, requires a refined understanding of the effectiveness
of economic statecraft.51 During the Cold War, Soviet defense spending
assessments became important determinants of success.52 However, modern
US policy chronically underestimates Russia’s economic resilience during grayzone competition. For years, Russia studied the economic coercion of the United
States and mitigated the former’s economic vulnerability in relation to the
latter by slowly diversifying the former’s trade, reserve holdings, and payments
systems.53 Licitly, Russia took deliberate action to withstand economic pressure
by maintaining a large petroleum market share, low debt levels, and extensive
nondollar reserve holdings.54 Illicitly, Russian patronage networks have allowed
the Kremlin to bail out targeted officials and firms, compensating them with
48. Jonathan Falcone, “The People’s Bank of China’s Monetary Armament: Capabilities and Limitations of
Evolving Institutional Power,” Military Review (July–August 2020): 71–83.
49. Welt et al., US Sanctions on Russia, 39–44.
50. David Shlapak, The Russian Challenge (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 8–9.
51. Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2022), 295–97.
52. Barry Watts, “Net Assessment in the Era of Superpower Competition,” in Net Assessment and
Military Strategy: Retrospective and Prospective Essays, ed. Thomas Mahnken (New York: Cambria Press,
2020), 27–72.
53. Vadim Grishin, “The Economic Factors in U.S.-Russian Relations,” Program on New Approaches to
Research and Security in Eurasia (website), July 11, 2021, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-economic-factors
-in-u-s-russian-relations/.
54. Countering Russia: Assessing New Tools, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Daleep Singh, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s
Global Business and Economics Program).
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contracts, subsidies, and other rents.55 Russia’s successful use of nonmilitary means
to resist American sanctions reveals the symbolic and ineffective nature of US
economic policy.
Coercion is a form of negotiation in which an adversary signals its willingness
and capacity to hurt.56 Russian behavior signaled the country could withstand
the tools the West was willing and able to use below the threshold of armed
conflict. If the United States does not change its coercion strategy, the country
should only expect continued policy failure.

Modernizing US-Russian Policy through Improved Economic Statecraft
The United States must refocus its economic statecraft policy vis-à-vis Russia
to realign nonmilitary means and counter the illicit activities at the core of Russia’s
economic advantage. In short, the United States must create and signal additional
capacity to hurt Russia economically. This policy modernization achieves one
overarching goal—to build and focus economic means toward “latent force,” or the
withheld threat of violence.57 A more holistic and effective US strategy requires a
reassertion of three mutually supporting policy principles: domestic coordination,
international cooperation, and transatlantic transparency.

Figure 1: Policy response triad

Domestic Coordination
For decades, American economic statecraft has taken a back seat, lacking
vertical integration with jurisdictions spread across multiple agencies and
55. Carpenter, “Sanctions on Russia.”
56. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 3.
57. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.
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horizontal integration to generate the holistic capability necessary to combat a
wide-ranging threat like Russia’s malign influence.58
Better domestic integration requires a realignment of Russian policy talent.
Although the Biden administration recently created a short-term Task Force
KleptoCapture aimed at the wealth of Russian oligarchs, a more sustained effort
is needed.59 One mechanism of improved integration could feature a standing
National Security Council task force that focuses on Russian influence due to
its increasing centrality to US executive action.60 The United States’ combatant
commands, such as United States European Command, represent another way
to promote coordination. Both options provide the cultural, diplomatic, and
intelligence expertise to build economic statecraft preemptively into current,
future, and contingency operations.
Regardless of the format, these structures should join members of the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, and the Office of the US Trade Representative.61
This interagency group serves three core roles:

•

Assess the changing Russian vulnerabilities to American economic
leverage.

•
•

Evaluate the effectiveness of US policy allocations over time.
Ensure the coordination of economic statecraft in interagency
campaign planning during competition and crisis.62

Economic tools must remain dynamic in response to changing licit and illicit
economic market forces. These policy and theater-level constructs (for example,
closing loopholes in existing policy or preemptively establishing triggers for
implementation) can synchronize the intended goals of economic coercion and
tailor policy over time to improve effectiveness.63
58. David H. McCormick, Charles E. Luftig, and James M. Cunningham, “Economic Might, National
Security, and the Future of American Statecraft,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 2020):
20–22.
59. Aruna Viswanatha, “DOJ Fleshes Out Aims of Its Anti-Oligarch ‘KleptoCapture’ Task Force,” Wall Street
Journal (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-11
/card/doj-fleshes-out-aims-of-its-anti-oligarch-kleptocapture-task-force-lzw2ejB6MwRCkq796NeH.
60. Undermining Democracy (statement of Michael Carpenter); and John Gants, White House Warriors
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2019), 209.
61. Michael O’Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 151.
62. Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng, A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive
Economic Measures in the US-China Relationship (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
April 2020), 40–44.
63. Fishman, “How to Fix.”
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Another mechanism for improving unity of effort is organizational priority.
Unlike in the defense, intelligence, and diplomatic communities, no standing
interagency process for publishing documents related to reoccurring, national,
economic statecraft strategy exists.64 Such a process would allow the relevant
agencies to signal, coordinate, and assess a major pivot in economic statecraft—
for instance, to begin prioritizing the countering of authoritarian influence over
the countering of the financing of terrorism, thereby transitioning the interagency
from a legacy policy developed after the September 11 attacks.65
A final mechanism of integration is by way of legal process. The US legal code
inhibits sharing financial information related to law enforcement and national
security—a gap readily exploited by Russian actors seeking to obfuscate any ties
to the Kremlin or its proxies.66 The United States needs a more suitable way of
negotiating anti-money laundering (AML) consistent with citizens’ data privacy
protections.67 Currently, federal agencies operate through a patchwork of laws
to navigate restrictive and outdated provisions, such as the 1974 Privacy Act.
Legal code reform is necessary for enabling whole-of-government AML processes
that extend civil-liberty protections to cover the data protection needs of modern
society.68 Designed to support federal law enforcement and private-business needs,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act represents a reform model for building
an apparatus that improves financial intelligence gathering within the American
banking system without infringing upon civil liberties.69
When coupled with a coordinating interagency body and proper prioritization,
legal process reform offers an impressive tool against malign economic influence
within the broader American financial system. Consider the example of negative
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States externalities. The
committee’s reforms are widely credited with limiting potentially subversive
foreign direct investment inflow into the United States.70 Although restricting
foreign direct investment inflow is sometimes an appropriate policy goal, it is not
an unalloyed good. Preventing licit foreign direct investment inflow also generates
the negative externality of licit but unattributable or illicit inflows. Without
64. Drezner, “United States of Sanctions,” 152.
65. Rudolph and Morley, Covert Foreign Money, 60.
66. Jack Reed, “Russian Financial Influence,” Congressional Record 164, no. 36 (2018): S1268–S1271;
and Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Laura Rosenberger, director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy and senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund of the United States).
67. “Losing the War: The War against Money Laundering Is Being Lost,” Economist (website),
April 17, 2022, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/04/12/the-war-against-money
-laundering-is-being-lost.
68. Jill I. Goldenziel and Manal Cheema, “New Fighting Words?: How US Law Hampers the Fight
against Information Warfare,” Journal of Constitutional Law 22, no. 1 (November 2019): 168.
69. Goldenziel and Cheema, “New Fighting Words?,” 136.
70. Rosenberg, Harrell, and Feng, New Arsenal for Competition, 16.
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proper assessment and monitoring, this dynamic might generate an offsetting
effect representing a net loss for American interests.71 Armed with a legal process
similar to that codified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, an interagency
coordinating body could assess and refine policy over time.
Improved domestic coordination demonstrates national determination and
the capacity to deliver economic pain consistently over time. Relative to the
United States, Russia benefits from the longevity of its senior civilian and
military leaders, enabling the pursuit of consistent strategy. On the other hand,
Russia has long believed US policy is erratic due to the US electoral process and
political incentive structure, thereby creating vulnerability to political warfare.72
A more sustainable model of domestic coordination that is aligned to both
interagency requirements and national values delivers a powerful coercive effect by
addressing these perceived weaknesses.

International Cooperation
Improved international cooperation is essential for generating broad
enforcement of strategy vis-à-vis Russia. The United States must be realistic,
developing politically feasible options for partner countries to minimize
underbalancing. First, the United States should seek unity of effort within
like-minded structures—both established international organizations and
incipient regional organizations. Second, when the United States must
challenge economic paradigms, it must ruthlessly prioritize them.
Improved financial regulation and intelligence sharing represent one avenue
of international cooperation. Today, the global AML system suffers from critical
structural flaws because most governments have unsuccessfully outsourced
regulation to the private sector, leaving pockets of excellence balkanized within
Western financial intelligence.73 The United States should augment the personnel
and budgetary resources of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Intelligence
Unit (the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) and partner it with similar
state institutions overseas—notably, the Group of Seven’s Financial Action Task
Force and affiliated regional organizations.74
Additionally, the United States can bolster political support for the EU
Directorate-General for Competition. This office’s actions against stateowned enterprises such as Gazprom serve as an emerging check on malign
71. James Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), RL33388
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated July 2018), 41–43.
72. Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2020), 5–8.
73. “Losing the War.”
74. “Losing the War.”
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economic influence. In 2018, the office’s investigation of Gazprom’s gas-market
monopolization prompted Russia to make concessions in its long-term gas
pricing to avoid a multibillion-euro fine. These market-oriented concessions
threaten Gazprom’s future domination of the Eurasian energy sector and build
advance cooperation on geo-economic action (such as regulation and sanctions),
thereby minimizing tendencies for political compromise or underbalancing that
dilutes effectiveness.75
The United States can also improve cooperation by fostering independence
from Russian gas imports. For decades, natural gas served as a critical bridge of
mutual dependence from Russia to Europe.76 Thus, the United States must work
with the current of European gas politics to manage the broad, international
coalition required for sanction efficacy. First, the United States should adopt a
“small yard but high fence” concept to protect the most critical American sanctions
against Russia. This approach prioritizes the prevention of Western investment
and technology transfer to Russia’s energy sector—a major, long-term liability to
regime survivability because Russia requires technological innovation to access
and exploit its vast reserves in the Poluostrov Yamal.77 These sanctions threaten the
future market dominance of Russia’s state-owned energy firms, the Kremlin’s most
controllable geo-economic asset.78
Gas independence also requires American support for European energy and
investment diversification by promoting regional energy competition that decreases
the Russian market share. To reduce the importation of energy, the United States
can promote other European options, such as north-south connectors with Nordic
and Mediterranean nations, the recently opened EU Southern Gas Corridor,
or the expansion of European access to imports of liquefied natural gas.79 This
short-term diversification of European energy can replace as much as 60 percent
of current Russian-gas imports.80 Imports of liquefied natural gas to Europe
represent a Russian economic vulnerability as Russia’s legacy pipeline delivery
systems decrease in market efficiency.81

75. Mathew Heim, How Can European Competition Law Address Market Distortions Caused by State-Owned
Enterprises?, Policy Contribution Issue No. 18 (Brussels: Bruegel, December 2019).
76. Thane Gustafson, The Bridge: Natural Gas in a Redivided Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2020), 5–10.
77. Countering Russia: Assessing New Tools, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Leon Aron, resident scholar and director of Russian studies at the
American Enterprise Institute).
78. Ion Iftimie, Natural Gas: As an Instrument of Russian State Power (Washington, DC: Westphalia Press,
2014), 103–5.
79. Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means, 205–9.
80. “Can the World Cope without Russia’s Commodity Stash?,” Economist (website), updated
March 14, 2022, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/03/12/can-the-world-cope
-without-russias-huge-commodity-stash.
81. Gustafson, Bridge, 312–14.
TOC

48

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

To replace market investment opportunities, the United States can negotiate
bilateral investment treaties to liberalize private capital flows and reduce the risk
of Russian state economic capture.82 In particular, the United States can support
burgeoning green-energy production by leveraging the sector’s increasing regional
technological advances and political salience.83 Ultimately, the Europeans would
best achieve this diversification. The United States should support a continental
gas strategy that collectively assesses individual country exposure, shifts excess
stocks within the euro area, and establishes funds to compensate countries and
sectors damaged from ongoing economic sanctions.84
Financial regulation improvement and European gas-trade independence
will require the United States to withhold economic force selectively through
other inducements. One way is leveraging Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List exemptions for key political concessions in the
Russian-gas relationship. Formally known as licensing, this process temporarily
suspends economic sanctions in return for progress on desired objectives.85 The
United States should apply these tools on a bilateral or limited, multilateral
basis as needed to mitigate the effects of regional underbalancing. Alternatively,
the United States can selectively apply exemptions to foster competition among
Russia’s burgeoning independent gas producers who increasingly threaten Russia’s
state-sponsored dominance of gas exports.86 Another positive inducement is
providing diplomatic and economic clarity for Western firms to reenter the
Eurasian market as sanctions are reduced.87 This strategy could include clear
messaging about the triggers for sanction imposition and removal as well as
financial safeguards (such as capital liquidity and tax provisions). A final critical
economic inducement should seek to preserve third-party country access,
including that of China, to American, European, and US-dollar markets.
Transatlantic market access is an important incentive for minimizing Russian
sanction leakage by third parties, such as China.88
Alliances and partnerships inherently come with trade-offs. Opportunity cost
abounds in the prioritization of financial intelligence and energy independence.
But these mechanisms are rarely used to communicate commitment. As the
leader of a diverse coalition of allies, the United States must welcome trade-offs
amongst allies to secure a common purpose and key coercive tools.
82. “Bilateral Investment Treaties,” Office of the United States Trade Representative (website), accessed
March 18, 2022, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties.
83. Gustafson, Bridge, 355.
84. Poitiers et al., “Kremlin’s Gas Wars.”
85. Fishman, “How to Fix.”
86. Gustafson, Bridge, 291–316.
87. Drezner, “United States of Sanctions,” 152–54.
88. Liu and Papa, “Anti-Dollar Axis.”
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Transatlantic Transparency
Finally, the United States can modernize its economic firepower by
increasing the transparency of cross-border financial transactions. Data may
not be “the new oil,” but data are the key to understanding the allocation and
effectiveness of Russian economic means. As the preeminent global hub
for economic transactions, the West’s privileged access to financial flows
is its premier means of network power to exert international influence.89
In practice, Russia’s malign influence exploits state-level variations of
financial law and regulation to avoid attribution and complicate response.
Since 2006, just 17 percent of known malign Russian finance cases have been
illicit.90 Transparency is also constrained by evolving financial engineering and
reporting procedures (such as electronic currency procedures and alternate
clearing mechanisms). Financial operations that are not dollar-denominated, such
as Bitcoin, Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, and central bank digital
currencies, threaten future American advantage vis-à-vis Russia. These forms of
exchange decrease US financial access, placing bank liabilities directly within the
citizenry or outside the US-dominated commercial bank structure.91 Privileged
data access is a key US policy tool, and regulation-based financial transparency is
essential to maintaining the strength of this tool.
Financial transparency improvement begins by closing loopholes in the
transatlantic alliance structure. The New York City-, London-, and Brusselsbased financial industry continues to dominate global market flows. The industry
is also the hub of most global financial transparency mechanisms as states have
increasingly decentralized AML enforcement to the commercial banking sector.92
The United States should work with transatlantic financial organizations to
improve international financial transparency standards, such as defining the
ultimate beneficiaries of limited liability.93
The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 presents one opportunity. This law
requires first-time disclosure of individual ownership of an underlying financial
equity to the Department of the Treasury.94 The act is not without drawbacks.
The law does not cover pooled investment vehicles (such as trusts or privateequity funds), nor does it augment resources to administrate and oversee the
89. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks
Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42.
90. Rudolph and Morley, Covert Foreign Money, 10.
91. Francesca Carapella and Jean Flemming, “Central Bank Digital Currency: A Literature Review,” Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (website), updated November 9, 2020, https://www.federalreserve
.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/central-bank-digital-currency-a-literature-review-20201109.htm.
92. “Losing the War.”
93. Undermining Democracy (statement of Laura Rosenberger).
94. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395,
116th Cong. (2021).
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reporting.95 Nonetheless, the act represents a major milestone for improving
the financial community’s financial transparency standards and enforcement.
The law is one of many ways the United States can improve the transatlantic
financial system. The Biden administration could eliminate exceptions to the
USA PATRIOT Act that allow exemptions from AML provisions for real estate
and luxury transportation dealers.96 The administration could also implement
section 885 of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires
beneficial ownership reporting within federal acquisition databases.97 Finally,
Congress can pass the ENABLERS Act, which would establish more financial
transparency requirements (such as beneficial ownership reporting) for US law,
real estate, and accounting firms.98
Transparency can also come from improved international financial institution
reporting. The inability of international financial institutions to manage changing
financial engineering trends over time contributes to the institutions’ increasing
insignificance and enables Kremlin operations.99 For instance, definitions of key
bilateral flows (such as hydrocarbons and military expenditures and investment)
and remittance flows vary across states and institutions, making Russian means
more obscure.100 Limited reform of international financial institutions could
streamline financial flow accounting and authorize penalties for actors who violate
revised transparency norms. Such reform could also support the construction
of databases for law enforcement and intelligence that could contain beneficial
ownership and transaction history information.101
Transatlantic financial transparency is crucial to building the latent economic
force required to coerce Russia and combat its malign influence. Armed with this
knowledge, the United States can design more effective sanctions and market
pressures or reallocate support that builds resilience in key states and sectors. More
importantly, the consolidation of transparency norms among a global coalition
would be a critical signal to the Kremlin and build future capability to monitor
and penalize Russia’s malign influence.

95. Thomas Bogle et al., Congress Enacts Significant Changes to the US Anti-Money Laundering Regime
(Philadelphia: Dechert LLP, February 2021), 3.
96. Jodi Vittori, “Biden Must Go beyond Sanctions to Rid the US Financial System of Dirty Money,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), March 8, 2022, https://carnegieendowment
.org/2022/03/08/biden-must-go-beyond-sanctions-to-rid-u.s.-financial-system-of-dirty-money-pub-86589.
97. Vittori, “Biden Must Go.”
98. Vittori, “Biden Must Go.”
99. McCormick, Luftig, and Cunningham, “Economic Might,” 18.
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Communicating Commitment to the Financial Industry
Democracies often struggle to communicate resolve to their targets due to
the strength and quantity of various interest groups.102 The limiting factor for
US economic coercion is not capacity; instead, the limiting factor is coordination
and communication. Despite its dominant position in international financial
markets, the United States’ inability to control outbound investment by private
citizens severely weakens its financial sanctions.103 Fueled by competition among
transatlantic banking firms, the financial lobby has grown in strength since
the 1980s, achieving a broad trend of deregulation.104 In many ways, this lobby
exemplifies the domestic and international challenges facing the United States
vis-à-vis Russian economic statecraft. The United States must work with the
industry through moral suasion, market incentives, or failure of risk reform.
One way to realign incentives is by signaling the use of section 311 of the
USA PATRIOT Act against Russian malign financial networks. Section 311
compels American banks to guard the sanctity of the American financial system
against illicit financial activity by designated groups. Whereas market forces
usually weaken conventional trade sanctions, section 311 leverages these structures
as banks naturally seek to protect their access to private-market liquidity.105 Section
311 combines governmental suasion and market incentives into a powerful,
geo-economic weapon for safeguardomg the larger American financial system.
Since its inception, section 311 has aligned US and industry goals as banks have
moved out of self-interest to isolate the laundering and threat financing of state
actors and terrorist networks.106 The threat of section-311 action following ongoing
economic sanctions on the Russian banking system would be a powerful signal of
more latent force and increased targeting of malign finance.
With proper signaling, the United States can use this tool to align state and
market goals, influencing financial industry reform without formally triggering
section 311. The strength of section 311 derives from potential use, leveraging
market pressures to align the goals of banks and government against money
laundering practices. Numerous actions could increase the perceived plausibility
of section-311 action. The United States could provide planning guidance for
banks to deleverage Russia-linked liabilities. In addition, the United States
could create Federal Reserve liquidity provision vehicles to support banking
systems. Alternatively, the United States could take on financial lobby influence
102. Biddle, “Coercion Theory.”
103. Steil and Litan, Financial Statecraft, 159–62.
104. Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crisis Changed the World (New York:
Viking, 2018), 79–82.
105. Benjamin Cohen, Currency Statecraft: Monetary Rivalry and Geopolitical Ambition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2019), 123.
106. Zarate, Treasury’s War, 151–58.
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by strengthening Foreign Agents Registration Act provisions and passing
federal defamation law to restrict baseless libel claims.107 Finally, the United
States could promote a voluntary code of conduct amongst leading US banks
to resist Russia’s malign economic influence, encouraging both public-private
transparency and cooperation.108 Fundamentally, the United States signals a
commitment by consistently executing economic statecraft, including herding its
powerful financial system.

Conclusion: Consolidating Economic Gains in the Gray Zone
Acknowledgment that potential adversaries such as Russia have studied and
countered the United States’ capabilities and willingness to use military coercion
since the Persian Gulf War is almost axiomatic.109 Much less appreciated is
potential adversaries have studied and countered the American economic
playbook. For years, Russia has exploited a fundamental misalignment in the
United States’ deterrence policy through licit and illicit economic means to
a gain relative advantage in gray-zone competition. Although US policy has
stagnated and suffered from a lack of domestic unity of effort, broad international
enforcement, and transparent measures of success, Russia has continued to shape
and complicate the human, physical, and informational dimensions of the modern
operating environment for American strategists, military leaders, and diplomats.
The United States’ economic statecraft must return the favor. A combination
of mutually reinforcing domestic integration, international coordination, and
transatlantic transparency tailored toward unique Russian economic weaknesses
would allow the United States to organize, galvanize, and prioritize its ways and
means more effectively.
As the United States participates in the largest war in Europe since
World War II, the nation should heed the lessons of postwar peace. The
institutions developed and refined in the 1940s—from the Bretton Woods
system to the UN—fundamentally altered the political and economic context
to thwart Soviet goals.110 At times, improved foreign and domestic economic
coordination and transparency will strain the United States’ geopolitical
position. This strain, however, is the necessary pain of long-term coalition
management.111 Today, the United States stands at the beginning of an
107. Phillip Zelikow et al., “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft,” Foreign
Affairs (website), July/August 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/risestrategic-corruption.
108. Rosenberg, Harrell, and Feng, New Arsenal for Competition, 48.
109. Brian Steed, “Narrative in Culture, Center of Gravity, and the Golden Azimuth,” in Great Power
Competition: The Changing Landscape of Global Geopolitics, ed. Mahir Ibrahimov (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2020), 231–54.
110. Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great Power Rivalry Today
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 30–47.
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unprecedented economic war with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. The
United States must simultaneously set conditions to sustain its coalition for
long-term economic coercion and return to competition on better terms. During
a conflict, the distinction between success and failure is most fragile. Good
strategy, however, consolidates gains to make them endure.112 Largely undeterred
by previous US gray-zone policy, Russia has aggressively exploited this arena
to gain geostrategic advances. Under unprecedented economic strain, Russia is
likely to need its gray-zone advantage now more than ever. The United States
should harness the domestic and international policy window created by the
2022 Russo-Ukrainian war to consolidate the former’s economic gains, thereby
denying strategic opportunity to Russia.
The United States must achieve objectives in the space between war and
peace in a manner commensurate with the nation’s values and means. This
imperative and the associated future coercive objectives potentially represent the
United States’ preeminent foreign policy challenge in the twenty-first century.
Russia is one test. On this battlefield, the dollar is stronger than the sword.
The United States’ strategy must adapt and reform priorities and processes to
wield its best weapons. Economic statecraft can no longer be a complementary
effort; rather, economic statecraft must be the decisive force in generating the
desired coercive strategy.

Ryan J. Orsini
Major Ryan J. Orsini, US Army, is an infantry officer assigned as a student at
the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds
a master of public policy degree from Georgetown University.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues shortfalls in the international institutions
governing the Arctic have allowed Russia and China to expand control over the
region. It provides an overview of regional governance and power dynamics, outlines
a three-part approach to correcting deficiencies, highlights attempts by Russia and
China to circumvent international governance, examines how the Arctic’s governing
institutions address Russian and Chinese growth in the region, and focuses on
the institutional failures that have allowed Russia and China to expand—failures
academic scholarship and US policy have not adequately addressed. Practitioners
will find specific steps for rectifying issues with Arctic institutions to support the
United States’ interests in the region.
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ince the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arctic has been deemed a bastion
of peaceful international cooperation. Observers credit effective
intergovernmental organizations and universally respected international
agreements with maintaining this prolonged period of cooperation. Recently, however,
global focus on the region has increased. A reduction in ice due to climate change
has exposed the Arctic’s potential for resource extraction and commercial shipping.
As the region’s strategic value has increased, the current “rules-based order” has
become incapable of effectively safeguarding American interests.1 A critical
assessment of Russian activity over the past two decades demonstrates Moscow’s
growing willingness to exploit weaknesses in international institutions to expand
Russia’s military and economic control over the region. China has also manipulated
international institutions to establish itself in the region. Washington’s reliance on
the existing, rules-based order to maintain cooperation in the Arctic is insufficient.
The institutions that regulate international politics in the Arctic now require
critical updates to prevent the United States’ two primary geopolitical rivals from
continuing to expand control in the region.
To safeguard its Arctic interests, the United States must develop more effective
international institutions in the region. It must commit to establishing international
consensus on the neutral status of Arctic shipping routes, establish a new forum in
which to discuss and monitor economic and military activity in the region, and lead
1. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2019).
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the creation of a multilateral defense agreement in the Arctic that binds key
regional allies in mutual defense against Russian and Chinese expansionism. This
three-step approach would resolve critical gaps in Arctic governance and ensure
the United States is prepared to protect its future interests as the Arctic region
increasingly becomes a site for international competition.

Arctic Governance
A variety of organizations and agreements govern conduct between states in
the Arctic, including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (coordinates coast guard
operations), the Svalbard Treaty (regulates activity on the Svalbard Islands), and
the International Maritime Organization (standardizes maritime practices).
However, the two most influential institutions in the region are the Arctic Council
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The Arctic Council, initially formed by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, brings
together key Arctic players to discuss the major issues facing the region and
develop cooperative solutions. The core of the Arctic Council is comprised of eight
permanent Arctic state members: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (representing
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden,
and the United States. These states have full deliberative and voting rights on
all council activities, and chairmanship rotates between the permanent members
every two years. The council also includes six representatives of Arctic indigenous
groups as permanent participants (who can speak about issues but cannot vote)
and 13 non-Arctic-state observers. China has participated as a non-Arctic-state
observer since 2013. Key priorities include environmental protection, sustainable
resource usage, and support to Arctic communities. Six working groups coordinate
research and discussions on these key areas.
Since its inception, the Arctic Council has led Arctic governance and
successfully promoted international cooperation on environmental protection
and sustainable development. Despite these successes, the council’s governing
capacity is limited due to significant gaps in the council’s ability to regulate
commercial activity. Per the council’s charter, discussion of military activity is not
authorized in the forum.2 As economic and military interests increasingly form
the foundation of Arctic strategies, the council’s inability to address these interests
will decrease the organization’s effectiveness in regulating international conduct in
the region.
In May 2008, the five Arctic littoral states—Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia, and the United States—met in Ilulissat, Greenland, to agree upon a
2. Arctic States, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Tromsø, NO: Arctic Council,
September 1996).
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legal framework for governing the Arctic Ocean.3 In the resulting agreement,
the Ilulissat Declaration, the signatories agreed to maintain peaceful
cooperation in the region and resolve territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean
through the tenets of the UNCLOS.4 The treaty, signed in 1982, gives a country
the legal right to exercise sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles off the country’s
coastlines and rights to explore and exploit resources up to 200 miles off
the continental shelf in an area referred to as an “exclusive economic zone.”5
A state can manage and extract resources beyond the 200-mile zone if the area is
determined to be a natural continuation of the state’s continental shelf. A state
must submit a claim to alter the internationally recognized continental-shelf limit
to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for approval.6
Historically, UNCLOS has managed territorial disputes in the Arctic
Ocean well enough to prevent major conflict in the region. As climate change
reduces Arctic ice coverage and opens the region to increased commercial
activity, unresolved territorial claims threaten regional peace. Multiple states
have competing claims to expand their exclusive economic zones to include
newly accessible, resource-rich sections of the Arctic seabed. Canada, Denmark,
Norway, and Russia have overlapping claims for exclusive economic rights over
the Lomonosov Ridge, a resource-rich, 1,100-mile underwater feature stretching
across the Arctic Ocean, asserting the feature is part of the continental shelf.7
Additionally, both Canada and Russia claim the channels between the islands
off their northern coastlines are “internal waters” and can be governed like
sovereign territory.8 Other states with interests in the region—particularly the
United States—dispute this claim. Therefore, the critical question of whether
key Arctic shipping routes—the Northwest Passage in Canada’s case and the
Northeast Passage (also known as the Northern Sea Route) in Russia’s case—
are international waters or sovereign territory remains unresolved.9 As Arctic
territory becomes more strategically and commercially valuable, territorial disputes
left unresolved by UNCLOS will continue to escalate tensions in the region.

3. Governments of Denmark, Canada, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States of
America, Ilulissat Declaration (Ilulissat, GL: Arctic Ocean Conference, May 2008).
4. Governments of Denmark, Canada, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States of
America, Ilulissat Declaration.
5. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (New York: UN, December 1982).
6. Geir Hønneland, International Politics in the Arctic: Contested Borders, Natural Resources, and Russian
Foreign Policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 271.
7. Michael T. Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2019), 134.
8. Ariel Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic: Challenges to US Energy and Geopolitics in the High North,”
in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russia in the Arctic (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College Press, 2011), 13.
9. Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic,” 27.
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Russia and China in the Arctic
The Arctic was a site of conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union throughout the Cold War. However, for the past three decades, strategic
competition has given way to cooperation. Scholars often credit the effectiveness
of the Arctic Council and the regimes built around UNCLOS for maintaining this
peace; however, more critical analysis suggests this period of benign cooperation
was primarily driven by the United States’ reduced focus on the region. As climate
change makes the Arctic more accessible, the region’s strategic importance has
become more apparent to American policymakers—especially as Russia and
China routinely circumvent the international institutions that govern the Arctic to
militarize and exploit the region economically.
Both Russia and China consider Arctic resources critical to continued economic
growth in the coming decades. The two most sought-after resources are northern
maritime shipping routes—specifically, the Northwest Passage over Canada and
the Northern Sea Route north of Russia—and the newly accessible mineral and
energy deposits beneath the melting Arctic ice.
With the largest Arctic territory of any state, Russia has always seen the
region as foundational to its national identity, economic development, and
defense policy. As a permanent member of the Arctic Council and a key player in
most Arctic institutions, Russia has a history of sustained engagement with the
international community in the region. Additionally, with an economy based on
exporting raw materials, Russia has been a leader in locating and extracting oil,
gas, and mineral deposits in its northern territories. The potential for economic
exploitation has made the region, in the words of Russian President Vladimir
Putin, the country’s “strategic reserve for the twenty-first century.”10
Since 2001, Russia has expanded its military and economic presence in the
Arctic to secure access to its resources. In 2008, Russia released the Principles of the
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and Future Perspectives.
This strategic document, begun as early as 2001, identifies as key priorities the use
of the Arctic “as a strategic resource base,” “the use of the Northern Sea Route
as a national unified transportation line of communications,” and the protection
of the environment and preservation of peace in the region.11 In 2014, Putin
announced the creation of the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (now
known as the Northern Military District) to coordinate the expansion of military
activity throughout Russia’s northern territories.12 In March 2020, Putin issued
10. Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography (London: Elliot & Thompson, 2015), 281.
11. Security Council of Russia, Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020
and Future Perspectives, trans. Aspen Institute (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, March 2009).
12. Nurlan Aliyev, Russia’s Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Tallinn, EE: International Centre for Defence
and Security, June 2019).
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the Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the
Period Up to 2035. Though it reiterated many of the same policies as the 2008
document, the updated policy called for an even stronger focus on developing
the Northern Sea Route and a commitment to combating “actions by foreign states
. . . to obstruct the Russian Federation’s legitimate economic or other activities in
the Arctic.”13 In the coming decade, Russian economic activity in the Arctic and
the ensuing military buildup to protect it will continue to increase.
Although Russia relies on the Arctic primarily as a source of natural resources
to export, China sees the region as the source of raw materials to process or
consume domestically to fuel its continued economic growth. Additionally, Arctic
shipping routes offer Beijing a potential method for transporting goods without
having to move through the geopolitically sensitive and geographically restrictive
Strait of Malacca. Lacking a historical presence in the region, China has
rushed to build a cultural connection and legal right to access the region. In
addition, China refers to itself as a “near-Arctic power,” thereby advancing
a national narrative of China as the central element linking the Arctic and
Antarctica and claiming a deep, historical connection to both poles.14 Chinese
leaders seek to use scientific research to gain physical access to the region and
a role in its governing institutions. In 2004, Beijing established the Arctic
Yellow River Station on the Svalbard Islands, an international hub for scientific
research that secured the country’s access to the region and strengthened its
capacity to operate in polar conditions.15 In 2013, China leveraged its role in
Arctic scientific research to gain observer status on the Arctic Council. Since
then, Beijing has used its Arctic access and position in its governing institutions
to lay the groundwork for economic exploitation of the region.
Russian and Chinese leaders have exhibited a growing ability to cooperate
despite their differing Arctic aims. These leaders have developed a partnership
based on a shared interest in building the infrastructure needed to access the
region’s resources. Russian companies need investment from external sources to
access deposits of liquified natural gas.16 China, which has money to invest but
lacks Arctic territory in which to invest it, is partnering with Russia on major
infrastructure projects, such as the Yamal LNG natural gas project.17 Joint
Russian and Chinese efforts to extract Arctic resources make the region more
commercially valuable to both countries.
13. Vladimir Putin, Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the Period Up to 2035,
trans. Anna Davis and Ryan Vest (Newport, RI: Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2020), 5.
14. Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 41.
15. Brady, Polar Great Power, 55.
16. Hønneland, Politics in Arctic, 273.
17. Ronald O’Rourke et al., Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, R41153
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated March 2022), 31.
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To expand access to raw materials in the region, Russia and China have shown
a willingness to exploit deficiencies and ambiguities in regimes that govern the
Arctic. Beijing refers to the Arctic region, in addition to the deep seabed and
outer space, as “res nullius,” or “no one’s property”—a region ungoverned by law
and without defined territorial holdings. So far, China has been unwilling to
disrupt international norms by taking steps unilaterally to extract Arctic resources,
choosing instead to partner with Arctic powers such as Russia and Greenland
on mining and drilling projects. Chinese leaders, however, continue to define
the region as unregulated and free for economic activity. Chinese scientific
activity increasingly focuses on preparing for the direct extraction of resources
and conducting “assessments of polar oil and natural gas . . . to explore the
possibilities and means for future use.”18 The country’s public disregard for the
legal regimes governing the Arctic and its clear focus on building the scientific
knowledge and technical familiarity needed to mine Arctic resources clearly
illustrate Beijing’s intention to expand economic activity without regard for
international institutions.
Russia has been more brazen than China in its disregard for the Arctic
institutions. In 2001, Russia submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf a claim for over 460,000 square miles of the disputed
Lomonosov Ridge.19 The commission rejected the claim, citing significant gaps in
Russia’s scientific justification. In 2007, with the territorial status of the ridge still
undetermined, Russian leaders sent a submersible vehicle to the disputed territory
to collect soil and water samples and, most controversially, to plant a metal
Russian flag on the seabed.20 The event sent a clear message to foreign observers.
Regardless of the rulings of international bodies, Russia would continue to operate
in and claim ownership of the resource-rich territory.
In addition to broadening access to Arctic territory to extract resources, Chinese
and Russian leaders seek to increase access to the region’s key transportation
routes by expanding control over the Northern Sea Route. Capitalizing on the
route’s legally ambiguous status under UNCLOS, Russia instituted a requirement
for foreign vessels to be escorted by Russian icebreakers.21 The law allows Russia
to monitor and control traffic directly through the Northern Sea Route and
to profit from the fees levied on foreign vessels for this support.22 Despite the
route’s disputed status under UNCLOS, Moscow’s willingness to institute

18. Brady, Polar Great Power, 7, 57, 94.
19. Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic,” 15.
20. Hønneland, Politics in Arctic, 271.
21. Aliyev, Russia’s Military Capabilities.
22. Katarzyna Zysk, “The Evolving Arctic Security Environment: An Assessment,” in Russia in the
Arctic, 103.
TOC

Russia and China

Vicik

61

these restrictions, and to exploit loopholes in Arctic governance has allowed the
country to expand its control over the valuable commercial passageway.
In the spirit of viewing the Arctic as “no one’s property,” China has
sought to gain control over shipping routes through massive investments in
infrastructure. A 2018 Arctic white paper notes the creation of a Polar Silk Road
through the Arctic as a key national aim. The project is part of Beijing’s larger
Belt and Road Initiative to connect the country to emerging economic
partners worldwide through massive infrastructure projects. The Polar Silk
Road would develop the Northern Sea Route into a “blue economic passage
linking China and Europe via the Arctic Ocean.”23 Considering the Northern
Sea Route to be under its sovereign control, Russia invited China to expand the
Belt and Road Initiative into the Arctic to profit from the new source of
infrastructure investment.24 As it has elsewhere in the world, China has begun
using this Belt and Road Initiative investment to expand its current political
and economic capacity—and in the future, potentially, military capacity—
in the region.25
Both Russian and Chinese leaders are committed to expanding access to
raw materials and the use of Arctic maritime shipping routes and have taken
steps to exploit the gaps in the Arctic’s governing regimes to secure control
over these resources. Unless significant measures are developed to strengthen
Arctic institutions, Russia and China will continue to expand their control
over the region.

A Plan to Strengthen Arctic Governance
As Sino-Russian overreach in the Arctic has grown more flagrant, the United
States has tried to draw international attention to the issue. For example, in 2019,
then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attempted to call out Chinese incursion
into the region, stating, “There are only Arctic States and Non-Arctic States. No
third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing.”26
However, these sporadic, unilateral actions have not led to significant changes in
Russian and Chinese activity. To maintain effective and enduring peace, the United
States needs to spearhead a multilateral effort to strengthen the rules-based order
in the region and to enable American leadership to work with strategic partners to
identify and counteract the pattern of Sino-Russian expansionism.
23. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy” (white paper,
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 26, 2018).
24. Rebecca Pincus, “Three-Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Spring
2020): 46.
25. Pincus, “Power Dynamics in Arctic,” 45.
26. Michael R. Pompeo, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus” (speech, Arctic Council
ministerial meeting, Rovaniemi, FI, May 6, 2019).
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The United States must take three steps to improve Arctic governance and
stymie Sino-Russian expansionism. First, it must lead an international effort to
recognize the neutral status of the Northern Sea Route definitively, establishing
a global norm Russia cannot restrict its use as a maritime transport route.
Additionally, key players in the region should preemptively address future disputes
by establishing a similar status for the not-yet-active Transpolar Sea Route through
the center of the Arctic Ocean. The growing commercial viability of these Arctic
maritime routes offers the potential for faster, safer, and more effective global
transportation of goods. But Russia’s attempts to treat these routes as sovereign
territory threaten the international community’s ability to realize their benefits
fully. With UNCLOS unable to address this issue, the United States must step in
and lead a new effort to define and regulate the Arctic shipping routes.
Second, the United States must create a new, international Arctic economic
and security forum to take a leading role in the management of commercial
and military developments in the region and fill gaps in the governing capacity
of the Arctic Council. The council would remain a cornerstone of international
cooperation in the region, but, based on its structure and established norms, the
council is only capable of addressing “safe and noncontroversial issues.”27
Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021, Russia
identified its primary goals as combating climate change, promoting sustainable
development, supporting indigenous communities, and protecting biodiversity.28
The United States should support these commendable priorities. Conspicuously
absent from Russia’s statement is any mention of the massive Sino-Russian
infrastructure projects or increased attempts to control traffic through the
Northern Sea Route that have come to define Russia’s activity in the region.
At the 2019 Arctic Council ministerial meeting, Pompeo received criticism for
attempting to use the forum to voice concern about the threat Russian and Chinese
activity in the region posed to American interests.29 The council’s obligation to
maintain a cooperative spirit allows Russia and China to continue to support the
organization while expanding their aggressive economic activity. Although the
United States should continue to support the progressive, cooperative goals of
the Arctic Council, the country needs a venue in which to discuss transparently,
coordinate activity, and voice concerns about Russian and Chinese economic
exploitation of the region.
27. Margrét Cela and Pia Hanson, “A Challenging Chairmanship in Turbulent Times,” Polar Journal 11,
no. 1 (June 2021): 51.
28. Nikolay Viktorovich Korchunov, “The Russian Chairmanship Begins,” Arctic Council (website),
May 10, 2021, https://arctic-council.org/news/the-russian-chairmanship-begins/.
29. “The Arctic Institute’s Reaction to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s Speech in Rovaniemi Ahead of
the AC Ministerial Meeting,” Arctic Institute (website), May 6, 2019, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org
/reaction-secretary-state-mike-pompeos-speech-rovaniemi-finland-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting/.
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As countries increase their military presence in the Arctic, the absence of a
body in which to discuss international security matters becomes increasingly
problematic. The Arctic Council’s charter bans any discussion of military issues
within the forum. This shortfall is creating potentially destabilizing conditions.
The dangers of this inability to coordinate on security matters were made clear in
August 2020, when Alaskan fishermen, legally fishing within the United States’
exclusive economic zone, were buzzed by Russian aircraft and sent radio messages
ordering them to relocate in an attempt to divert them from an ongoing naval
exercise.30 The incident illustrated the need for an international forum to discuss,
manage, and resolve issues related to military activity in the Arctic.
Presently, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable is the primary organization
that addresses international security issues in the region. This body unites key
military leaders from seven Arctic and four non-Arctic states on a recurring
basis to “exchange . . . information and [explore] the Arctic security and threat
environment.”31 But, since 2014, Russia has been excluded from these discussions
in response to its aggression in Crimea.32 This exclusion allows Russia to expand
its military presence in the region without formal coordination with neighboring
states—a dangerous and destabilizing trend.
In recent years, Arctic security experts have increasingly called for
establishing an Arctic security forum that includes Russia as a permanent
member.33 This expanded security forum should be established in
conjunction with a new economic forum to be most effective. Therefore,
the forum could address large-scale economic activity and the increased
militarization of the region—the two major sources of tension the Arctic Council
cannot manage. At a minimum, such an organization needs to meet annually
and include the eight Arctic states (Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States). Key non-Arctic states should
be invited in a limited capacity to participate in discussions on matters pertinent
to the states’ interests. For instance, China should be invited to discussions on
Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in the region.
Whereas the Arctic Council provides a venue where states can establish
consensus on key environmental and human development goals, this forum would
30. Nathaniel Herz, “US Investigates ‘Unprofessional Interactions’ after Russian Military Confronts
Bering Sea Fishermen,” Alaska Public Media (website), August 28, 2020, https://www.alaskapublic
.org/ 2020/ 08/28/u-s-investigates-reports-of-unprofessional-behavior-after-russian-military-ordered-bering
-sea-fishermen-to-move/.
31. Ernie Regehr, Pan-Arctic Military Cooperation: Still the Most Reliable (and Likely?) Option (New York:
Simons Foundation, January 2020), 5.
32. Regehr, Military Cooperation, 5.
33. Troy J. Bouffard, Elizabeth Buchanan, and Michael Young, “Arctic Security and Dialogue: Assurance
through Defense Diplomacy,” Modern Diplomacy (website), July, 11, 2020, https://moderndiplomacy
.eu/2020/07/11/arctic-security-and-dialogue-assurance-through-defence-diplomacy/.
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allow states to present their military and economic strategies in the region to solicit
assistance The United States must develop a new multinational security agreement
among allied and partnered states in the region to monitor Russian and Chinese
threats and coordinate policies to address the threats.
Recently, NATO has attempted to fill this role. Following the 2016 Warsaw
summit, NATO released a communiqué that focused on strengthening the ability
to “deter and defend” against threats to the North Atlantic. But the communiqué
stopped short of articulating a comprehensive policy on Arctic security.34 Many
scholars and policymakers hope NATO can unite to mount a credible deterrence
in the north, but using the organization as the primary tool for securing American
interests in the Arctic appears unlikely and inadvisable. Of the 30 countries in
NATO, only five, including the United States, are Arctic states. Many non-Arctic
members, particularly those in Southern and Eastern Europe, have routinely
shown little interest in committing resources to Arctic security matters.35 Even
if NATO could develop an Arctic policy, the significant differences in security
concerns between member states would leave the alliance inflexible and slow to
respond to Arctic security issues.
To best serve US security interests in the Arctic, Washington should
develop a new northern security alliance modeled after North American
Aerospace Defense Command that extended to European partners and allies.
The alliance would focus on coordinated monitoring of foreign military activity in
the Arctic and intelligence sharing and focus on detecting and sharing intelligence
on offensive cyberwarfare operations and other gray-zone operations that have
become Russia’s trademark in Eastern Europe. Maintaining the ability to mount
a credible defense against Russian and Chinese expansion without unnecessarily
escalating military tension in the region is foundational to American security in
the Arctic. An alliance like the North American Aerospace Defense Command,
which focuses on collective monitoring and coordination of military capabilities,
would be most effective at striking this balance.
This northern security alliance would include NATO Arctic states,
such as Denmark and Norway, and non-NATO partner states with a shared
concern over Russian activity in the region, such as Finland and Sweden.
Participation could also be offered to non-Arctic NATO states with genuine
security interests in the region, such as the United Kingdom, which has
strategic interests based on its position in the Greenland-Iceland-United
Kingdom gap, one of the key entry points into Arctic waters. A small, focused
34. NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” press release (2016) 100, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
35. Rebecca Pincus, “NATO North? Building a Role for NATO in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks (website),
November 6, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/nato-north-building-a-role-for-nato-in-the-arctic/.
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northern security alliance would be much more flexible than NATO in
countering Russian coercive activity in the region. With a focus primarily
on monitoring naval and air activity and intelligence sharing, such an
alliance would be less threatening to Russian leadership than an expansion
of NATO into the region. The three steps outlined in this article would fill the
critical gaps in international institutions in the region and ensure a more stable,
rules-based order.

Conclusion
Official Russian and Chinese policy documents outlining Arctic strategies still
identify cooperation and respect for international governance as key priorities in
the region. But these nations’ actions over the past two decades have not matched
their rhetoric. Both Russia and China are making deliberate attempts to exploit
loopholes in the region’s governing regimes, specifically those related to UNCLOS
and the authority of the Arctic Council, to expand Sino-Russian access to Arctic
resources and shipping routes. To deter Sino-Russian expansionism in the region,
the United States must strengthen the international institutions in the Arctic.
The three key areas requiring American attention are the territorial status of
Arctic shipping routes, a lack of coordination on economic and military matters
between Arctic states, and the ineffectiveness of collective security agreements in
the region. These areas of focus offer the best initial steps for the United States to
secure its interests in the region more effectively.
Along with its allies and partners, the United States relies on access to the
Arctic for transportation, scientific research, and regulated economic activity
conducted in accordance with international law. Additionally, the United
States is not obligated to secure its population in the high north from negative
influences from foreign states. As Russia and China continue to exploit,
control, and restrict access to the region, protecting these interests will become
increasingly difficult for the United States. The United States must lead an
international effort to correct these shortfalls in the Arctic’s governing regimes
as quickly as possible. The longer the United States allows its adversaries to
circumvent the rules-based international order in support of their expansionist
policies, the more difficult maintaining a cooperative and peaceful Arctic in the
future will become.
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Defining and Deterring Faits Accomplis
Brandon Colas

ABSTRACT: This article describes faits accomplis—how states attempt to seize
disputed territory using military force, hoping to avoid war in the process—and
offers suggestions for how to deter them. Since 1945, faits accomplis have become
the most common means by which states attempt to take over territory, even though
they frequently result in armed conflict. US deterrent efforts, however, often focus
on stopping invasions, not limited land grabs. This study combines the traditional
literature on deterrence with Dan Altman’s recent research on faits accomplis to
suggest Department of Defense leaders should frame territorial disputes as a
real estate market they can both analyze and manipulate.

I

Keywords: deterrence, territorial disputes, gray zone, brinkmanship,
escalation

n February 2014, Ukraine had 22,000 troops stationed on the Crimean Peninsula.
A month later, Ukrainian armed forces had lost their primary naval base,
12 of 17 surface combatants, most of their naval aviation assets, and their main
naval repair and maintenance facilities.1 Ukraine also lost over 2 million citizens
and 10,000 square miles of territory. In the process, the Ukrainian armed forces
suffered only a single casualty.2 If this action was a Russian invasion, as then-Vice
President Biden insisted while visiting Kyiv the following year, it was a strange
one.3 The “invasion” had cost Ukraine dearly, but the seizure of Crimea in 2014 is
better described as a fait accompli, wherein an aggressor state uses limited military
force to seize a disputed territory, risking war in the process. It takes two states for a
successful fait accompli: an aggressor willing to risk war and a victim or defender who
decides losing territory is better than using its military to respond and risk war. Russia
seized the disputed territory without going to war, using a complex combination of
techniques that included removing insignia from Russians’ uniforms, overcoming
Ukrainian military bases by ramming through gates, and blocking aircraft runways
with vehicles to prevent Ukrainian reinforcements from landing. The brazen Russian
tactics relied on a belief the Ukrainians would be unwilling to fire the first shot.4
1. Manash Pratim Boruah and Prathamesh Karle, “Ukrainian Navy: A Force in Distress,” Janes (website),
February 15, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukrainian-navy-a-force-in-distress.
2. Anton Lavrov, “Russia Again: The Military Operations for Crimea,” in Colby Howard and Ruslan
Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press,
2014): 174.
3. White House Office of the Vice President, “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden and President Petro
Poroshenko,” December 7, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/07/remarks-vicepresident-joe-biden-and-ukrainian-president-petro.
4. Lavrov, “Russia Again,” 157–84; and John Chambers, Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats (West Point, NY:
Modern War Institute, 2016), 17–19, https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Countering-Gray-Zone
-Hybrid-Threats.pdf.
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The 2014 conquest cost Russia as well. Following Crimea, Russia
weathered various sanctions, built up its military, and learned the wrong
lessons. Eight years later, Russian troops entering Ukraine expected the same
experience. Numerous reports indicate that many Russian soldiers did not
know they were going to invade Ukraine until shortly before it began. Those
who knew did not expect opposition. Some may have brought along parade
uniforms.5 This fait accompli failed catastrophically.

How States Seize Territory
Russian aggression against Crimea in 2014 and the whole of Ukraine in
2022 illustrates the three means by which states can seize territory: brute
force, coercion, and faits accomplis. The Department of Defense is prepared
to counter the first two. Brute force is an invasion and occupation, such as
Hitler in Poland in 1940 or the current Russian campaign in Ukraine after
the unexpected Ukrainian resistance to the fait accompli attempt. A second
means to seize territory is coercion: threatening damage and latent violence.6
Enough force built upon a border could cause a government to make
concessions, determining the fight is not worth it. Hitler entered Denmark
unopposed in 1940; Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky could have
resigned in February 2022. However, brute force and coercion can be deterred
by an opposing force or, if deterrence fails, rolled back by military conflict.
Despite years of talk about the gray zone, the Department of Defense
is unprepared for faits accomplis, perhaps because resisting a fait accompli
is more complicated than deterring a full invasion. Instead of initiating
war and then attempting to seize territory (brute force) or threatening war
unless territory is surrendered (coercion), in a fait accompli, a state seizes a
piece of disputed territory with military force and attempts to avoid war in
the process.7
Faits accomplis are common. Recent international relations research has
shown the primacy of faits accomplis compared to the use of coercion or brute
force to seize territory. Attempted conquests of entire territory after 1945
were extremely rare. From 1945 to 2022, there were only four attempts to
conquer another state wholesale and absorb its territory. Successful attempts
5. Luke Harding, “Demoralised Russian Soldiers Tell of Anger at Being ‘Duped’ into War,” Guardian
(website), March 4, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russian-soldiers-ukraine
-anger-duped-into-war; and TEW, “Exclusive: Ukrainian Civilians Found Russian Army Uniforms
Parade Items in Garage after Bombing,” YouTube, March 11, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v
_EVWcbbAGs.
6. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), 1–34.
7. Dan Altman, “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial
Integrity Norm,” International Organization 74, Summer (2020): 491.
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were North Vietnam against South Vietnam in 1975 and Indonesia against
Timor-Leste in 1975, and unsuccessful attempts were North Korea against
South Korea in 1950 and Iraq against Kuwait in 1990.8 The United States’
invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) led to the occupation of
both states, but the long-term occupation was never the intent of these wars,
which were also not based on territorial claims. Since 1945, there have only
been four instances of brute force and two of coercion, but as of 2018, states
had attempted 65 faits accomplis.9 Faits accomplis, which impose “a limited
unilateral gain at an adversary’s expense in an attempt to get away with that
gain when the adversary chooses to relent rather than escalate in retaliation,”
are the most common means for states to pursue territorial gains.10
Common but risky, attempted land grabs frequently fail and lead to armed
conflict. Of the 65 cases between 1945 and 2018 charted by Dan Altman,
only half succeeded.11 Attempts to return to the status quo often lead to
major escalation, presumably because the aggressor state has miscalculated
the “true” red line for the status quo.12 The risk of war is probably
higher than the cases that result in armed conflict. States using limited
military force to take territory have already calculated their action is more
likely to succeed in seizing the territory than escalating to a wider war. This
data only accounts for the states that acted on the (sometimes erroneous)
belief that war would not result. We cannot determine the number of states
that did not act based on the expectation of war—as James Fearon noted,
a state that launches an attack has already taken the defender’s relative
capabilities into account. Hence, a state making a challenge is a state that is
already resolved.13
The US military must understand the conditions under which faits
accomplis occur and what factors lead to their success and failure. Both
China and Russia have several ongoing territorial disputes with US allies,
have employed faits accomplis in the past, and will likely do so in the future.
Limiting Chinese and Russian expansion entails cutting off these forcible
territory seizures before they occur. Resolving them after the fact—“rollback”
type strategies—are a considerable risk.14 Studying faits accomplis can also
help map out underdeveloped “road to war” sequences, providing leaders with
8. Altman, “Evolution of Territorial Conquest,” 493.
9. Altman “Evolution of Territorial Conquest,” 493, 501–3.
10. Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory From Their Adversaries,”
International Studies Quarterly 61 (2017): 882.
11. Altman, “Evolution of Territorial Conquest,” 509.
12. Altman, “By Fait Accompli,” 886–88; and Altman, ”Evolution of Territorial Conquest,” 505.
13. James D. Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis
Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 18, no. 4 (1994): 238, https://www.jstor.org/stable/174295.
14. Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,” Naval War
College Review 71, no. 1 (2018): 8–20.
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anticipated off-ramps and better scenario planning. In Arms and Influence,
Thomas Schelling notes:
There is just no foreseeable route by which the United States and
the Soviet Union could become engaged in a major nuclear war. This
does not mean that a major nuclear war cannot occur. It only means
that if it occurs it will result from a process not entirely foreseen,
from reactions that are not fully predictable, from decisions that are
not wholly deliberate, from events that are not fully under control.15

One implication of Schelling’s claim is that if a war between the
United States and China occurs, it is unlikely to take place because Taiwan
declares its independence; all three states are aware of the dangers of such a
scenario. A war involving a Chinese attempt to use a fait accompli to claim
Taiwan-occupied Itu Aba (Taiping Island), on the other hand, could well
happen: faits accomplis generate unpredictable reactions.
This study attempts to anticipate reactions by showing how states can
calculate the desirability of using faits accomplis to seize disputed territory,
for both themselves and their rivals, by modeling disputed territory as a
real estate market. Military and civilian leaders wanting to deter faits
accomplis can manipulate the market by directly affecting the input variables
of territorial value, the cost of war, and the probability of war. Deterrence
against faits accomplis also has implications for countering a wide range of
gradualist techniques common in the gray zone.

Calculating the Desirability of Faits Accomplis
Why States Prefer Faits Accomplis to Brute Force and Coercion
The near-universal condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine strongly
implies there is a global norm against the use of violence to claim territory.16
The existence of a norm among states does not mean that actions violating
it will occur but does suggest that if that norm is violated, states will
need to explain and justify their behavior. Extreme discursive practices are
required to break the norm; Russia has claimed it will de-Nazify Ukraine, fears
Ukrainian chemical weapons provocations, and suspects Ukraine may develop

15. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 94–95.
16. Stephen Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2012);
and Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,”
International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–50, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3078631; and Altman,
“Evolution of Territorial Conquest,” 497.
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a plutonium-based nuclear “dirty bomb.”17 If any of these justifications were
true, breaking the norm against Ukraine’s territorial integrity would make sense.
But by protesting too much, Russian propaganda inadvertently shows how
unacceptable it is for a state to launch a war to seize territory.
While brute force can enable one state to absorb another, it rarely takes place.
Although coercion might seem another way for a state to claim the territory
of another, coercion is difficult and can create its own set of problems for the
aggressor state. Studies of compellence provide some suggestions for why an
aggressor state’s efforts to coerce another state to surrender its territorial
claims rarely succeed. As Schelling notes, almost any affirmative action
“requires that an opponent or a victim do something, even if only to stop or get
out.”18 In a territorial dispute, the affirmative action required would be that one
state accepts the de facto loss of its territory. By contrasting compellence and
deterrence, Gary Schaub shows why compelling an opponent is more difficult
than dissuading an opponent from an action. In deterrence, generally, a compliant
adversary is no worse off, while a defiant one expects retribution. However, as he
notes, “Compellent demands […] promise no chance of gains. They pose the
adversary with a choice between two losses: the certain loss of compliance and
the gamble between avoiding this loss or suffering more significant losses.”19
Prospect theory suggests the nature of coercion encourages resistance: defying
the coercive attempt might result in success, or at least less of a loss, whereas
submitting locks in the loss.
Even though seizing territory by brute force is difficult, and coercion inspires
defiance, there are still territorial disputes around the world—many militarized,
and many resulting in the shifting of territory from one state to another—
and yet few wars. One suggestion for this absence of full-scale war is that
conquest has changed: states seize smaller territories in faits accomplis.
In terms of timing and pace, seizing the territory can occur quickly in a
lightning strike or a gradualist manner—a long series of discrete events that
achieve a state’s objectives over time.20 Regardless of the pace, no single model
is used in a fait accompli. The Russian example of using the hybrid war in the
17. Reuters Staff, “Russia, Without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear ‘Dirty Bomb’,” Reuters
(website), March 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine
-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/; David M. Herszenhorn, “Russia Claims US Mercenaries Plan
Chemical Attack in Ukraine,” Politico EU (website), December 21, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article
/russia-us-mercenaries-plan-chemical-attack-ukraine/; and Neil MacFarquhar, “Two Days of Russian News
Coverage: An Alternate Reality of War,” New York Times (website), March 8, 2022, https://www.nytimes
.com/2022/03/08/world/europe/russia-ukraine-media.html.
18. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 8.
19. Gary Schaub Jr., “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004):
401, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3792549.
20. Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015), 37.
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Crimean Peninsula in 2014 differs significantly from current Chinese efforts to
make land (literally) in the Pacific and then fortify those territories.
Categorizing the success rate of conventional versus hybrid means of
seizing disputed territory is beyond the scope of this article. A state launching
a fait accompli will employ its available forces in the means it believes is most
likely to succeed in conquering while avoiding war. Trying to generalize what
that force employment will look like is difficult. A massive buildup followed
by limited use of overwhelming force might cause a defending state to become
more (or less) likely to resist or collapse. The hybrid use of “contractors”
and cyberattacks against the power grid could lead to sudden surrender or
irate resistance.
Faits accomplis, whether fast or slow, subtle or blatant, all share the
calculated risk of actions that could result in war. A successful fait accompli by
the aggressor represents a corresponding failure of deterrence on the part of a
defending state. And the failure of deterrence can erode the defending state’s
broader deterrent position toward the aggressor and undercut its commitments.21
A Model of Fait Accompli Calculation
Data show territorial conflicts still exist in the twenty-first century,
and states prefer to use faits accomplis to seize territory. In what context
would a fait accompli become appealing for a state? Understanding this
decision-making process is critical for military leaders who want to anticipate
and deter conflict. One way to frame how states decide that the risk of a
fait accompli is worth risking war is to treat disputed territory as a real
estate market. China and India, for instance, have identified sections of
their disputed border line (what they have “agreed to disagree” about) as the
“Line of Actual Control.” States agree on the location, which is fixed, but
the value of the territory fluctuates over time for each state. This fluctuation
helps explain why a state would risk a war for a land grab.
To set up a simple model: at a particular time, two states have implicitly
agreed that a particular piece of territory is too valuable to abandon but not
worth a war. Each state’s calculations differ, but both countries anticipate a
negative value in going to war for the territory.22 When determining how
much to value territory, a state first identifies how much it would be worth to
have the territory without conflict. From this constructed value, the state then
21. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 45, 55–56.
22. James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–
414, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
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plans for the worst-case scenario, subtracts the cost of a losing war, and factors
in the probability of war and victory given war. A positive result suggests the
benefits of war for the territory are likely to outweigh the costs—and, of course,
a fait accompli is a bet war is unlikely to occur.

Constructed Value

Cost of War

• National narrative
• Resource availability
• Strategic location
• Availability of military forces
• Limited/unlimited escalation potential
• Outside party involvement
• Perceived willingness to use force

Likelihood of War

• Public/private statements
• Troop placement
• Intelligence assessments

Expectations of Victory

• National narrative
• Resource availability
• Strategic location

Figure 1: Variables affecting desirability of a fait accompli

Actual numbers are irrelevant to this simple model, which shows how
the four input variables that determine whether the risk of a fait accompli is
worthwhile can be affected by states’ strategies even though internal and external
changes to a state mean dozens of factors will interact to affect the value of the
disputed territory and the probability of war.23 The unpredictability of outcomes
does not mean states will step back rather than commit to winning a dispute.
Instead, aggressor states increase their odds of success by manipulating the
market, increasing the possibility of a fait accompli. Yet even a defending state
must keep the other side’s computed value from rising too much, too quickly.
For instance, Taiwan’s de facto independence is not publicly proclaimed based
on beliefs that a Chinese invasion would follow. A claim of independence would
“officially” make Taiwan a breakaway province, and the value of the territory
would shoot up for China since the Party could not countenance the humiliation
of formally losing a province. At the same time, Chinese pressure can increase
Taiwanese nationalism, perhaps over time, making it harder for Taiwanese
leaders, who are responding to their populace, to hint at independence.
So the status quo is never entirely stable, and states’ actions and reactions can be
hard to anticipate.
23. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1999).
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Regardless of the unpredictability of outcomes, states will engage in market
manipulation to shift the calculations of the other would-be-claimant. For
example, an American-Japanese joint maritime exercise would improve
the interoperability of both forces, raise the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’
confidence that they may prevail in a limited direct conflict over the Senkakus
with China, and lower Chinese expectations of victory as they reassess the
danger posed by the Japanese naval forces, making the value of the Chinese
Senkaku claims decrease, all other factors being equal. For an aggressor to resolve
a territorial dispute in its favor, an optimal solution would be to raise the value
of the territory for its state—making the risk of a conflict more worthwhile—
while convincing the defender the territory is not as valuable—making the risk of
a conflict less likely. To maintain the status quo, however, a defending state may
also need to convince its population that the disputed territory is worth claiming
and the would-be aggressor state that war is not in its interest.

Using the Market Model to Deter Faits Accomplis
States wishing to maintain the status quo must shape the environment for
themselves and their adversaries by attempting to increase the value of the territory,
lower the cost of a losing war, or lessen the probability of war. The defending
state wins by convincing the aggressor that the territory is not worth the fight.
States can manipulate the value of disputed territory by making historical claims,
military modernization, and troop deployments—all of which can help counter
faits accomplis.
Manipulating the Current Value of Territory by Historical Claims
A state’s historical claims and narratives regarding a given piece of territory
are intimately connected to the value of that territory. Both aggressor and
defender states will employ historical narratives to support their claims and
justify any actions taken. For instance, the Chinese government’s well-known
“Nine Dash Line” for maritime claims was submitted to the United Nations
in 2009, based on a 1947 map. However, China decided 1947 did not provide
sufficient weight for its claims. In 2016, China Daily reported the 1947 map
had its provenance in a 600-year-old book called An Arcane Book about the South
China Sea, giving China “ironclad proof ” of its rights in the region.24 Although
China is a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea signatory, it

24. Li Xiaokun and Liu Xiaoli, “Ancient Book ‘Provides Ironclad Proof of Chinese Ownership’,” China
Daily (website), May 24, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-05-24/content_25433846.htm;
and John Sudworth, “South China Sea: The Mystery of Missing Books and Maritime Claims,” BBC (website),
June 19, 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-36545565.
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refused to follow a 2016 tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines in a maritime
dispute based on this spurious historical claim.
More recently, in January 2022, the Wall Street Journal reported on a desperate
search for the bones of Yaroslav the Wise, an eleventh-century Ukrainian saint,
taking place in New York City. For the Ukrainian government, Yaroslav is a sign of
nationhood and separation from Russia to oppose, in the words of the Ukrainian
foreign minister, “modern Putinist myths and illegitimate territorial claims.”25
The Ukrainian search is a response to Putin’s insistence the previous year that
the Russians and Ukrainians are “one people—a single whole.” In Putin’s view,
as early as the late ninth century (even during the fragmentation of Ancient Rus),
“both the nobility and the common people perceived Rus as a common territory,
as their homeland.”26 Both sides appeal to history to explain their actions,
suggesting history has a high degree of resonance—whether for defending
a sovereign state or justifying the encroachment and seizure of another
state’s territory.
Historical narratives strengthen a nation’s claims while signaling what a state
decides it cannot give up. National histories can also build the confidence and will
to prevail against another state. Both China and Russia have invested heavily in
efforts to develop a nationalist population ready to make sacrifices for the state’s
needs. China stresses its grievance-themed history against the West and national
humiliation, while Russia has made and continues to make increasing efforts in
this arena, imposing a legally mandated “military-patriotic upbringing” for the
nation’s education program in 2020.27 If our strategic partners involved in territorial
disputes, particularly with China and Russia, are not consistently “talking the
talk” about the reasons why a disputed territory is theirs, we should be wary and
not value another state’s disputed territory more than the state itself. The tedious
explanation by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs about its rights to the Senkaku
Islands will not convince the rival claimants of China and Taiwan, and perhaps
not even Americans, but does serve as a signal by Japan that it is committed
to these claims.28

25. Brett Forrest, “Russia-Ukraine Conflict Lies in the Bones of an 11th Century Prince,” Wall Street
Journal (website), January 1, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-conflict-lies-in-the-bones-of
-an-11th-century-prince-11641052801.
26. Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” July 12, 2021, http://en.kremlin
.ru/events/president/news/66181.
27. Zang Weng, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); and Hannah Alberts, “Next-Generation Fighters:
Youth Military-Patriotic Upbringing Bolsters the Russian Military’s Manning and Mobilization Potential,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), September 22, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs
/post-soviet-post/next-generation-fighters-youth-military-patriotic-upbringing-bolsters-russian.
28. “Senkaku Islands Q&A,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (website), April 13, 2016, https://www
.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q6.
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Manipulating the Cost of War by Military Developments
States can raise the cost of war by investing in improving and expanding their
military. This buildup might lead to an arms race, as both defender and aggressor
seek to increase deterrence rather than fall behind.29 However, scholarship on this
security dilemma posits abstract states starting from value-neutral positions rather
than states already in competition. When two states are already in an adversarial
relationship, where disputed territory is only one area of contention, concerns
about a security dilemma are less urgent than the possibility of being outpaced
by an opponent. It is difficult to imagine a convincing policy argument that a
status quo state should not improve its military because possessing a stronger
military might foster a fait accompli by the other disputant. There are arguments
that a state seeing the gradual shift in the balance of power in an opposing
state’s favor might choose to go to war in a “better now than later approach.” Such
cases of preemptive war are rare, possibly because striking first comes with the
political cost of being perceived as an aggressor.30
Although America does not have territorial disputes with China or Russia,
many of our strategic partners do. To best support our allies and raise potential
costs against Chinese or Russian territorial aggression, the American military
would be prudent to reconsider its “threats-based or capabilities-based” strategic
planning models and begin with geography. There are a finite number of
locations where China and Russia may attempt faits accomplis, and a conscious
decision of where to deter and contain will lend itself to shaping future force
development needs. Projects such as the US Army’s Long-Range Precision
Fires or practice using pre-positioned floating stocks show the potential for
US forces to adapt and develop a more geography-based strategy for the future.31
Manipulating the Cost of War by Broadening the Quarrel
A defending state can expand the quarrel by increasing the number of
participants supporting its side, linking the dispute to other matters where their
state has a comparative advantage (even if those issues are unrelated to the
territory). This approach might seem strange: relating reactions to actions has value
in helping bound the nature of a conflict and not confusing opponents. There is
29. Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 174–75, https://www
.jstor.org/stable/25054031.
30. Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,”
International Security 20, no. 2 (1995): 29, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539227.
31. Stephen Lanza and Daniel Roper, “Fires for Effect: 10 Questions about Army Long-Range
Precision Fires in the Joint Fight,” Association of the United States Army (website), August 30, 2021, https://
www.ausa.org/publications/fires-effect-10-questions-about-army-long-range-precision-fires-joint-fight;
and Katie Nelson, “Army Prepositioned Stock Afloat Equipment Issued to Soldiers for Use in Salaknib 22,”
US Indo-Pacific Command (website), March 17, 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article
-View/Article/2970307/army-prepositioned-stock-afloat-equipment-issued-to-soldiers-for-use-in-salakni/.
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something logical about keeping South China Sea disputes located in the South
China Sea amongst South China Sea disputants. However, as Schelling notes,
there are times when “breaking the rules is more dramatic, and communicates
more about one’s intent, precisely because it can be seen as a refusal to abide by
rules.”32
Determining how to expand the quarrel can be particularly important when
one state has a comparative advantage. Chinese proximity to Fiery Cross Reef
gives it a logistical advantage in resupplying its entrenched forces. An effort to
erode this advantage might make matters increasingly uncomfortable for the
Chinese forces, perhaps by routine aggressive US air patrols, which would
be a direct retaliatory consequence, clearly connected with Chinese behavior.
A less-direct approach to expand the quarrel could be developing and selling
containerized missiles (like those of the Russian Club-K) to Vietnam and the
Philippines and announcing the change is due to new Chinese military capabilities
on Fiery Cross Reef.33 The linkage is less direct but still serves to change the
Chinese cost-benefit calculus.
Changing the current rules of the conflict can also expand a quarrel, possibly
enabling future faits accomplis. For example, China’s 2021 Coast Guard Law
changes the nature of its maritime disputes by directing the Chinese Coast
Guard to perform defensive operations based on the orders of the Central
Military Commission. This action adds to Chinese naval power in the region
and increases the number of Chinese vessels claiming the latitude offered to
military activities under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Other states have disputed that Chinese domestic law can be applied to other
nations. Still, the Coast Guard Law will add legal hurdles for states seeking to
challenge China under the dispute-settlement procedures of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.34 The overall muted response to the China’s
suggests another successful gradualist step by Beijing in its campaign to dominate
its near abroad—increasing its naval power will make it harder for other states in
the region to dispute Chinese maritime claims.
The occasional overreaction by a defending state also has merit when attempting
to hamper a fait accompli by keeping redlines in place. For example, there
is a stark contrast between Israeli and American willingness to accept probing
32. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 149–51.
33. “Club-K Container Missile System,” Rosoboronexport (website), n.d., http://roe.ru/esp/catalog
/marina-de-guerra/armas-de-la-nave/klab-k/.
34. Alex P. Dela Cruz, “Marching towards Exception: The Chinese Coast Guard Law and the Military
Activities Exception of the Law of the Sea Convention” Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 8, no. 2
(2021): 6–7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48617338; and Jacques deLisle, “Political-Legal
Implications of the July 2016 Arbitration Decision in the Philippines-PRC Case Concerning the South
China Sea: The United States, China, and International Law,” in Asian Yearbook of International Law 21
(2015): 49–82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvbqs7d3.7.
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attacks from Iranian-supported militias. Israel has launched hundreds of attacks
against Iranian targets in Syria to maintain its redlines.35 The United States
has shown less willingness to respond kinetically to attacks on its forces unless
there are US causalities. The perception of US unwillingness to risk war has
permitted a tacit acceptance of Iranian-sponsored provocations, making war more
likely to occur as Iranian elements become less risk-averse over time.36
Discussions about the gray zone often miss that calculated acts of retaliatory
violence in response to gray-zone activities by an aggressor state leave the
aggressor state with the unappealing choice of escalating or absorbing the costs.
The Russian reaction to the defeat of its mercenaries and Syrian forces in a fight
against US forces deployed in Syria to fight the Islamic State is one example.
As then-Defense Secretary James Mattis observed afterward, the decision for
the United States to destroy the force came after the Russian high command
in Syria had stated the massing forces were not their own.37 Rather than dispute
the fighters’ real provenance with Russian leadership in Syria, US forces acted
boldly in self-defense, and the Russian response was muted.
Manipulating the Probability of War by Troop Placement
Garrisoned territories make faits accomplis more difficult since the presence
of armed troops suggests violence may be required to dislodge them, raising the
potential scale and cost of an operation. Garrisoned troops may function as trip
wires—their deaths may lead to a war, which the aggressor state would rather
avoid. Schelling asserts the purpose of US troops stationed in West Berlin
during the Cold War was to die “in a manner that guarantees that the action
cannot stop there.”38 More recent US deployments to Eastern Europe and the
Baltics have adopted the same logic, employing forces small enough that even
the most modest Russian effort could defeat.39 According to Altman’s recent
research, since 1990, undefended areas are those most frequently targeted by
aggressor states.40

35. Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, Kaleigh Thomas, and Jennie Matuschak, “Countering Iran in the
Gray Zone: What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria,” Center for a New
American Security (website), April 14, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-iran
-gray-zone.
36. Goldenberg, Heras, Thomas, and Matuschak, “Countering Iran,” 19–20.
37. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos
Unfolded in Syria,” New York Times (website), May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world
/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html.
38. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 47.
39. Paul McLeary, Quint Forgey, and Connor O’Brien, “U.S. Deploys Troops to Eastern Europe; Thousands
More on Standby,” Politico (website), February 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/02/biden
-troops-europe-ukraine-tensions-00004630.
40. Altman, “Evolution of Territorial Conquest,” 516.
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Even if troops are not permanently garrisoned near the disputed territory,
US and allied troop movements can affect an aggressor’s force calculus. A recent
study of post-1991 US troop movements suggested that when dealing with
weaker targets, deployment of air and naval assets by the United States was
“unequivocally positive” for achieving the goals of the United States in deterring
or compelling the weaker state. In dealing with states categorized as “stronger
targets,” the movement of US ground forces had a more significant effect—
perhaps because of a perceived signal by the United States that it was willing to
accept causalities and escalate the conflict.41 Historically, Americans have been
supportive of US contributions to defending friends and allies compared to
interventions that are perceived as more internal affairs—consider the bipartisan
lack of support for involvement in Syria in 2012, for instance.42
Regardless of the state’s power, changing the status of a garrison at or near
a disputed territory is a complex matter since moving troops into the territory
can lead to unintended consequences. Unfortunately, an adversary will not be able
to determine the purpose of force buildup—it could be to deter a fait accompli,
or it could be to launch one. Even if one state could have confidence in a more
peaceful motive for the other, they have no guarantee that over time the state’s
motive will not change and lead to an attempt to claim the territory. If the
territory is already garrisoned, this is a strong deterrent against a fait accompli.
Moving troops in is a complex calculation for a state trying to keep the status
quo in a territorial dispute. If allies of the United States are unwilling to garrison
troops in a disputed area—or at least near a particular disputed area—they signal
to rivals they have decided not to fight over the territory.

Resources, Technology, and Social Change
The various efforts to increase the value of a piece of territory by historical
claims—raising the cost of war for an opponent while lowering it for their
state and increasing the probability of war for the territory by having troops
in place—are all means that states can employ to affect the value of a disputed
territory. However, another factor likely to affect faits accomplis that states
have little control over is when technological or social changes unexpectedly
shift the value of a piece of territory for one or both states. I call this the gold
rush, and at least three overlapping categories could lead to a gold rush: resources,
technology, and social change. In terms of resources, imagine a scenario where
41. Jacob Aronson, Daniel Tuke, Paul Huth, and Melanie Sisson, “Making Use of History,” in Melanie W.
Sisson, James A. Siebens, and Barry M. Blechman, eds., Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of
Force Short of War (New York: Routledge, 2020), 45–46.
42. Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 73, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1061af; and “Little
Support for U.S. Intervention in Syrian Conflict,” Pew Research Center (website), March 15, 2012, https://www
.pewresearch.org/politics/2012/03/15/little-support-for-u-s-intervention-in-syrian-conflict/.
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previously unknown resources were discovered in a particular territory, such as
in the East China Sea between Japan and China. As the economic value of a
particular territory increased, both states would have more incentive to claim it,
even if the risks of war remained the same. In the longer term, a climate-change
scenario could shift the value of water-sharing arrangements between states,
making it more urgent to resolve the status of a disputed territory.
In addition to a resource-driven scenario, changes in military technology
might increase the value of one piece of territory over another. For instance,
China’s development of hypersonic missiles might lead to a previously disputed
territory between China and a South Sea claimant becoming an ideal site for an
early-warning radar system for the United States. Military technological change
could be biological as well.43 Suppose Chinese efforts to change the biology
of its soldiers succeed in developing troops who can exert themselves at high
altitudes without the need for supplemental oxygen. These physical changes
could make it easier to gain and hold terrain—without needing firepower—
in the Line of Actual Control, which is disputed with India. Physical
stamina can be a game-changing advantage in fights voluntarily limited to
non-gunpowder weapons.44
Besides resource shifts and changes in military technology, social changes might
change the value of the territory, particularly under nationalist governments.
For example, Narendra Modi’s 2019 electoral victory in India seems to have led
to a steady increase in Indian pushback against China in disputed territorial
regions. Of course, China’s increasing willingness to use force in the disputed
border region was another factor in his party’s rise to power.45 Other plausible
scenarios could change the value of territory in unanticipated ways besides social,
technological, or resource changes—what is important to emphasize is that
a state might not be able to manage how the value of a given territory may
change. Nonetheless, attempting to control the available variables will put the
state in a stronger position than drifting with the status quo.

43. Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil
Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation (website),
October 8, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil
-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/; and John Ratcliffe, “China is National Security Threat
No. 1.” Wall Street Journal (website), December 3, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national
-security-threat-no-1-11607019599.
44. Soutik Biswas, “India-China Clash: An Extraordinary Escalation ‘With Rocks and Clubs’,” BBC
(website), June 16, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-53071913.
45. Tanvi Madan, “India Is Not Sitting on the Geopolitical Fence,” War on the Rocks (website),
October 27, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/india-is-not-sitting-on-the-geopolitical-fence.
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Conclusions and Implications
Faits accomplis are widespread and difficult to counter. A quintessential
gray zone technique, faits accomplis present states that wish to see the status
quo continue with a dilemma: acquiesce or start what could become a major
war. If a fait accompli does occur, the losing state may conclude the potential
benefits of regaining the status quo are outweighed by the possibility of its military
response escalating into a wider war. This conclusion is a valid concern based
on the empirical record of failed faits accomplis leading to war. Yet, hesitation
in response favors the belligerent state. On the other hand, faits accomplis that
take place gradually are difficult to counter because drawing a line in the sand at
one irritant might seem disproportionate.
Changing the perspective on how states compute the value of disputed
territory offers a different frame by which to understand the problem of faits
accomplis. A state wanting to keep matters as they now stand would be wise to
increase the relative value of the territory to its population while simultaneously
lowering the value for its adversary. The use of garrisoned troops, a convincing
justification narrative, expanding the quarrel to go beyond the obvious issue
at hand, and raising the costs for the opponent are all means that can deter
a fait accompli. Regardless of states’ efforts, unexpected events can still shift
the value of the territory, which requires states to be alert for possible changes
(particularly in their rivals) and prepared to move rapidly. Not all techniques
used to counter faits accomplis directly apply to countering every gray-zone
tool available to states, but seeing contested issues as contests of value has wide
application. Discouraging our opponents’ advance means convincing them that
“it”—whatever “it” may be—is not worth the cost. Careful study of the factors that
encourage states’ seizure of disputed territory can help us change our adversaries’
calculations and discourage them from risking war.
In addition to thinking of contested issues as issues of value, Department of
Defense leaders should consider that an opponent’s means to pursue an end is
a form of indirect communication.46 An attempted fait accompli does risk war,
but the aggressor state also communicates that it would prefer to avoid war if
possible, which means a robust response from a defender may well lead it to back
down.47 Attentive listening to indirect communication can give us better insight
into the true redlines of our adversaries. Russian direct communication that
arms provisions to the Ukrainian military would result in NATO forces
being treated as cobelligerents has, to date, resulted in nothing.48 Russian
46. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 126–89.
47. Altman, “By Fait Accompli,” 888.
48. Peter Beaumont, “Arms Shipments Are a Legitimate Military Target, Kremlin Warns West,” Guardian
(website), March 12, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/12/arms-shipments-are-a
-legitimate-military-target-kremlin-warns-west.
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indirect communication (by the lack of a response) is that Russia lacks some
combination of capability or intent (or both) to respond to Western support to
Ukraine: indirect communication may have provided better information about
Russian redlines.
Listening to our adversaries’ indirect communication may help us discern
when we have room to escalate. At other times, we should take our opponents
at their word and act accordingly. Russian claims that it had no means to
control the volunteers about to attack American troops in Syria were a factor
in ruling out a strong Russian reprisal against the American military response.49
Proclaiming that one is not responsible makes it difficult to claim responsibility
subsequently. Similarly, Beijing’s insistence that its military buildup on artificial
islands in the South China Sea is not a military buildup provides the United
States with the option of using similar explanations when responding to Chinese
complaints about US force posture in the region.50
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49. Gibbons-Neff, “4-Hour Battle.”
50. Jeremy Page, Carol E. Lee, and Gordon Lubold, “China’s President Pledges No Militarization in
Disputed Islands,” Wall Street Journal (website), September 25, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china
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ABSTRACT: Drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and
even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to
date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large.
This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the
resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space,
and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning.
Overall, the article offers insights into how this important emerging technology
fits into the broader defense ecosystem and outlines practical approaches to
strengthening related information warfare capabilities.

Keywords: information warfare, drone swarms, unmanned systems,
cyberwarfare, electronic warfare

D

rone swarms are here.1 In Israel’s 2021 conflict with Gaza, the country’s
military became the first to deploy a drone swarm in combat. During
the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia deployed the
Kalashnikov KUB-BLA loitering munition, which reportedly is (or will be) capable
of swarming.2 Russia also possesses a yet-to-be-deployed Lancet-3 munition with the
potential capability to create aerial minefields to target drones and other aircraft.
The United States and its allies and adversaries are pursuing collaborative
drone-swarm technology. This pursuit is no surprise. Drone swarms have applications
for every military service across every area of conflict, from infantry support
and logistics to nuclear deterrence.3 Military leaders across the Joint force must
consider how drone swarms relate to existing capabilities and forms of warfare as
the technology matures and enters the battlefield. These ideas should inform future
concepts, acquisition decisions, exercises, training, plans, and operations to account
for friendly and adversarial use. This article examines one aspect of a larger challenge:
drone swarms and information warfare.
1. Sebastien Roblin, “Russian Drone Swarm Technology Promises Aerial Minefield Capabilities,”
National Interest (website), December 30, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/russian-drone-swarm
-technology-promises-aerial-minefield-capabilities-198640.
2. “ZALA Aero Company Successfully Tests KUB-BLA Kamikaze Drone,” Air Recognition (website),
November 12, 2021, https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/news/defense-aviation-news/2021/november
/7857-zala-aero-company-successfully-tests-kub-bla-kamikaze-drone.html; and Will Knight, “Russia’s Killer
Drone in Ukraine Raises Fears about AI in Warfare,” Wired (website), March 17, 2022, https://www.wired.com
/story/ai-drones-russia-ukraine/.
3. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Swarming Destruction: Drone Swarms and Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 5-6 (2019): 523–43.
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Although drone swarms may operate on land, at sea, in the air, and even in
space, they are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. The common
denominator of every swarm is the need to maintain stable communication links
between drones and ensure information is processed efficiently and appropriately.
Indeed, swarms are “multiple unmanned systems capable of coordinating their
actions to accomplish shared objectives.”4 Many of the unique strengths of
swarming also derive from information sharing.
The advantages of drone swarms stem from three key areas: swarm size,
customization, and diversity.5 Each area depends on effective information
management. Larger swarms with more sensors and munitions are more capable
and can enable mass attacks; however, the swarm must handle inputs from more
drones. Flexible swarms add or remove drones to meet commander needs, may
break into smaller groups to attack from multiple directions or strike different
targets, and handle changes to information inputs as drones are added or removed.
Diverse swarms can incorporate different types of munitions and sensors and allow
closely integrated, multidomain strikes, add new types of information sources, and
create coordination challenges when the drones move at different speeds with
different environmental risks. Information failure means risk of collision and loss
of capability.
These capabilities enable novel tactics supported by information sharing.
As Paul Scharre writes, “Swarming will be a more effective, dynamic, and
responsive organizational paradigm for combat.”6 Swarms can concentrate fire
on targets or disperse and reform to counterattack. Achieving these feats requires
high levels of stable communication.7
Support technologies depend on information as well. Machine vision—the
ability of machines to see—requires a high volume of data to train the algorithms.
Sensor drones use these algorithms to collect and share information on adversarial
defenses, possible targets, and environmental hazards.8 Like individual drones, the
swarm as a whole or the external control systems must process the high volume of
information collected in the field. Processing speeds affect the swarm’s battlefield
value because slower algorithm speeds mean slower decision making.9 Although
4. Kallenborn and Bleek, “Swarming Destruction.”
5. Zachary Kallenborn, “The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We Need to Be Ready for It,”
Modern War Institute at West Point (website), October 25, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm
-coming-need-ready/.
6. Paul Scharre, “How Swarming Will Change Warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (website),
October 22, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/how-swarming-will-change-warfare/.
7. Scharre, “Swarming Will Change Warfare.”
8. Zachary Kallenborn, “Swarm Talk: Understanding Drone Typology,” Modern War Institute at West
Point (website), December 10, 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/swarm-talk-understanding-drone-typology/.
9. Paul Scharre, “Counter-Swarm: A Guide to Defeating Robotic Swarms,” War on the Rocks (website),
March 31, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/counter-swarm-a-guide-to-defeating-robotic-swarms/.
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a swarm may not incorporate machine vision, human controllers will face similar
challenges as the swarm scales in size.
Information dependence means drone swarms must be considered in the
context of information warfare. According to the Congressional Research Service,
the US government does not have an official definition for information warfare.
Practitioners typically define information warfare as “strategy for the use and
management of information to pursue a competitive advantage, including both
offensive and defensive operations.”10 This strategy includes electronic warfare,
elements of cyberwarfare, and psychological warfare. Space warfare is included
here because position, navigation, timing information, and satellite-based
communication are critical information sources for unmanned systems.11
Of course, noting the information dependence does not mean actors will
successfully recognize or exploit this dependency. Although the Russian military
has long recognized the importance of electronic warfare in countering drones,
the military appears to have struggled in implementing this knowledge during
the Ukraine conflict. For example, video released on social media seems to
show Ukrainian drones in close proximity to Russian vehicles with no Russian
electronic-warfare protection.12 The Russian military and others may also
struggle to implement this knowledge in the cyber, space, and psychological
warfare domains.
This article examines the relationship of drone swarms to the four dimensions
of information warfare (electronic, cyber, space, and psychological) and explores
artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, which support the other areas and affect
drone-swarm information-warfare vulnerabilities. Policy recommendations
conclude the article.

Electronic Warfare
In the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College’s review of
counterdrone systems, electronic jamming was the most popular counterdrone
interdiction system.13 This popularity is no surprise; electronic jamming represents
a potentially cheap, reusable approach to defeating drones, swarming or not.
Humans must provide drones with mission parameters, firing decisions, and,
sometimes, physical control. Interrupting control and information sharing within
10. Catherine A. Theohary, Defense Primer: Information Operations, IF10771 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, December 2020).
11. Theohary, Defense Primer.
12. Samuel Bendett (@SamBendett), “If these are indeed Ukrainian drones in such a close proximity to
Russian vehicles, where is the Russian counter-UAV and EW protection?,” Twitter, March 19, 2022, 8:54 AM,
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1505165776814288897.
13. Arthur Holland Michel, Counter-Drone Systems (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Center for the Study of
the Drone, February 2018).
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the swarm disrupts the drones. If communication is disrupted, humans cannot
set or revise the mission or direct strikes or issue retreat orders. Drone swarms
depend even more on communication—particularly, communication on the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Although drones can create swarms according to simple rules, communication is
essential for complex behaviors, particularly for swarming in a military context in
which battlefields have varied terrain, combatant numbers and configurations shift,
and a range of combat tactics are employed.14 Thus, communication is necessary to
prevent drone-swarm collision and coordinate movements and attack decisions.
If the drones cannot communicate, the swarm cannot function as a coherent unit,
coordinate searches for targets, or share successful identifications. In addition,
the drones cannot coordinate strikes in which some drones attack one target and
others another. The value of a drone swarm is lost without communication.
Electronic attacks can mimic friendly signals and manipulate the
communication of the whole swarm. For instance, Iran reportedly captured a
Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel drone by jamming the drone’s communication
and manipulating the Global Positioning System to force it to land in Iran
in 2011.15 False signals could steer an aerial swarm into a mountain, building, or
other obstacle. If a state allows drones to fire without human control (which is by
no means certain), adversaries could also send a signal indicating an adversary is at
a friendly position, potentially causing the swarm to fire on the position.
The communication architecture—and, therefore, the methods of disrupting
or manipulating the drone swarm—vary among different swarms.16 Swarm
communication typically relies on the electromagnetic spectrum—radio waves
(for example, Wi-Fi), infrared, and optical—but acoustic signals are likely
necessary for underwater drones because electromagnetic signals do not propagate
well underwater.17 Thus, spectrum management is important to ensure signals
within and among the swarm and any control station are deconflicted. The swarm
control architecture requires signal delivery to the correct drone, which presents a
challenge if drones in the swarm are disabled or destroyed.

14. Maaike Verbruggen, The Question of Swarms Control: Challenges to Ensuring Human Control over Military
Systems, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 65 (Brussels: EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Consortium, 2019).
15. Scott Peterson, “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says Iranian Engineer,” Christian Science Monitor
(website), December 15, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran
-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer.
16. Xi Chen, Jun Tang, and Songyang Lao, “Review of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarm Communication
Architectures and Routing Protocols,” Applied Sciences 10, no. 10 (2020).
17. John Heidemann, Milica Stojanovic, and Michele Zorzi, “Underwater Sensor Networks: Applications,
Advances, and Challenges,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engineering Sciences 370, no. 1,958 (2012): 158–75.
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How information propagates throughout the swarm may vary, too, which
may affect the mechanics of disrupting or maintaining communication.18
In a swarm with centralized control, a single leader may coordinate tasks
assigned to each member of the swarm. In swarms with decentralized control,
drones communicate with the drones nearest them, leading to emergent flocking
behaviors. In theory, this action removes the need for global communication.
But the simple algorithms that enable decentralized control may be insufficient
for complex, dynamic military contexts.
Future developments may reduce swarm electromagnetic spectrum dependence.
New technologies offer communication channels according to different physical
principles, such as quantum communication.19 Alternatively, drones could
coordinate their actions indirectly through stigmergy.20 Insects such as ants leave
pheromone traces on potential food sources. The ants that follow hone in on the
traces and leave their pheromones if they, too, find food. Advanced drone swarms
could adopt similar methods.
Ants offer another lesson for drone swarms: diversity in roles. Ants in a
colony adopt specialized roles, most obviously between queen and worker ants.
Likewise, swarms may incorporate communication drones that dedicate available
onboard power to strengthening signals, serve as alternate nodes to exchange
communication, or use a different signal type to issue retreat orders. Drone
swarms could also blend centralized and decentralized communication approaches
to increase resiliency. For example, the swarm may rely on decentralized
communication and have a backup centralized communication system to combat
jamming. This approach would require significant technical development to
prevent conflict between the two communication approaches.
As drone swarms grow more autonomous, less information from
electromagnetic spectrum-based sources originating outside the swarm is
necessary, and less need for human input means less need for some communication
channels. This autonomy, however, comes with a trade-off in new opportunities to
manipulate or disrupt the autonomous systems.
In theory, an advanced drone swarm could become independent from external
control, but policy and technical challenges place an upper bound on autonomy.
Current Department of Defense policy does not allow semiautonomous weapons
aboard unmanned platforms to select and engage targets if communications are
18. Verbruggen, Swarms Control.
19. Martin Giles, “Explainer: What Is Quantum Communication?,” MIT Technology Review (website),
February 14, 2019, www.technologyreview.com/s/612964/what-is-quantum-communications/.
20. Ralph Beckers, Owen E. Holland, and Jean-Louis Deneubourg, “From Local Actions to Global Tasks:
Stigmergy and Collective Robotics,” in Prerational Intelligence: Adaptive Behavior and Intelligent Systems
without Symbols and Logic, ed. Holk Cruise, Jeffrey Dean, and Helge Ritter (Dordrecht, NL: Springer Science,
2000), 2:1008–22.
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degraded, nor can autonomous weapons target human beings with lethal force
without meaningful human input.21 Popular resistance will likely constrain change
because people already fear robots gone wild. Autonomous, complex strategic
decisions such as assessing the value of a target to an overall war effort are likely
to be impossible without generalized AI, which is unlikely to emerge in the near
term, if ever. So, some electronic communication will be needed for the foreseeable
future. Electronic warfare is also increasingly tied to cyberwarfare.

Cyberwarfare
Cyberattacks may seek to disable, control, manipulate, or exfiltrate
information from drone swarms. Swarms necessarily possess all the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities of individual drones, including vulnerability to deauthentication
attacks (preventing the controller from operating the drone), code injection,
and code alteration, exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, and exfiltration of
data.22 The incorporation of swarming introduces the interception, manipulation,
and disruption of interswarm communication and the algorithms that manage
collective swarm behavior, thereby broadening the attack surface. More drones
also means more opportunities to attack the system.
Cyberattacks could drone control systems through deauthentication attacks or
code injections or alterations. Disabling human control or code alterations that
immobilize drone engines or propellers may cause the swarm to crash. Falling
drones could collide with other drones or other friendly assets. Disabling sensors
could cause the drone swarm to fly blindly, resulting in collisions or preventing
the identification of adversary defenses and other targets of interest. As a civilian
example, researchers in July 2015 exploited cyber vulnerabilities to disable the
brakes on a Jeep Cherokee®.23 Limiting drone movement provides adversaries
with a battlefield advantage. More subtly, cyberattacks may exploit drone-swarm
information processing algorithms. Simple manipulations of drone control and
task allocation algorithms achieved through the provision of incorrect data, replay
attacks (repeating or delaying valid information transfers), injections of nefarious
code, or the alteration of existing code could cause significant disruptions. If a
manipulation prevents drones from detecting one another, they may collide.
A failure to detect an environmental hazard may cause a crash by simply
feeding old video or image data so the swarm does not “see” the building in
front of it. Because errors are inevitable, code alterations that increase the risk of
21. Ashton B. Carter, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, Department of Defense Directive 3000.09
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 2012).
22. C. G. Leela Krishna and Robin R. Murphy, “A Review of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” in 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Safety, Security, and Rescue Robotics
(SSRR) (New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017).
23. Mahmoud Hashem Eiza and Qiang Ni, “Driving with Sharks: Rethinking Connected Vehicles with
Vehicle Cyber Security,” IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine 12, no. 2 (June 2017).
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error (but that do not necessarily cause one) may go undetected for a long
time. An adversary-induced error may appear as a normal computer error.24
Alternatively, cyber manipulations may slow information processing, decision
making, or object recognition and make the swarm more vulnerable to
counterswarm defenses. Algorithm sabotage could even occur during the
production process.
Advances in machine learning and related technologies allow adversaries to
create and disseminate highly sophisticated fake images and videos or use cyber
infiltration to inject them into data collections.25 Fake data may lead image
and video analysis software to incorrect conclusions, missed threats, or
noncombatant targeting. If the same software is used in multiple unmanned
systems, adversaries could cause massive harm.
Most significantly, adversaries could redirect the drone swarm to attack friendly
targets through code alteration to the control algorithm or feeding incorrect
data so the swarm believes a friendly target is an adversary.26 Adversaries would
turn the swarms’ capabilities to their gain. Alternatively, adversaries could order
the swarm to leave a threatened area or move into adversarial fire. Adversaries
might also render the swarm safe for collection and study to gain unique
intelligence on the swarm’s capabilities. Vulnerability to cyber manipulation and
levels of autonomy are interrelated.
More autonomy means more complex computing systems with more
opportunities for exploitation and greater risk of error. Drones with autonomous
navigation, movement, or targeting systems can operate without human control
and can be manipulated. Likewise, coordination is likely to be more difficult
with larger, heterogeneous swarms, which raises the risk of catastrophic failure.
Identifying infiltration is also more challenging with larger swarms because
adversaries may attack only one drone within the swarm.
Finally, adversaries could seek to exfiltrate data from the swarm by accessing
communication links between the drones or between the drones and the control
station or software and firmware in the internal control system of the drones
themselves. These tactics could allow adversaries to collect intelligence on the
location and activity of the swarm to improve defenses, retreat from an anticipated
attack area, or prepare countermeasures as appropriate. Data exfiltration may
24. Duffel Blog reporters 29 Reasons Why and Veishnoriets, “Point/Counterpoint: Future Wars Will
Be Fought with AI Robots vs. ‘Microsoft Word Is Not Responding,’ ” Duffel Blog, May 30, 2019,
www.duffelblog.com / 2019 / 05 / point- counterpoint -future- wars-will-be-fought -with-ai -robots -vs-microsoft
-word-is-not-responding/.
25. Patrick Tucker, “The Newest AI-Enabled Weapon: ‘Deep-Faking’ Photos of the Earth,” Defense One
(website), March 31, 2019, www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/03/next-phase-ai-deep-faking-whole
-world-and-china-ahead/155944/?oref=d-topstory.
26. Scharre, “Counter-Swarm.”
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also enable more disruptive operations through a better understanding of the
algorithms and programs that enable multiple drones to operate as swarms.
This understanding would also better enable actors to create their own swarms.

Space Warfare
Drone swarms typically rely on space assets for geolocation, and swarms that
operate over the horizon require space assets for command and control. If satellites
are disabled or destroyed, the swarms may not operate effectively—or at all. Recent
technological developments, however, suggest the space domain may be less of a
dependency over time and the most likely dimension of information warfare to
stop being a drone-swarm requirement.
Many drone swarms rely on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
to guide them, and GNSS waypoints can be used to define the paths followed or
the areas to avoid, identify targets of interest (such as the location of adversarial
installations for intelligence collection), and y guide the swarm back to launch
positions. Satellites may also serve as relays for command-and-control information.
Currently, drone swarms operate at relatively short ranges at which satellite
communication is unnecessary. As the technology evolves, swarms may operate
at longer ranges and these greater distances will likely require satellite-based
communication for updating mission objectives, giving permissions, or providing
other commands. In the future, communication among drones in a swarm may
even require space assets to cover long distances.
Disabling or destroying satellites would prevent swarms reliant on satellites
for geolocation or command orders from operating effectively. The drones would
become ineffective and start wandering without knowing what to do or where
to go. In a world where adversarial military force depends largely on unmanned
systems, disabling geolocation over a wide area could prove devastating.
Advances in technology may reduce or possibly mitigate space-based risks.
Swarms could use external GNSS nodes to aid in localization. One research
team used Global Positioning System-linked buoys to allow underwater
drones to locate their positions without direct access to the system.27 The buoys
released a periodic signal that underwater drones sensed to infer their location.
A similar concept could aid ground or aerial vehicle geolocation by using signals
transmitted from a known location (such as a support vehicle). Alternatively,
new navigation concepts may remove the need for GNSS, though the degree
27. Jules S. Jaffe et al., “A Swarm of Autonomous Miniature Underwater Robot Drifters for Exploring
Submesoscale Ocean Dynamics,” Nature Communications 8, no. 1 (January 2017).
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to which these concepts will be successful in a military context is unclear.28 As
with electronic warfare, greater drone autonomy lowers the need for external,
space-based signals.

Psychological Warfare
Drone swarms have the least relevance for psychological warfare. The exception
is for possibly spreading propaganda pamphlets, however, swarms appear
to have few, if any, meaningful advantages over existing means of spreading
propaganda. Nevertheless, drone swarms—and autonomous weapons more
broadly—may be objects of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation
to the extent global and public norms form around the use of swarms and
autonomous weapons. Growing movements are seeking to ban autonomous
weapons due to concerns over risks to civilians and the ethics of abandoning
human control. Increasingly large constituencies support the movement, including
in some NATO member countries. For instance, 72 percent of Germans oppose
the use of autonomous weapons, according to a January 2019 Ipsos poll.29
Likewise, armed, fully autonomous swarms may pose psychological impacts and
risks akin to traditional weapons of mass destruction due to the combination of
mass casualty potential and the brittleness of current machine vision systems.30
The term “weapons of mass destruction” carries strong normative implications
with stigmas around their use and proliferation.31
Regardless of whether these public movements translate into changes in global
policy, they may create opportunities for strategic information operations to sow
division. For example, actors may amplify claims about the use of swarms and
autonomous weapons to encourage opposition to a war effort, both internally and
with partner nations. Conversely, actors may make false accusations against others
to achieve the same effects. The challenges of verifying whether an autonomous
weapon is truly autonomous make separating truth from fiction difficult.32
The autonomy of a drone swarm may be easier to prove because a person could
potentially control a small swarm consisting of dozens of drones, but no person
could reasonably control a few thousand drones. Disproving false claims about
autonomous drone-swarm use would be much harder.
28. Evan Ackerman, “This Autonomous Quadrotor Swarm Doesn’t Need GPS,” IEEE Spectrum (website),
December 27, 2017, https://spectrum.ieee.org/this-autonomous-quadrotor-swarm-doesnt-need-gps.
29. Chris Deeney, “Six in Ten (61%) Respondents across 26 Countries Oppose the Use of Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems,” Ipsos (website), January 22, 2019, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/human-rights
-watch-six-in-ten-oppose-autonomous-weapons.
30. Zachary Kallenborn, Are Drone Swarms Weapons of Mass Destruction?, Future Warfare Series no. 60
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies, 2020)
31. Patricia Shamai, “Name and Shame: Unraveling the Stigmatization of Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 1 (2015).
32. Zachary Kallenborn, “If a Killer Robot Were Used, Would We Know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(website), June 4, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/06/if-a-killer-robot-were-used-would-we-know/.
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Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Advances in AI and robotics underpin all aspects of drone swarms and affect
vulnerability and resilience to information warfare. Improvements in these
technologies may lead to better targeting algorithms, swarm task allocation
algorithms, and larger and more complex swarms and also affect electronic
warfare, cyberwarfare, and space warfare systems that may be used by or against
swarms. Greater use of AI and robotics on the battlefield may also create more
opportunities for psychological warfare.
Robotics and AI could improve offensive electronic warfare and cyberwarfare
capabilities. Machine learning could strengthen electronic warfare targeting and
create more effective and automated cyberattacks. For instance, machine learning
can enable better spectrum and power allocation, phishing detection, network
intrusion detection, and other activities.33 Indeed, China’s People’s Liberation
Army Strategic Support Force is reportedly integrating machine learning with
both cyberwarfare and electronic warfare.34 Additionally, advances in machine
learning could allow users to add better deep fakes to friendly or adversarial data
sets via cyber means.35 Researchers are also exploring the use of robots as platforms
for electronic attacks and cyberattacks.36
Advancements in AI are also likely to improve electronic, cyber, and space
countermeasures. Cyber defense techniques based on AI offer significant benefits
to cyber intrusion detection, including improved accuracy, automated response,
and throughput.37 Alternatively, robotic systems could be used to form an ad
hoc communications network where other systems are degraded or destroyed.
For example, Swarm Technologies’ SpaceBEE satellites form communication
networks for Internet-connected devices.38 Individual or multiple robots could
serve as intermediaries to support stable communication.

33. Vitaly Ford and Ambareen Siraj, “Applications of Machine Learning in Cyber Security”
(working paper, 27th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering,
New Orleans, LA, October 13–15, 2014), https://vford.me/papers/Ford%20Siraj%20Machine%20
Learning%20in%20Cyber%20Security%20final%20manuscript.pdf; and Yonghua Wang et al., “A Survey of
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation Based on Reinforcement Learning Algorithms in Cognitive Radio Networks,”
Artificial Intelligence Review 51, no. 3 (March 2019): 491–506.
34. Elsa B. Kania, “China’s Strategic Arsenals in a New Era,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (website),
April 20, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/chinas-strategic-arsenals-in-a-new-era/.
35. Tucker, “AI-Enabled Weapon.”
36. Polat Ceviket et al., “The Small and Silent Force Multiplier: A Swarm UAV—Electronic Attack,”
Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems 70, no. 1-4 (2013): 595–608.
37. Amjad Rehman and Tanzila Saba, “Evaluation of Artificial Intelligent Techniques to Secure Information
in Enterprises,” Artificial Intelligence Review 42, no. 4 (December 2014): 1029–44.
38. Marina Koren, “The Mystery of the ‘SpaceBees’ Just Got Even Weirder,” Atlantic (website),
May 17, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/rogue-satellites-launch-fcc/555482/.
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Robotic systems are great for space warfare; they do not need life-sustaining
equipment, which makes them less costly.39 Space-based robots could be used
to attack or collect information on adversarial satellites.40 Multiple space-based
robots could maneuver space debris into an orbit to hit adversary satellites or
mount distributed, coordinated attacks.41 Of course, a space-based swarm may have
different technological challenges than a terrestrial swarm—especially successful
movement and coordination.
More AI and robots on the battlefield means more opportunities to accuse
adversaries of violating nascent norms of autonomous weapons and, therefore,
more opportunities to wage psychological warfare. Improvements to AI might
counter some of this concern. One concern of activists is machine learning is
known to be brittle because training data may be biased or otherwise incomplete.
Enhanced testing and evaluation, synthetic data, and data sharing may reduce
the risks and provide opportunities for countermessaging. Judging how robust
machine learning systems are would be difficult, if not impossible, without closely
examining the training data. Adversaries may falsely claim the machine learning
systems are untested and poorly designed, leading to high risks to civilians, and
disproving such a claim would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus,
extensive deployment of these systems may lead to increased claims of violations
of the laws of war.

Policy Recommendations
The dependence of drone swarms on information warfare has several
implications the military should consider for successful operations.
More in-depth studies of the relationship between drone swarms and
information warfare are necessary and should explore the technical characteristics
of informational interactions, how the information environment shapes tactical
usage, and how tactical uses influence the operational and strategic environments.
Some studies could perform modeling and simulation to assess the resilience
of different drone-swarm configurations to informational attacks. Simulations
and war games could explore the relative value of drone swarms in specific
information-related roles (such as electronic attack) or as anti-satellite weapons.

39. Peter W. Singer, “Op-Ed: Wired for War: The Future of Military Robots,” Brookings Institution
(website), August 28, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/wired-for-war-the-future-of-military
-robots/.
40. Subrata Ghoshroy, “The X-37B: Backdoor Weaponization of Space?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71,
no. 3 (2015).
41. Marie Murphy, “70. Star Wars 2050,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command Mad Scientist
Laboratory (blog), July 23, 2018, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/70-star-wars-2050/.
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Analysis should focus on how the information competition changes in different
types of conflict (peer versus peer, peer versus near-peer, and asymmetric), the
resilience of different forms of communication to electronic attack and how drone
swarms fit into broader spectrum allocation, and new concepts incorporating
drone swarms and how they interact with information warfare.
Research and development of friendly drone swarms must include hardening
to informational attacks. Intraswarm communication channels, information
processing systems, and longer-range, command-and-control systems must
all be protected. Certain systems (such as object detection algorithms) will
not be specific to swarms. Some promising research on information hardening
has begun, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s work
on swarms that are operable in GNSS-denied environments.42 These projects
should be expanded. The degree to which a drone swarm is hardened should
depend on the mission and the likelihood and type of information-based attacks
the swarm may face.
The United States should also conduct a comprehensive review of
information warfare capabilities across each service. Indications point to
electronic-warfare challenges for the US Air Force and the US Army, though
not the US Navy.43 Major General John Morrison, commanding general of the
US Army Cyber Center of Excellence, bluntly stated, “When it comes to
electronic warfare, we are outgunned . . . We are plain outgunned by peer and
near-peer competitors.”44 Recent reports also paint a negative image of military
cybersecurity. An October 2018 Government Accountability Office report
“found that from 2012 to 2017, [Department of Defense] testers routinely found
mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems that were under
development.”45 Department of Defense difficulties in recruiting cyberwarriors
and a growing divide between Silicon Valley and the department exacerbate the
challenge.46 The United States faces increasing opposition in space, too. A recent
unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency report found the following.
42. Patrick Tucker, “The US Military’s Drone Swarm Strategy Just Passed a Key Test,” Defense One
(website), November 21, 2018, www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/11/us-militarys-drone-swarm
-strategy-just-passed-key-test/153007.
43. Mike Pietrucha, “Low-Altitude Penetration and Electronic Warfare: Stuck on Denial, Part III,” War
on the Rocks, April 25, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/low-altitude-penetration-stuck-on-denial
-part-iii/; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Tests Jamming MRAPs: New Electronic Warfare Vehicle,” Breaking
Defense, August 16, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-tests-jamming-mraps-new-electronic
-warfare-vehicle/; and Mark Pomerleau, “US Is ‘Outgunned’ in Electronic Warfare Says Cyber Commander,”
C4ISRNET (website), August 10, 2017, www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/technet-augusta/2017/08/10/us-is
-outgunned-in-electronic-warfare-says-cyber-commander/.
44. Pomerleau, “US Is ‘Outgunned.’ ”
45. Cristina T. Chaplain, Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of
Vulnerabilities, GAO-19-128 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, October 2018).
46. Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National
-Security Threat,” Atlantic (website), December 13, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12
/growing-gulf-between-silicon-valley-and-washington/577963/.

Beyond Conventional War

Kallenborn

99

Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they view space
as important to modern warfare and view counterspace capabilities
as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness . . . Both
have developed robust and capable space services, including spacebased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance . . . Both states
are developing jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy
weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based antisatellite missiles
that can achieve a range of reversible to nonreversible effects.47

The review should assess the true state of military information warfare and
its alignment with adversarial developments, identify concrete recommendations
to improve information warfare capabilities and organizations, and provide
an unclassified set of recommendations and guidance for the defense industry
and intelligentsia on how their efforts may support broader information
warfare activities.
According to the review results, the US military would be able to make
targeted investments in the study and development of offensive information
warfare capabilities (for example, electronic jamming and offensive cyberweapons)
to disrupt, manipulate, or otherwise defeat adversarial drone swarms that
may be used against American forces. Such investments would also benefit
other aspects of future warfare—from countering unmanned systems and
information-dependent warfare concepts to disrupting adversarial supply chains.
Relevant capabilities should be integrated organizationally, and developments
in robotics, electronic warfare, cyberwarfare, and space warfare should inform
drone swarm acquisition, research and development, war gaming, concept and
doctrine development, and related training. Activities should take place at the
Joint level to the extent possible because the drone-swarm information challenge
is the same for each service. Better integration across the components of the
information domain would also be useful for nonswarming, unmanned systems
because much of the analysis in this article also applies to them.
Intelligence collection on adversarial drone swarms and related information
warfare aspects would be important, too. Intelligence collection aimed at
drone-swarm technical operations would help the military understand how
to manipulate or disrupt adversarial drone swarms and identify opportunities
for covert action, such as poisoning data collections used for machine vision
algorithms.48 Other obvious targets for intelligence collections are adversarial
47. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence
Agency, 2019).
48. Matthew Jagielski et al., “Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures
for Regression Learning” (working paper, 2018 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Francisco, California, May 21–23, 2018), https://arxiv.org
/pdf/1804.00308.pdf.
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organizations that combine information warfare capabilities (for example, the
People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force). Information gathered
would help the military understand the capabilities potentially deployed against
American and strategic partner drone swarms.
Before deploying a drone swarm, future commanders should evaluate the
information warfare situation on the battlefield to inform the types of swarms
to be used and their composition. For instance, commanders could include
more communication drones to increase survivability. Training, exercises, and
war games should be created to help commanders develop and exercise this
judgment. In addition, incorporating information warfare elements into broader
readiness and training activities would allow commanders to appreciate the
challenges of losing control of the information environment. Commanders
could also consider the deployment of counterelectronic warfare weapons to
support the drone swarm in denied environments.
If the US military seeks to employ drone swarms in large numbers, it must
also plan for the mitigation of the resultant psychological warfare risks and
adopt measures to make these operations more transparent and to ensure
appropriate human control, provided the transparency does not deliver
advantages to adversaries. For example, the United States could adopt stronger
restrictions on autonomous weapons by turning current restrictions under
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, into
binding law or adopting new transparency policies on autonomous weapon
capabilities.49 These restrictions could be accompanied by costly commitments,
such as investment in verification measures for autonomous weapons.50

Conclusion
More than any other weapon system, drone swarms are dependent on
information. Virtually every swarm-related capability requires mastery of
information flows that let swarms grow in size, adopt complex behaviors,
and operate in multiple domains simultaneously. These advantages, however,
also pose a significant vulnerability. Disabling, disrupting, or manipulating
swarm communication, information processing, and geolocation can disable or
defeat a swarm.
No military technology exists in a vacuum. The military is a highly complex
system of systems, and numerous technological areas are interdependent.
49. “ICRC Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems,” International Committee of the Red Cross
(website), May 12, 2021, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems.
50. Matthew Mittelsteadt, AI Verification: Mechanisms to Ensure AI Arms Control Compliance
(Washington, DC: Center for Security and Emerging Technology, February 2021).
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Senior leaders must consider the role of new technologies within the broader
military ecosystem because myopia and failure are fast friends.
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Zachary Kallenborn is a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and
Government, a research aff iliate of the Unconventional Weapons and
Technology program at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, a senior consultant at ABS Group, and officially
proclaimed US Army “mad scientist.” He is the author of publications on
autonomous weapons, drone swarms, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction.

102

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

Select Bibliography
Kallenborn, Zachary. Are Drone Swarms Weapons of Mass Destruction?
Future Warfare Series no. 60. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air
Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies, 2020.
Kallenborn, Zachary. “The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We
Need to Be Ready for It.” Modern War Institute at West Point (website).
October 25, 2018. https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm-coming
-need-ready/.
Krishna, C. G. Leela., and Robin R. Murphy, “A Review of Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” in 2017 IEEE
International Symposium on Safety, Security, and Rescue Robotics (SSRR).
New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017.
Michel, Arthur Holland. Counter-Drone Systems. Annandale-on-Hudson,
NY: Center for the Study of the Drone, February 2018.
Scharre, Paul. “Counter-Swarm: A Guide to Defeating Robotic Swarms.”
War on the Rocks (website). March 31, 2015. https://warontherocks
.com/2015/03/counter-swarm-a-guide-to-defeating-robotic-swarms/.
Theohary, Catherine A.. Defense Primer: Information Operations, IF10771.
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 2020.
Verbruggen, Maaike. The Question of Swarms Control: Challenges to
Ensuring Human Control over Military Systems. Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament Paper no. 65. Brussels: EU Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Consortium, 2019.
Xi Chen, Jun Tang, and Songyang Lao, “Review of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Swarm Communication Architectures and Routing Protocols.”
Applied Sciences 10, no. 10 (2020).

Lessons from History

Character Traits Strategic Leaders Need
Tami Davis Biddle

©2022 Tami Davis Biddle

ABSTRACT: Strategic leaders must possess a range of skills to work successfully
in complex environments. To use those skills to best effect, they rely on character
traits that enhance the likelihood of their effectiveness as leaders and maximize
their success when working in teams. Certain character traits facilitate work
in demanding settings that rely heavily on communication, integration, and
cooperation. Programs designed to educate senior leaders must help future national
security professionals identify these character traits and then practice and hone
them. Highlighting individuals with challenging roles in World War II, this essay
analyzes the character traits that enabled them to succeed in their work.

Key words: character, leadership, self-awareness, effectiveness,
self-development

W

hen national security professionals develop and implement strategy,
they are engaged in an intensely analytical and human activity.
While a strategist’s successful practice requires an understanding
of logistics and geography, for instance, it also requires a sound grasp of human
perception and decision making. Strategists must be broadly educated; they must be
able, in particular, to grasp and analyze readily the complex environments in which
they work. However, as they look outward, they must also look inward to develop a
sense of themselves—including their strengths and weaknesses and ability to work in
groups, among allies, and across key networks. Since strategy demands cooperation
and coordination among many actors, its success depends heavily on leadership and
communication. Yet undergirding these—and the skills they require—are important
elements of character.1

Any curriculum designed to teach national security professionals to be successful
strategic leaders should incorporate lessons that heighten their self-awareness and
give them time to understand and appreciate the elements of character that have served
them well so far in their careers. They must also be given opportunities to reinforce
these attributes and develop the new ones they will need in the future. This article
identifies the most essential elements of character needed by strategists. Working
at the senior level of the American professional military education system for
20 years, I developed a strong sense of the skills and abilities my students would
1. On strategic leadership, see Strategic Leadership: Primer for Senior Leaders, 4th ed., Department of Command,
Leadership, and Management, US Army War College (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2019). For material
related to ideas in this essay, see chapter 7, “Senior Leader Character,” by Maurice L. Sipos, Nate Hunsinger, and
Peter R. Sniffin.
TOC

104

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

need for success. These skills were supported and facilitated by personal attributes
and qualities that might be thought of as “character.”
Many individual elements of character, including honesty and integrity,
are moral and ethical in nature; they support an individual’s leadership ability
by building a foundation upon which subordinates can place their trust. Other
qualities, such as a willingness to accept responsibility, have an important
ethical component but are not strictly ethical in nature. A third set of attributes
is most closely related to perception, analytical skill, and cognitive ability.
These elements can be highlighted, discussed, and reinforced in the classrooms
so that students hone and refine the strengths they will rely upon when facing
challenging tasks in the future.
Using historical case studies can be beneficial since they help national
security professionals recognize the elements of character that influence a
senior leader’s likelihood of success in a given situation. Once the positive
qualities are recognized and understood, they can be embraced and practiced.
Additionally, the development of these elements of character will help these
individuals successfully frame complex issues as members of strategy and
planning teams. Drawing on the rich history of World War II, I identify several
key leaders and highlight the character traits that helped them achieve success
in the challenging roles they performed. By providing specific examples drawn
from the not-so-distant past, I hope to offer future strategists a way to grasp and
retain the information more readily than if it were presented solely in general or
theoretical terms.
The first quality a strategist needs is the ability to discern what is salient in a
given situation. In a complex scenario, where many problems are intertwined and
competing for attention, it is difficult to see right to the heart of the matter and
then discern how to make ways and means match desired ends. Yet, this is an
essential skill for creating, articulating, and implementing strategy. While more
instinctive for some than others, this ability can be learned and developed with
practice. It demands focus and a keen analytical sensibility. An able strategist will
help others to stay fixed on the core elements of the problem at hand.
Harry Hopkins, the closest adviser and confidant of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (FDR), was noted for his qualities of discernment, and FDR gave
Hopkins a central role in the “New Deal” program aimed at coping with the
worst effects of the Great Depression. As war engulfed the world, Hopkins took
a leading role in US national security, and the US relationship with its
World War II allies. Traveling often to meet with key leaders, he became the
eyes and ears of a president with limited mobility. British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill formed a bond with Hopkins that helped facilitate
TOC
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Anglo-American relations throughout World War II. In tribute to Hopkins’
bird-dog ability to find the objective and stay fixed on it, Churchill named him
“Lord Root of the Matter.”
While chief lend-lease administrator in the early years of the war, Hopkins
was responsible for ascertaining the most urgent needs of the allied leaders
fighting Hitler, to include weapons, equipment, and materials. After discerning
these needs, often in face-to-face talks with leaders, Hopkins had to make the
case for them in the highest councils in Washington, DC. In addition, Hopkins
helped prepare the president for summit meetings and wartime conferences,
and, while attending those with the president, would ensure the most pressing
and consequential issues were prioritized and given full attention by senior
decisionmakers. When Hopkins was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal
after the war, the citation noted the “piercing understanding” he had displayed in
tackling the many strategic problems posed by the war.2
Two other qualities Hopkins possessed in abundance were determination
and commitment. Strategists need these qualities to initiate and sustain allconsuming projects that will be buffeted by many winds and subject to frequent
change due to adaptive enemies, contingencies, and forces that strategists cannot
wholly control. Hopkins, plagued by poor health and the acute aftereffects
of surgery for stomach cancer in 1937, carried out his weighty tasks with a
determination that belied his physical condition. Indeed, the greater the burden
upon him, the more he seemed able to transcend the limits of his frail body.3
General George C. Marshall remarked that Hopkins, through his energy,
determination, and unflagging commitment to the way forward, “rendered a
service to his country which will never even vaguely be appreciated.”4 In a deft
sketch, Churchill said Hopkins was “a crumbling lighthouse from which there
shown the beams that led great fleets to harbor.”5
Strategists work within complex networks of actors, agencies, and stakeholders;
they must win and hold the trust of others. This trust, in turn, enables them
to influence others and develop successful initiatives. Marshall, who served as
Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, had impeccable integrity
that earned him the respect and trust of those with whom he worked. No one
who knew Marshall ever believed his judgments or actions were self-serving,
publicity-seeking, or narrowly-conceived.
2. For Churchill’s characterization, see David Roll, The Hopkins Touch (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 87, 406 (quoted material on 406). The citation for Hopkins’ Distinguished Service Medal is
quoted in Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (rev. ed., New York: Grosset and
Dunlap, 1950), 4.
3. Roll, Hopkins Touch, 43, 81.
4. Marshall quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 1.
5. Churchill quoted in Roll, Hopkins Touch, 409.
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Marshall could speak with frankness and authority in the highest councils
and win broad support for his decisions. His colleagues had faith his behavior
was motivated only by pursuit of the nation’s good.6 He was able to tell the
president hard truths about the need to improve the functioning of the military
services rapidly by giving them the resources they needed to defend the nation.
Additionally, he dramatically restructured a stale, bureaucratic interwar army
by pulling in talented new leaders and relieving those who had outlasted
their usefulness. As a senior leader in the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Marshall made key decisions about the allocation of resources among competing
services and commanders who often fought over those resources.
A successful strategist must have self-confidence, since this quality enables
decisiveness in times of trial and crisis; however, it must be tempered by humility.
If self-confidence errs toward arrogance, it becomes suspect—even poisonous.
Born into wealth and high social standing, Roosevelt had the confidence and
shrewdness possessed by most successful politicians.7 He also bore an acute
physical burden brought on by polio in young adulthood. Illness strengthened his
determination, but it also humbled him and helped inoculate him against
overweening arrogance, even while he served as president of the United States.
It also enabled him to feel empathy for others who suffered. This capacity for
empathy, in turn, helped FDR during the Great Depression when he battled
vast unemployment and mass misery. The New Deal, designed to relieve national
suffering, and restore confidence in the nation’s financial system, was a jolt
to Americans who believed the national government should play only a very
small role in the lives of citizens. Roosevelt, therefore, had to contend with
numerous critics in Congress and the press—and among businesses, local
politicians, and local government agencies opposed to change. As fire tempers
steel, these experiences prepared him for the even greater challenges he faced
during World War II.8
An ability to overcome hardship also builds courage, another essential
quality for the strategist. In one of the most powerful statements in On War,
6. On Marshall, see the multiple volumes by his biographer: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall:
Education of a General, 1880–1939 (New York: Viking Adult, 1963); Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall:
Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1967); and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall:
Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1973). See also Mark Stoler, George C. Marshall:
Soldier-Statesman of the American Century (Farmington Hills, MI: Twayne Publishers, 1989); Ed Cray,
General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990); and
Eric Larrabee, “Marshall” in Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War
(New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1987), 96–115.
7. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Political Life (New York: Viking/Penguin Random House
LLC, 2017).
8. See Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 74–100, which discusses his polio. On FDR during the
Great Depression and World War II, see David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People
in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Doris Kearns Goodwin,
No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, The Home Front in World War II (New York:
Simon & Schuster Inc., 1994).
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Clausewitz observed that courage was of two kinds: “courage in the face of
personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal
of some outside power or before the court of one’s own conscience.”9 Those
who serve successfully in the military learn quickly that great leaders need both
physical courage and the courage to accept responsibility. Courage enables
leaders to make and live with choices that involve the highest possible stakes and
allows them to handle and even thrive in fraught and dangerous environments
while inspiring others to do the same.
Before troops landed in Normandy in June 1944, Supreme Allied Commander
Dwight D. Eisenhower drafted a letter to be sent if the assault failed. It read:
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain
a satisfactory foothold. I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to
attack at this time and place was based on the best information available.
The troops, the Air and the Navy, did all that bravery and devotion
to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is
mine alone.

He revised the first draft of his second sentence, changing it from “the
troops have been withdrawn” to “I have withdrawn the troops.” This change
from the passive to the active voice highlights his willingness to carry the full
weight of responsibility on his shoulders. The brief statement is a marvelous
example of leadership that jumps off the page and wins instant respect. Words
matter, and in a situation with the highest possible stakes, the individual in charge
had the courage to accept responsibility fully.10
The strategist, whether military or civilian, must be constantly aware that
each strategic decision, particularly in crisis and/or war, may involve life and
death and affect the lives of others for generations to come. Field Marshal Sir
William Slim, Britain’s talented World War II commander who took on a nearly
hopeless situation in Burma and turned it around, also divided courage into
two types: physical courage and moral courage. Of the latter, he wrote: “Moral
courage simply means that you do what you think is right without bothering
too much about the effect on yourself. . . . You must be as big as your job and you
must not be afraid of losing it.”11
Leaders entrusted with weighty decisions must also have the humility to
adjust course or change direction if new information and evidence require it.
9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 101.
10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “ ‘In Case of Failure’ Message, 6/5/1944,” US National Archives Docs Teach
(website), accessed December 10, 2021, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/in-case-of-failure.
11. For the quote, William Slim, “Higher Command in War” (speech, Army Command and General Staff
College, April 1952) reprinted in Military Review (May 1990), 13.
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Here humility facilitates and pairs with a particular kind of courage. Those who
dig so deeply into a position that they never change their minds will be a liability
in the fluid and dynamic world of strategy, where leaders must constantly reassess
their assumptions, and weigh outcomes against expectations. In a speech delivered
at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Slim argued that where
events develop and change quickly, as in war, one must possess an openness to
new information. He explained, “What you have to cultivate is imagination, but
a controlled imagination, and a flexibility of mind. There is an obvious conflict
between flexibility of mind and strength of will. You have to be very careful to
see that your strength of will does not become just obstinacy, and your flexibility
of mind does not become mere vacillation.”12 Slim understood the challenge
here: on the one hand, leaders are told they must commit themselves fully to
what they believe is the best course of action; on the other hand, they must be
adroit and adaptive. Despite this seeming paradox, Slim believed leaders at the
highest levels must cultivate a willingness to tack in a new direction if the wind
changes. Inflexibility or brittleness when clear evidence warrants change is a
sign of insecurity. Genuinely self-confident leaders are willing to adjust when
sound and sufficient information tells them to do so.
Slim also realized that when leaders cloud the truth, their subordinates will
see through them. Military leaders feel this especially keenly, because soldiers
will quickly sense any attempt to mask or manipulate reality. Drawing on his
extensive experience, he argued that “when you are in command and things
have gone wrong, there always comes a pause when your men stop . . . They
don’t say anything—they just look at you. It’s a rather awful moment for the
commander because then he knows that their courage is ebbing, their will is
fading, and he has got to pull up out of himself the courage and the willpower
that will stiffen them and make them go on.” Slim insisted that no commander
“would ever get over that moment unless he has the confidence of his men.”
This confidence derived from a “massive and simple honesty.” He added:
“All the really great commanders who have held their men have had it because
the only foundations under man which will stand under great stress are the
moral ones.”13 Those trying to pick their way through wickedly difficult problems
will face moments like this. They may not be as acute or consequential as they are
on the battlefield, but they will occur nonetheless. In these moments, strategists
will require the stores of honesty and integrity they have earned among those
around them.
Slim’s stress on moral foundations takes us back to honesty and integrity.
Truth is the bedrock upon which rests all the moral and legal codes supporting
12. Slim, “Higher Command in War,” 15.
13. Slim, “Higher Command in War,” 16–17.
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advanced societies. Attesting to the truth of a statement, either by giving one’s
word or by signing one’s name to a document, has moral and legal standing.
Both adherence and enforcement of laws make possible predictability and thus
social advancement. Based on collective, widely supported interpretations of
justice, codified standards and practices offer progress and security for political
communities. Foundational documents such as the Magna Carta, and singularly
important practices as habeas corpus, reflect the core principles that were the
foundation stones of later democratic societies in Britain and the United States.
In early May 1940, Britain faced an existential crisis. With Germany in
control of most of Europe, many British leaders felt there was no option but to seek
terms with Hitler—even though they understood by then how little they could
rely on any agreement with him. Soon-to-be British Prime Minister Churchill
argued otherwise. Facing his fears of what lay ahead, he rallied the British people
on behalf of a noble cause, arousing in his countrymen an instinctive desire for
justice, independence, and self-determination—even if these would require
great personal sacrifice. Remarking on Churchill’s speech of May 13, 1940, the
Philadelphia Inquirer observed on its editorial page: “He proved in this one short
speech that he was not afraid to face the truth and tell it. He proved himself an
honest man as well as a man of action. Britain has reason to be enheartened by
his brevity, his bluntness, and his courage.”14 Above all, Churchill persuaded his
countrymen that even if the fight proved to be long and hard, fighting for these
principles was the only choice that would rest easily on the British conscience.
By accepting Churchill’s arguments, the British people could steel themselves
and embrace a necessary battle.
Early on, a handful of others shared this courage and forthrightness in the
face of the Nazi threat. Though she is not a household name, American writer
Dorothy Thompson should be remembered for her clear-eyed and fearless
writing about Nazism, which predated Churchill’s speeches. In her outspoken,
prescient columns and radio speeches of the 1930s, Thompson sounded the klaxon
about Hitler and the threat he posed to the world. She argued Nazism placed
will above reason and appealed unremittingly “to totem and taboo; elevating
tribal fetishes; subjugating and destroying the common sense that grows out of
human experience.” She explained that both lying and bullying were central to
the movement Hitler had created in Germany; the Nazis would erode
Enlightenment principles and moral values and would be a direct threat to
democracy. For National Socialists, she explained, “the Lie is openly accepted
14. Editorial quoted in Max Hastings, Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord, 1940-1945 (London:
HarperPress, 2009), 13; see also Jon Lukacs, The Duel: The Eighty-Day Struggle between Churchill and
Hitler (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); and on effective communication, see Tom Galvin,
Communication Campaigning: Primer for Senior Leaders (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Department
of Command, Leadership and Management), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3675.pdf.
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as a useful means to an end.” Nazism, she argued emphatically, could not be
appeased—only opposed—since appeasement “would only strengthen it, never
satisfy it, and breed in it an enormous mocking contempt for the world it
would destroy.”15
Thompson forced herself to face things others at the time refused to
countenance. Her biographer Peter Kurth noted that in early 1933 in Germany,
she had “with unbelieving eyes” witnessed the seduction of a nation, the triumph
of “hatred, envy, greed, vanity, and cheap heroics.” She said what others would
not say, that “post-war Europe was finished, and pre-war Europe had begun . . .
the boiling kettle had exploded.”16 Yet, Thompson avoided despair: “To be
conscious of serious danger, and to be ready to look it in the eye, is not
pessimism. It is the way one gathers one’s strength. For when one looks it in the
eye, it becomes, interestingly enough, less ominous.” She was forthright and
powerful, too, in her arguments against American isolationism, insisting the
United States was “not a forgotten Elysian island.” She argued:
Our two oceans connect us with the rest of the world; they do
not separate us. . . . They protect us, still, from armed attack upon our
soil, but they do not protect us from assaults upon our economy or
upon the public mind. They in no way relieve us of the responsibility of
doing everything that a great nation can do to maintain a world order in
which the interests of its people, and the values they cherish, can survive
and improve.17

Implementing strategy requires immense energy, determination, and resiliency
in the face of setbacks. Despite the many doubts he faced privately during World
War II, Churchill found courage in himself, and gave it a voice. His speeches
moved a nation, instilling in the British people the grit, cohesion, and moral
strength they needed to commit to an immense project requiring great and
continuing sacrifice. They needed all of these in a harrowing war characterized
by immense risks and (in the early years) aerial threats, and daunting land and
naval defeats. In the realm of strategy, the stakes are rarely so high as they were
for Britain in the first years of World War II, but every successful strategy will
require the ability to cope with setbacks and nasty surprises.
In late 1943, during and after the Tehran Conference, where all three Allied
leaders met for the first time, Churchill was burdened by two concerns: his
acute fear a cross-Channel attack into France might fail and his worry over the
looming threat of German “secret weapons.” These burdens taxed his body, and,
15. Dorothy Thompson, Let the Record Speak (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1939), 3, 4.
16. Peter Kurth, American Cassandra: The Life of Dorothy Thompson (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1990), 164.
17. Thompson, Let the Record Speak, 9.
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in the wake of the summit, he succumbed to pneumonia and heart arrhythmia
so acute he nearly died. Indeed, Lord Moran, Churchill’s personal physician,
noticed the physical impacts of stress on all three Allied leaders at that time.
Nevertheless, each one rallied repeatedly throughout the war, finding the strength
to lead their nations forward.18 Determination and a strong commitment to a
cause can undergird physical strength and resiliency. In today’s environment, with
the relentless 24-hour news cycle, senior leaders must learn how to take care of
themselves physically and emotionally, so they will have the endurance they need
in crises and wars.
An able strategist will not only cultivate a broad worldview, but will seek advice
from those who have knowledge and expertise on alternative perspectives. That
expert knowledge, which comes through study and, if possible, the experience
of living in a foreign culture, is invaluable. Some of the worst mistakes in the
history of American national security occurred because decisionmakers did not
take the time to understand what drove an adversary’s behavior or chose to ignore
those who had such insights. Indeed, a frequent cause of strategic setback is a
propensity to “mirror image,” to assume an adversary has a frame of mind
similar to one’s own. All actors in the international system, even close allies, have
unique interests and priorities and will assess stakes and risks in unique ways. If
strategists can see only their perspective, they are likely doomed to strategic
failure. Moving beyond one’s perspective is vital, but it requires a combination
of broadmindedness, agile thought, and empathy. The latter, in particular,
is crucial.
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, who headed Britain’s wartime Joint Staff Mission
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, DC, is not well known today—
but he ought to be. Dill had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff during
the first years of Britain’s battle against Hitler, when the situation was relentlessly
grim. During the interwar years, the British, unwilling to countenance another
fight with Germany so soon after World War I, had not prepared themselves
adequately to face the Nazi threat. Dill’s job, therefore, had been exhausting and
frustrating. In December 1941, as he was about to be replaced and sent to India
as the governor-designate of Bombay, he was asked to travel to the United States
with Churchill. The prime minister was anxious to hasten to Washington, DC,
in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor to gain early influence on the Americans with

18. See Lord Moran, Churchill at War, 1940-1945 (1966; repr. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers,
2003), 170–91; on Roosevelt’s health, see Rose McDermott, Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision
Making (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially 83–117; and Tami Davis Biddle,
“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in
Europe,” Journal of Military History 83, no. 1 (January 2019): 157–94.
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respect to the grand strategy of the war. This last-minute decision to include Dill
among the traveling party was contingent and providential.19
A mechanism for ongoing strategic cooperation between the British and the
Americans would be required, and it made sense to set up a permanent mission
in Washington, DC, to represent British views. The individual at the helm would
need experience, wisdom, diplomatic instincts, impeccable integrity, and the
ability to speak for the prime minister himself. Dill was selected for the position
and stayed in Washington after Churchill sailed back to London in early 1942.
Both Harry Hopkins and Marshall had met Dill on previous occasions and had
formed a high opinion of him. Their enthusiasm and Hopkins’s endorsement no
doubt influenced Churchill’s thinking on the matter. As it turned out, the role
suited Dill’s personality exactly and leveraged his greatest strengths, enabling him
to become an immense and irreplaceable asset not only to the British but to the
Americans as well.
Among Dill’s talents were empathy and broadmindedness. Working closely
with Marshall, he transmitted and translated British interests to the Americans
and American interests to the British. Marshall found a kindred spirit in Dill—
a man who equaled him in integrity, loved and understood armies and army life,
and could serve as the kind of sympathetic confidant those in elevated positions
are rarely are fortunate enough to find. Dill had overseen the British military in
the difficult early years of the war and understood the great pressures and the
challenging, consequential choices and tradeoffs that Marshall faced.
Dill also assisted his American colleagues in coping with FDR’s less-thanideal administrative instincts. When the president would convey information to
Churchill he had not shared with his own chiefs, Dill’s colleagues in London could
relay the information to Dill, who could then share it with Marshall—giving the
latter insight into the thinking of the US president he otherwise would not have
had. In the view of one astute historian, Dill was the “fulcrum” of the combined
machinery giving central direction to the war effort.20
Dill died of aplastic anemia on November 4, 1944, despite the most energetic
efforts of the best American doctors available. On the day of Dill’s memorial
service, flags flew at half-mast throughout Washington, DC. The US Joint Chiefs
of Staff were his pallbearers, and Dill was one of only a few foreign nationals
to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff
19. Alex Danchev, Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance,
1941-44 (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1986); and Alex Danchev, “Being Friends: the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and the Making of Allied Strategy in the Second World War,” in Lawrence Freedman, Paul
Hayes, and Robert O’Neill, eds., War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael
Howard (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1992), 195–210.
20. Danchev, Very Special Relationship, 11.
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told their British counterparts they “shared equally with you the loss to our
combined war effort resulting from the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill,”
and added: “His character and wisdom, his selfless devotion to the allied
cause made his contribution to the combined British-American war effort of
outstanding importance. It is not too much to say that probably no other individual
was more responsible for the achievement of complete cooperation in the work of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”21
Six years later, an equestrian statue of Dill, meticulously overseen by Marshall,
was erected on a beautiful site in the Arlington National Cemetery. On that
occasion, Marshall, then-secretary of state, said in his dedication speech:
“Here before us in Arlington, among our hallowed dead, lies a great hero, Field
Marshall Sir John Dill. He was my friend, I am proud to say, and he was my
intimate associate through most of the war years. I have never known a man
whose high character showed so clearly in the honest directness of his every
action. He was an inspiration to all of us.”22 During the war, Marshall worked
at the highest levels of grand strategic planning and implementation. Dill not
only helped Marshall bear the weight of enormously consequential decisions but,
through his “honest directness,” he could help shape those decisions—and also
serve as a model for those around him.
Finally, a strategic leader can benefit from a sense of humor, or simply an
appreciation of humor. A sense of humor will not only support resiliency but
can help create hope and sustain morale in challenging times.23 Writing in 1944,
E. E. Reynolds argued that FDR’s “good fellowship, cheerful spirits, and ready
laugh are great assets.”24 In addition, those blessed with a sense of humor can
help foster cohesion and loyalty within groups. The two exceptionally able men
who, under Dill, initially ran the Secretariat of the Washington-based Combined
Chiefs of Staff in World War II, US Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith, and
UK Brigadier Vivian Dykes, formed a close bond for many reasons, but one of
them was a shared appreciation for humor. Dykes, in particular, had a sparkling
wit, an easy and likable manner, and a talent for winning the loyalty of those
around him. One colleague noted he was, “a grand man in a tight place.”25 He
also possessed a remarkable talent for benign comic impersonation of some of
the more irascible senior officers on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Bedell Smith
21. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of Staff, November 5, 1944, printed in the New York Times
(November 19, 1944) and quoted in Danchev, Very Special Relationship, 3.
22. Marshall’s Speech, November 1, 1950, printed in the New York Times (November 2, 1950) and quoted in
Danchev, Very Special Relationship, 1.
23. There is extensive scientific and medical literature supporting the claim that humor and laughter
are important for stress management. See “Stress Relief from Laughter? It’s No Joke,” https://www
.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/stress-management/in-depth/stress-relief/art-20044456.
24. E. E. Reynolds, Four Modern Statesmen (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1944), 47.
25. Alex Danchev, Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier
Vivian Dykes (London: Brassey’s, 1990), 3.
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and Dykes, “who worked at the very epicenter of Anglo-American decision
making . . . swiftly established one of the keynote relationships of the military
alliance.”26 Dykes’ conviviality, perceptiveness, and wit injected energy into long
hours of stressful and often delicate work. Wit and humor became the lubricant
that allowed smooth operations between Dykes, representing British interests,
and Smith, representing American interests. Moreover, humor created a close tie
between them. Their relationship proved crucial to moving the Anglo-American
alliance onto a sound footing, thus facilitating the successful prosecution of the
war in the longer term.
Qualities of character matter: integrity, honesty, determination, self-confidence,
and the ability to see beyond one’s own perspective are the core qualities that a
strategist needs above all others. These qualities, along with an unfailing instinct
for the most salient, relevant, and pressing elements of a complex problem, give the
strategist a powerful tool kit. Strong communication skills are essential, but so too
is the ability to build trust among subordinates, superiors, and peers. Great ideas
brilliantly articulated will not be accepted unless their advocate is respected and
trusted by those who will share and implement those ideas. Great administrative
and planning skills are hollow unless they are accompanied by a capacity for
empathy and broadmindedness.
It is rare to see all these abilities and qualities present equally in a single
individual. However, strategy is never a solo endeavor. As the vignettes above
illustrate, the character of successful strategists contributed to their individual
effectiveness and served as a catalyst for strategy formulation among diverse
stakeholders. Today, careful team-building can help ensure that personnel
entrusted with vital matters in the life of a state—including developing
strategies for its long-term security and prosperity—will possess the array of
strengths they need for success.

Tami Davis Biddle
Tami Davis Biddle retired as the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the
US Army War College, where she is now a Distinguished Fellow. She has
written extensively on military history, airpower, and strategy. The author
of Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (2002), she is currently writing
Taking Command: The United States in the Second World War for Oxford
University Press.

26.

Danchev, Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance, 7–8.
TOC

Lessons from History

Biddle

115

Select Bibliography
Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Political Life. New York:
Viking/Penguin Random House LLC, 2017.
Danchev, Alex. Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and the
Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–44. London: Brassey’s, 1986.
Galvin, Tom., and Dale Watson. eds. Strategic Leadership: Primer for Senior
Leaders, 4th ed. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management,
US Army War College. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2019.
Hastings, Max. Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord, 1940–1945. London:
HarperPress, 2009.
Roll, David. The Hopkins Touch. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Sherwood, Robert. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. rev. ed.
New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1950.
Stoler, Mark. George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century.
Farmington Hills, MI: Twayne, 1989.
Thompson, Dorothy. Let the Record Speak. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin &
Company, 1939.

TOC

TOC

Lessons from History

Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media
Alexander G. Lovelace

©2022 Alexander G. Lovelace

ABSTRACT: Distilling lessons from the author’s book, The Media Offensive:
How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, this
article provides applicable suggestions for the US military today. As in World
War II, the press is both a weapon and a possible vulnerability in modern warfare.
Consequently, this article offers practical suggestions for how the press can be
used by public affairs officers, commanders, and policymakers to achieve victory in
coming conflicts.
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ieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. began a November 6, 1944, press
conference by asking the assembled reporters for a favor. The purpose of
the press conference was to brief the correspondents on the Third Army’s
coming offensive to capture Metz, France. Patton asked if the BBC correspondent
was present and explained “you can do me a very great favor by lying for me when
we attack by saying we are straightening our lines for a winter position.” He hoped
the deception would gain his army 24 hours. Other reporters reminded the general
their stories were also broadcast on the radio, and Patton agreed they could help.1
Major General Hobart Gay, the Third Army’s deputy chief of staff, recorded that
Patton “gave them practically all the details of the proposed attack.” Gay added
“the purpose of this statement is to mislead the enemy and not the public.”2 Patton
had an additional request, “Another thing is to give the Corps, Division, and
Regimental Commanders credit for what they do.” Giving individuals or specific units’
publicity would uplift the morale of both soldiers and civilians. After reminding the
reporters that everything he had told them was secret, he ended by saying “I know
I can trust you.”3
Seventy-seven years later in the early morning hours of May 14, 2021 ( Jerusalem
time), the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) announced “air and ground troops are currently
attacking in the Gaza Strip.” Hamas reacted by ordering their ground forces into
a maze of defensive tunnels to repel the assault. No ground attack came. Instead, the
Israeli Air Force subjected the tunnels to 40 minutes of bombardment. Meanwhile,
the IDF corrected their statement. No ground attack was afoot. Only artillery
1. “Conference between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents,” November 6, 1944, folder 7, box 53,
George S. Patton Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.
2. Hobart R. Gay, Diary, November 6, 1944, folder October 7, 1944 to November 20, 1944, box 2, Hobart R. Gay
Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center.
3. “General Patton and Third Army Correspondents.”
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fire from outside Gaza, which, in the fog of war, had been misinterpreted as a
ground invasion. Despite the IDF denial, the international media were outraged
and claimed the military had deliberately used the press to mislead Hamas into
their crosshairs.4 Whatever the truth, the erroneous report had worked to Israel’s
tactical advantage.
As the above examples demonstrate, the press has played a role in past conflicts
and will continue to be an important factor in future wars. Although the two
stories have notable differences, they also contain striking similarities. With
changing technologies and the onset of social media and content apps (such as
TikTok), the press’s role in warfare continues to grow.
In my forthcoming book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public
Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, I argue the onset of total war
made World War II combatants attempt to use the press as a weapon.5 At the
same time, press and public opinion increasingly influenced the battlefield
decisions of commanders. In this article, I argue that both observations are
valid today, explore how lessons from the World War II media war can guide
future conflicts, address perennial issues in military media situations (not function
as a critique of current US Army public affairs policies), and provide lessons drawn
from history while acknowledging the vastly different media landscape that has
emerged since World War II.
For this article, the definitions of what is “news” and “public opinion” have
been left deliberately opaque. Most people, military officers included, do not
have a formal definition for either term, but view where they get information on
current events as news. Public opinion can be in the eye of the beholder. As this
article shows, what an officer believes news and public opinion to be is more
significant for explaining his or her actions than what news and public opinion
actually are.

News Will Influence Battlefield Decisions
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ernest King, and George Marshall were hardly
publicity hounds. During World War II, however, they allowed their military
decisions to be influenced by the media as much as limelight-loving Mark Clark,
4. David M. Halbfinger, “A Press Corps Deceived, and the Gaza Invasion That Wasn’t,” New York
Times (website), May 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/middleeast/israel-gaza
-disinformation.html?msclkid=5baa82afcd2f11eca81f0bc36e6545ae; Josef Federman, “Israeli Military
Accused of Using Media to Trick Hamas,” Associated Press (website), May 15, 2021, https://apnews.com
/article/hamas-middle-east-israel-media-4d942411c64c8ae1e919ae93401f8919?msclkid=a6766017cd2f11ec9
ddf42856dde7cd1; Nir Dvori, “The IDF’s Ploy: This Is How the Tunnels Became Death Traps for
Terrorists in Gaza,” N12 (website), May 14, 2021, https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/2021_q2/Article
-178966f b8e96971026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=173113802.
5. Alexander G. Lovelace, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy
during World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022).
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Douglas MacArthur, and George Patton. As Francis de Guingand, Bernard Law
Montgomery’s chief of staff, wrote after the war, “It is well that the press should
realise how even the most dogged and determined characters are influenced by
what they say.”6
Even strong-willed commanders who ignore the press will have to answer
to military and political leaders who do the opposite. As Saddam Hussein’s
forces retreated from Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War, for example, they
were caught in the open by the US Air Force. The press labeled the subsequent
destruction the “Highway of Death.” It did not take long before coalition
commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf heard his superiors were beginning
to worry public opinion might be negatively affected by the graphic images.
Schwarzkopf concluded, “Washington was ready to overreact, as usual, to the
slightest ripple in public opinion. I thought, but didn’t say, that the best thing
the White House could do would be to turn off the damned TV in the situation
room.”7 Clearly, the press is a weapon that cuts both ways and understanding how
the media influences military decision making is a necessary precursor to wielding
the media as a weapon.
During World War II, overseas commanders rarely had access to editorials,
opinion polls, or timely news.8 However, this lack of access did not stop them from
guessing what public opinion was and responding accordingly. For example, near
the end of the North African campaign in spring 1943 the British announced
logistical problems prevented British and American forces from taking part in
the final battle for Tunisia and explained they would take the Axis surrender.
Major General Omar Bradley, who commanded the US II Corps, visited
Eisenhower to complain. Bradley told Eisenhower, “The people in the United
States want a victory and they deserve one,” Bradley argued. “After playing
an important part on the North African invasion and in the early Tunisian
campaign, they would find it difficult to understand why the American forces were
squeezed out in this final campaign.”9 Instead of inquiring how Bradley knew
public opinion so conveniently supported his argument, Eisenhower changed
the battle plans to include the II Corps. In this case, as in others, perception of
public opinion mattered more than its reality.
6. Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 381–82.
7. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
(New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 468.
8. Eisenhower to Charles Kenon Gailey Jr., January 1, 1943, letter, in Dwight Eisenhower, The Papers of
Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 2, The War Years, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1970), 883; Dwight Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, February 18, 1943, letter, in Dwight D. Eisenhower,
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 1, The War Years, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970), 962; and Eisenhower to Alexander Day Surles, April 6, 1943, letter, in Eisenhower
Papers, vol. 2, 1081.
9. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Random House, 1951), 56–59.
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Today, social media provides a new pressure—and danger—of influencing
commanders and policymakers. Although it is easy to equate social media and
public opinion, they are not the same. A 2019 Pew study of Twitter found
22 percent of American adults who have a Twitter account are more likely to
be young, highly educated, wealthy, women, and vote for Democrats. A more
stunning fact is that 10 percent of Twitter users are responsible for 80 percent of all
the tweets created. Additionally, the study observed, “Individuals who are among
the top 10 percent most active tweeters also differ from those who tweet rarely
in ways that go beyond the volume of content they produce . . . Compared
with other US adults on Twitter, they are much more likely to be women and
more likely to say they regularly tweet about politics.”10 More significant is
the size of this group. With 22 percent of the US adult population, the group
numbered 56,153,082 in 2019.11 Ten percent of this number means 5,615,309
people made 80 percent of all the tweets on Twitter. This number is hardly
insignificant, but when it is compared to the US adult population of 255,241,278,
it is not impressive. Twitter activity may represent something, but it does not
represent American public opinion.
The real power of Twitter is not so much the number of people that post, but
the power they have to drive news stories. Indeed, Twitter and other social media
sites have provided politicians, business leaders, and others with a platform that
bypasses traditional news outlets. Tweets can be picked up by different news
sources and have much wider influence than they would have on Twitter.12 These
posts, however, come from already-famous users who could attract media attention
without Twitter. In addition, this group is much smaller than the 2 percent of the
population that creates most tweets. At best, Twitter shows the opinions of the
elite who post and should not be mistaken for public opinion.
Enemy actors can also use social media to create public pressure to end a war,
amplify domestic unrest, create disinformation, highlight rumors, and spread
havoc. The use of fake or stolen social media accounts by the Chinese and Russian

10. Stefan Wojcik and Adam Hughes, “Sizing Up Twitter Users,” April 24, 2019, Pew Research Center
(website), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/04/24/sizing-up-twitter-users/; and Mason Walker
and Katerina Eva Matsa, “News Consumption across Social Media in 2021,” September 20, 2021, Pew
Research Center (website), https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-across
-social-media-in-2021/.
11. “Total Population by Child and Adult Populations in the United States,” Annie E. Casey Foundation
Kids Count Data Center (website), accessed January 4, 2022, https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables
/ 99-total-population-by-child-and-adult-populations#detailed/ 1/any/false/574,1729,37,871,870,573,869,36,
868,867/39,40,41/416,417.
12. Walker and Matsa, “News Consumption across Social Media.”
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governments is well documented.13 One 2021 study found that “[a] coordinated
influence operation on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube is using a mix of fake
and repurposed accounts to push pro-China narratives and distort perceptions
on important issues.”14 The same report estimated Chinese influence operations
employed between 40 to 55 Facebook accounts, 300 to 500 Twitter accounts,
and 12 YouTube accounts.15 In other words, opinion gleaned from anecdotal
social media posts no more represents public opinion than the anonymous notes
Shakespeare’s Cassius left for Brutus to find to convince him the masses wished
him to save Rome from Caesar.16
While commanders cannot always avoid letting public opinion influence
battlefield decisions, they should exercise careful judgment over what is public
opinion, what they assume is public opinion, and what is a loud minority or enemy
disinformation.

Today’s Media Is Different from the World War II Press
In 1987, journalists Peter Jennings and Mike Wallace participated in a
discussion about combat ethics. The moderator asked Jennings what he would do
if he were covering a hypothetical enemy unit preparing to ambush US soldiers.
Jennings responded he would do everything in his power to warn the Americans.
Wallace disagreed asserting, “I am astonished, really, to hear Peter say that.
You’re a reporter. Granted you are an American. But you are a reporter
covering combat . . . and I am a little bit at a loss to understand why, because
you are an American, you would not cover that story.” The moderator asked if
Wallace did not have a higher duty “as an American citizen” to save the lives of
his country’s soldiers. Wallace replied he did not, and at this point, Jennings
had changed his mind as well.17
Four years later, Saddam Hussein apparently had no more qualms about
allowing an American news outlet to cover the Persian Gulf War from Baghdad
than CNN had in providing the coverage. A few days after the United States
began bombing Afghanistan in October 2001, National Public Radio’s senior
13. Insikt Group, “Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion,”
March 6, 2019, https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2019-0306.pdf; Marcel Schliebs et al.,
“China’s Inauthentic UK Twitter Diplomacy: A Coordinated Network Amplifying PRC Diplomats,”
The Programme on Democracy & Technology, University of Oxford; and Nina Jankowicz and Ross Burley,
“The West Has Gotten Savvier about Russian Disinformation. Will That Help Ukraine?” Washington Post,
January 22, 2022.
14. Benjamin Strick, Analysis of the Pro-China Propaganda Network Targeting International Narratives (Centre
for Information Resilience, 2021), 4.
15. Strick, “Pro-China Propaganda,” 4.
16. William Shakespeare, “Julius Caesar,” in The Works of William Shakespeare Complete (New York: Black’s
Readers Service Company, New York, 1937), 1.2.310. Referenced to act, scene, and line.
17. “Jennings & Wallace, Reporters First, Americans Second,” YouTube, video, 3:54, July 10, 2006,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGg_dpGhlf0; and James Fallows, “Why We Hate the Media,” Frontline
(website), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/press/vanities/fallows.html.
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foreign editor Loren Jenkins was asked about the ethics of reporting the secret
positions of US military units. Jenkins did noy hesitate in responding he would
expose the units’ positions, explaining “I don’t represent the government.
I represent history, information, what happened.”18
Such attitudes stand in stark contrast to those of the American press
during World War II. When discussing the soldier-slapping scandal that
might hurt or end Patton’s contribution to the war effort, Demaree Bess of the
Saturday Evening Post spoke for a different generation of reporters when he
explained “we’re Americans first and correspondents second.”19 The 60 journalists
in the theater apparently agreed, and the story was only broken months later by
a stateside commentator.20 The Vietnam War, combined with Watergate, made
the press much less trusting of government authority. Likewise, large media
corporations followed the trend of other international businesses within the
United States in seeing themselves as transcending national boundaries.21
More importantly, technology has fundamentally transformed the
news business in terms of speed, accessibility, and who can influence news.
Television changed who in news organizations influences editorial opinion.
During the first half of the twentieth century, newspaper editorials were
largely shaped by editors, media company presidents, and shareholders.
The television format gave reporters greater latitude in interpreting the meaning
of news.22 Years later, the need to fill the 24-hour cable news cycle added to
the increased focus on opinion shows and the competitiveness of journalism.
At the same time, the proliferation of new outlets, including online news, has
amplified the use of opinion over facts in reporting. A 2019 RAND Corporation
empirical study comparing broadcast television to cable news found post2000 cable news coverage “exhibited a dramatic and quantifiable shift toward
subjective, abstract, directive, and argumentative language and content based more
on the expression of opinion than on reporting of events.”
The same study compared print and online journalism between 2012 and 2017
and found online journalism tended to be “more argumentative, with an eye toward
persuasion.”23 While older news models focused on trying to attract the largest
audiences possible through objectivity, the RAND study found the opposite
18. Steve Johnson, “Cutting through ‘The Fog of War’,” Chicago Tribune (website), October 12, 2001,
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-10-12-0110120007-story.html?.
19. Quentin Reynolds, By Quentin Reynolds (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 296.
20. Virgil Pinkley with James F. Scheer, Eisenhower Declassified (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell
Company, 1979), 160.
21. Jeff Jacoby, “Patriotism and the CEOs,” Boston Globe, July 30, 1998, A15.
22. Paul Johnson, A History of the American People (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 846–47.
23. Jennifer Kavanagh et al., News In A Digital Age: Comparing the Presentation of News Information over
Time and across Media Platforms (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), xvii–xviii, https://www
.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2900/RR2960/RAND_RR2960.pdf.
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trend to be true today. As news became increasingly opinionated, it also became
more partisan and led to fragmentation.24 There are more ways to get news than
ever before, but with each outlet reaching smaller audiences. It is uncertain how
much TikTok and social media platforms will continue to wrest control of news
content from professional journalists. Real philosophical, technological, and
structural differences, therefore, exist between the World War II press and the
media today.
Given the press’s hostile attitude, it might be tempting to advocate some form
of censorship. If censorship saves military lives, would not the American public
come to demand it? World War II censorship methods today, however, are as
untenable as they are undesirable. During World War II, the military controlled
the means of communicating written and broadcast news to the American
people, which often took time and allowed for prepublication censorship. The
advent of the Internet, live coverage, satellites, and other technological advances
makes anything approaching World War II censorship impossible. News is no
longer the sole domain of professional journalists. Censoring every blog or Twitter
account would prove very difficult.
Despite these changes of the press in outlook and technology, World War II
can still impart important lessons for the military leadres who are dealing with
today’s press. To begin with, commanders during that conflict were working
with new forms of media (such as newsreels and radio) and the increasing speed
of information. As Eisenhower discovered, modern communications meant the
“commander in the field is never more than an hour away from home capitals
and public opinion.”25 Nor was the World War II press nearly as subservient
to the military as supposed.26 Commanders had to deal with scandals, mistakes,
and reporters hostile to the military. Finally, the basic task of reporters has not
changed, nor has the power of news to shape warfare.

The Press Is a Weapon
Fortunately, there are less draconian and more effective ways than censorship for
the press to contribute to victory. To start, the military should establish channels
to major news organizations long before any conflict begins to create trust and
provide a way for dangerous or false new stories to be blocked or managed. After
heavy criticism of the US military’s agreement to allow Vichy French officials
24. Kavanagh et al., News in a Digital Age, 8–9.
25. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 184.
26. Steven Casey, The War Beat, Europe: The American Media at War against Nazi Germany (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 3, 347, 352; Richard A. Fine, “ ‘Snakes in Our Midst’: The Media, the
Military and American Policy toward Vichy North Africa,” American Journalism 27 no. 4 (2010): 59–82;
and Richard A. Fine, “Edward Kennedy’s Long Road to Reims: The Media and the Military in
World War II,” American Journalism 33, no. 3 (2016): 317–39.
TOC

124

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

to retain power temporarily in North Africa in exchange for keeping order,
journalist Alexander F. Jones of the Washington Post helped establish a committee
with the American Society of Newspaper Editors to work with the military to
get more accurate angles on controversial stories.27 A modern equivalent could
help prevent needless scandals while fostering greater understanding between
soldiers and reporters.
The best public relations officers during World War II tended to be former
reporters, or at least officers who were somewhat sympathetic towards
journalism. Due to the massive growth of the US Army during the war, most
high-level commanders had at least one former reporter on their personal staffs
to facilitate contact between both groups and help commanders understand
the needs of journalists. Although direct recruitment of professional journalists
would be difficult, today’s public affairs officers should have some experience or
training as journalists to help meet the needs of both the military and reporters.
Initiatives such as the PAO Program, which provides public affairs officers with
additional training in journalism schools, is an excellent start.
Lessons learned from World War II led to the creation of the Defense
Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), which continues to cultivate
goodwill with journalists.28 Before D-Day, Allied public relations officers
compiled a massive library of photos and information to be made available
to fill the incredible demand for news the landing in France would generate.29
Journalists sympathetic to both the military and their profession, such as
CBS’s Edward R. Murrow, worked as liaisons between news organizations and
military officers planning press accommodations.30 Modern news driven by
constant television and online media will continue to need the important service
DVIDS provides.
Directing organized media attention toward ordinary soldiers, which the
US military has done successfully in recent wars, also has its origins during
World War II. For example, Patton tried—not always successfully—to direct
media attention away from himself and toward his soldiers. He wrote the head
of War Department Public Relations, stating “It is my opinion that in spite of
our large conversation about the psychology of war, we utterly fail to utilize the
27. Jones to Butcher, November 30, 1942, letter, folder November 30, 1942 to January 7, 1943 (2), box 166,
Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916–52, Principal File, Eisenhower President Library,
Kansas.
28. “DVIDS,” Defense Media Activity (website), https://www.dma.mil/Services/DVIDS/, accessed
April 16, 2022.
29. “Final Report on Invasion Reference Library,” June 9, 1944, folder 314.7, box 7, RG 331, National
Archives Annex, College Park, MD.
30. Lynne Olson, Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour
(New York: Random House, 2010), 317.
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simplest means of stimulating pride and valor in the troops.”31 Patton took for
granted that the names of commanders and units would already be known to the
enemy, and thus there was no harm in criticizing or praising them in the press.
He argued:
if the people at home know that the boys from Lensville [sic],
Illinois or Junction City Kansas are fighting and doing well, they will
get a great kick out of it and will write to the soldiers with the result
that the soldiers will fight harder than ever. If, on the other hand, they
learn that certain units have not done well, they will also write, and
these units will do better.32

As Patton stated during a press conference in 1944, stories of individual
heroism “are the things we should get to the people at home and they would
have a tremendous uplifting influence on the people and on the soldiers.”33
Eisenhower agreed, concluding “no thing . . . so improves the morale of the
soldier as to see his unit or his own name in print—just once.”34 He made an
effort to have his photo taken with ordinary GIs and then had the pictures sent
to their hometown newspapers.35 By the end of the war in Europe, the US Army
had formed bands of war correspondents who interviewed ordinary soldiers and
sent the stories to hometown newspapers.36 At the peak of the program, nearly
20,000 stories were sent home each week. One reporter recalled that “I’ve met
soldiers who’d show me well-worn clippings about some story I’d written about
them months before.”37
Today, as in World War II, accounts of ordinary soldiers make excellent
news stories. Although news—particularly hometown newspapers—is different
than during World War II such stories provide journalists with an inexhaustible
supply of exciting and appealing articles.38 It was no accident that Ernie Pyle
became the most famous war correspondent of World War II by writing almost
exclusively about ordinary GIs. These stories are limited when it comes to the
larger context of the conflict, and they cannot help the war effort.
Commanders should take every opportunity to bring public attention to
their subordinates and staff. The US Army released few division or regimental
31. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1974), 101.
32. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 101.
33. “Conference between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents,” November 6, 1944, folder 7,
box 53, George S. Patton Papers.
34. Barney Oldfield, Never A Shot in Anger (New York; Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), xii.
35. Patton, diary, June 26, 1944, folder 5, box 3, George S. Patton Papers.
36. Unpublished Lawrence memoir, page 219, folder Memoirs-World War II (2), box 2 Justus Baldwin
Lawrence Papers.
37. Unpublished Lawrence memoir, page 219,
38. Tom Curley and John Maxwell Hamilton, introduction, in Julia Kennedy Cochran, ed., Ed Kennedy’s
War: V-E Day, Censorship, & the Associated Press (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), xi.
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commander’s names to the press through most of World War II. Patton and
other commanders spent a lot of time trying to get the policy changed in order
to highlight their hard work and successes.39 When Marshall visited him in fall
1944, Patton startled the chief of staff by facetiously saying the wife of one of his
generals wanted a divorce. When Marshall offered to intervene, Patton replied
that the only thing he could do was release the general’s name to the press
because his wife thought her husband was a slacker. Patton got his general’s
name in the press but remembered belatedly that Marshall had “no sense of
humor.”40 Nevertheless, such actions built loyal and highly motivated subordinates.
Conversely, generals such as Clark and MacArthur created lasting resentment by
failing to spread praise in the press about their officers and men.41
Directing media attention toward the officers and soldiers one commands is
good press policy and one of the basics of leadership. One reason for the success
of “embedded” journalists during the Iraq War was the focus it placed on ordinary
soldiers. American troops are not saints, and there will also be stories that reflect
badly on the US military. Nevertheless, the best public affairs specialist is the
American soldier in combat. Commanders should remember two additional
points. First, troops performing vital work (such as logistics) also deserve press
attention. Second, praise and criticism must be merited. Honesty, in this regard,
separates praise from propaganda.

TikTok Wars
In fall 2021, schools across the United States experienced a wave of vandalism
inspired by “devious licks,” a TikTok “challenge” that encouraged students to
steal from—or destroy—bathrooms and post videos of the results.42 During
the week of September 13–17, for example, the school resource officer for
Hempfield School District in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, made six arrests and
questioned numerous students in connection with extensive bathroom vandalism.43
The “devious licks” episode is a warning that TikTok can quickly spread influential
messages with destructive consequences. The Russian invasion of Ukraine
provided evidence of TikTok’s influence in military affairs. As the Washington Post
noted, “TikTok videos offered some of the first glimpses of the Russian invasion,
and since then the platform has been a primary outlet for spreading news [of
39. George S. Patton Jr., War As I Knew It (New York: Bantam Books, 1947), 139.
40. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 566.
41. Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
2007), 547, 550; and William M. Leary, ed., We Shall Return! MacArthur’s Commanders and the Defeat of
Japan 1942–1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), ix–x.
42. Megan Marples, “The ‘Devious Licks’ TikTok Challenge Has Students Stealing Toilets and
Vandalizing Bathrooms,” CNN (website), September 18, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/18/health
/devious-licks-tiktok-challenge-wellness/index.html.
43. Tim Marks, telephone interview by author, March 17, 2022.
TOC

Lessons from History

Lovelace

127

the war] to the masses abroad.”44 Some commentators even began labeling the
conflict a “TikTok war.”45 As of this writing, the role TikTok will play in warfare
is unclear, but a few preliminary results are apparent.
TikTok poses a much more serious challenge than other social media sites
because it is not a “social media” app. Instead of connecting people, TikTok
tailors content to individual users by employing an algorithm that attempts to
find out what the consumer wants to see.46 When a user scrolls through a line
of short films, the algorithm notes how long the viewer lingers on a video and
begins showing similar content. A Wall Street Journal investigation found these
suggestions led users down “rabbit holes, which are hard to escape.”47 Hence,
it is difficult for a consumer to stop using TikTok because it is designed to
release dopamine. University of Southern California Professor Julie Albright
compares this effect to playing slot machines.48 Finally, TikTok operates out of
an authoritarian state with a record of human rights violations and an adversarial
relationship with the United States. In other words, an addictive information
site created in China feeds tailored content to users around the globe.
So far, the use of TikTok in warfare suggests it is the latest technological
innovation for news to influence conflict. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky, a former comedian, skillfully used the platform to connect with his
people and the world. He also used TikTok to speak to the enemy, encouraging
the Russian people to end the invasion.49 His success was demonstrated when
Russia enacted a “fake news” law. The law punished anyone knowingly
propagating false information with years in prison, levied hefty fines, and
drastically limiting news from outside countries.50 Meanwhile, the White House
briefed 30 TikTok “influencers”—one as young as 18 years old—on the war in
Ukraine. “Saturday Night Live” quickly produced a skit ridiculing the meeting,
44. Taylor Lorenz, “The White House Is Briefing TikTok Stars about the War in Ukraine,”
Washington Post (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/tiktok-ukraine-white-house/.
45. Kyle Chayka, “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War,’ ” New Yorker (website), March 3, 2022, https://
www.newyorker.com/culture/infinite-scroll/watching-the-worlds-first-tiktok-war; and Kaitlyn Tiffany,
“The Myth of the ‘First TikTok War,’” Atlantic (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2022/03/tiktok-war-ukraine-russia/627017/.
46. Fergus Ryan, “TikTok Algorithm: Why It Isn’t Really A Social Media App,” Vision of
Humanity (website), n.d., accessed March 17, 2022, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/why-tiktok-isnt
-really-a-social-media-app/; and Senate of Commonwealth of Australia, Select Committee on Foreign
Interference through Social Media, September 25, 2020, 10.
47. Wall Street Journal Staff, “Inside TikTok’s Algorithm: A WSJ Video Investigation,” Wall Street Journal
(website), July 21, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-algorithm-video-investigation-11626877477.
48. John Koetsier, “Digital Crack Cocaine: The Science behind TikTok’s Success,” Forbes (website),
January 18, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/01/18/digital-crack-cocaine-the-sciencebehind-tiktoks-success/?sh=2ad508f578be.
49. Chayka, “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War,’” New Yorker, March 3, 2022.
50. Ann M. Simmons and Alexandra Bruell, “Russia Targets Media Outlets With ‘Fake News’
Law, Blocks Facebook,” Wall Street Journal (website), March 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia
-targets-media-outlets-with-fake-news-law-blocks-facebook-11646442530; and Liza Lin, “TikTok Struggles
to Find Footing in Wartime,” Wall Street Journal (website), March 9, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/tiktok-struggles-to-find-footing-in-wartime-11646827213.
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but the influencers did not appear surprised. The Washington Post quoted Kahlil
Greene who explained his “generation gets all our information from TikTok.”51

No Such Thing as a “Noble Lie”
Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels was deservedly called the “father
of lies” by the Allies.52 Yet, his diaries suggest Goebbels understood spreading
misinformation as news was a position of weakness.53 For example, when the
Japanese began to refer to their defeats as “successful evacuations,” Goebbels
fumed that such obvious lies made the Axis a “laughing stock.”54 For their part,
the Japanese militarists also understood the need for honesty. After Pearl Harbor,
for example, the Japanese government publicly admitted they had lost all
the midget submarines involved in the attack. As Admiral Matome Ugaki
reasoned, “Since the Washington press reported” the story, “Japan could not but
announce it.”55 While the Axis nations habitually lied in their press and
propaganda, they also knew lying had its limits.
Radio made it easy for combatants to listen to the other side’s news. To
avoid looking foolish, news and propaganda had to be kept close to reality.
During the war, US General Robert Eichelberger wrote, “I listened to one of
their [Tokyo Radio] broadcasts and it is comparatively conservative. Noting
they knew their enemy was listening he observed, “I guess they try not to let it
sound foolish, although of course they present an improper picture.”56 While the
press of the Western Allied democracies was freer and more honest than the Axis,
technology also made the US government release information that it otherwise
would have kept secret. As Professor Steven Casey notes, when the American
government refused to release casualty figures, Allied news outlets reported
Axis claims.57 After the Battle of the Coral Sea, for example, the US Navy was
reluctant to release any information about the battle. When the Japanese began
falsely claiming a great victory with high Allied losses, MacArthur felt obliged to
release accurate information to refute the enemy propaganda.58
51. Lorenz, “Briefing TikTok Stars.”
52. David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1993), 308.
53. Louis P. Lochner, trans., The Goebbels Diaries: 1942–1943 (Garden City, NY: 1948), 239, 457, 458.
54. Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, 461.
55. Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, ed. Donald M.
Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, trans. Masataka Chihaya (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991),
57–58.
56. Robert Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger’s War in the Pacific, 1942–1945, ed. Jay Luvaas
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972), 96.
57. Steven Casey, When Soldiers Fall: How Americans Have Confronted Combat Losses from World War I to
Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 48.
58. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 2, 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1975), 164.
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New technologies have made deception more difficult, but truthful news—
news reporting that accurately depicts events—has a power that defies human
invention.59 Goebbels’s and Ugaki’s statements tacitly acknowledged truth’s power,
even if they understood it was a weapon they could not employ. Lying to the
public may yield short-term gains, but it comes at significant risk. For example,
in the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon Bonaparte learned the Prussians were
advancing to assist the Duke of Wellington’s troops. Nevertheless, he ordered
the story spread that French Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy was arriving with
reinforcements. Napoleon’s soldiers believed him until defeat arrived, along with
reality. It was enough to shatter French morale and turn defeat into a rout.60
Deceiving the enemy is an important and legitimate part of warfare. The
media can help fool the enemy, as the examples at the opening of this article
demonstrated. As the journalists Patton spoke to understood fully, he was not
trying to deceive them, his soldiers, or the Allied public. Today’s media is not
the World War II press corps, and commanders should use media deception
with extreme caution. Deceiving the enemy is necessary, but lying to one’s side
is dangerous.

Lessons Learned
Have new media technologies made the lessons from World War II
military-press relations obsolete? As of this writing, the war in Ukraine is still
raging, meaning any lessons drawn from the conflict must deal with incomplete
information. Nevertheless, the war has clearly shown that the media is still
a weapon in modern warfare, and new technologies have increased the media’s
power. As noted, Zelensky has brilliantly used TikTok to build support for
Ukraine.61 Not since Churchill has a leader exploited media technology to
link himself closely to resistance in a desperate cause. As evidenced by Russia’s
persistent efforts to kill him, Zelensky has succeeded in placing himself at the
center of gravity for Ukrainian endurance.62 Making one person the focal point
of resistance is dangerous; it leaves a vacuum if that person is killed. This
technique, however, has served the Ukrainian cause well.
Zelensky is not the only Ukrainian using social media. Thousands of ordinary
Ukrainians have uploaded videos and posts to Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and

59. Lovelace, Media Offensive, 5–6.
60. David Howarth, Waterloo: Day of Battle (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 172, 182.
61. Chayka, “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War,’” New Yorker, March 3, 2022.
62. Namita Singh, “Ukraine’s Zelensky Has Survived More Than a Dozen Assassination Attempts,
Adviser Claims,” Independent (website), March 10, 2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
/europe/ukraine-zelensky-assassination-attempts-russia-b2032759.html.
TOC

130

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

Twitter, giving the war immediacy to those watching thousands of miles away.63
Studies have also found disinformation on social media sites and TikTok.64
Persistent efforts to root out misinformation suggest the importance of truth in
warfare has not ended.65
Commanders and policymakers should mentally prepare for making difficult
decisions that might counter editorial or public opinion. They should remember
social media and Twitter storms do not necessarily represent popular sentiment
and realize they are more knowledgeable about events than stateside critics.
They must also resist the temptation to remove competent subordinates to satisfy
public opinion.
Commanders and policymakers should resist any attempts at prepublication
censorship. Nazi Germany tried to stop BBC radio broadcasts in World War II
and failed.66 Russia’s repeated unsuccessful efforts to block Western social media
in Ukraine indicate modern Internet censorship will be ineffective.67 Instead,
journalists should be accredited or embedded with units and provided guidelines
on what they cannot publish—and removed from their assignments if they
violate the guidelines. Criticism, and even disinformation, should not be silenced.
Opposition opinion in the United States was not restricted during World War II,
and this policy should continue in future wars.
Likewise, commanders must be honest with the press. Within the limits of
operational security and with an understanding that deception is part of warfare,
commanders should avoid lying to the media. Recently, there has been much
discussion of “fake news,” disinformation, or misinformation. The cure for such
problems is trust in institutions built on their personnel being honest. Even when
it is distasteful, humans want the truth, and honest commanders will serve their
country better than liars.
Nor is bad news necessarily detrimental when it comes to public relations.
Military leadership during World War II worried that if the press were too optimistic,
Americans would believe the conflict was almost won and lose interest. This
belief led to the release of photographs of dead American soldiers during the
63. Kate Linthicum, “TikTok and Twitter Capture Ukraine War in Frighteningly Real Time,”
Los Angeles Times (website), March 31, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-03-31
/ukraine-war-social-media-tik-tok.
64. Shayan Sardarizadeh, “Ukraine War: False TikTok Videos Draw Millions of Views,” BBC (website),
April 25, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/60867414.
65. Sardarizadeh, “Ukraine War.”
66. Nicholas Stargardt, The German War: A Nation Under Arms, 1939–1945, Citizens and Soldiers
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 79.
67. Sarah E. Needleman and Evan Gershkovich, “From YouTube to RuTube: Inside Russia’s
Influence Campaign,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-youtube-to
-rutube-inside-russias-influence-campaign-11650447002?msclkid=74bdd15bcd6311ec867c81e121a00d8c.
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middle of the war.68 Negative news stories can keep the civilian population from
taking victory for granted in long conflicts.
During a war, all commanders should direct media attention toward
their subordinates. Most importantly, the military should provide access to
ordinary soldiers and encourage journalists to write about them. These types of
stories make exciting news and will improve military morale. Although local
newspapers are less relevant today than during World War II, the Internet
has opened new avenues to reach audiences. Business and nonprofit organizations
have long used Facebook groups, Patreon, YouTube, and other social media to
connect with specific audiences by following the day-to-day lives of individuals
in pursuit of a particular goal. The military can do the same to highlight the
accomplishments of units and soldiers.
Finally, these conclusions are the result of an academic historical study.
They come from the past, but practitioners must be careful how they are
applied in the present. If they are tested in future wars and found wanting,
they must be discarded. Military leaders should remember that orchestrated
violence wins wars, not media strategies. The press is simply one weapon in the
arsenal of modern warfare.

Conclusion
Just as today, World War II military leaders sometimes viewed a free press
as a liability. “It’s one of the disadvantages of democracy that it can’t conduct
politics or war according to logic and intelligence,” smirked Goebbels, “but
have to respond to the up-and-down swings of public opinion.”69 Marshall worried
over the same issue. After the war he recalled, “the leader in a democracy has to
keep the people entertained.”70
Despite the annoyance and danger the press can cause the military during
a war, this article has argued that a free press is a powerful weapon in modern
warfare. Like all weapons, the media should be used and understood carefully.
Commanders, unduly influenced by public opinion—or what they believe
to be public opinion—may make unwise battlefield decisions. The Media
Offensive provides a deeper exploration of these topics; however, this article has
briefly outlined some lessons from the book that may be helpful. Studying the
68. George H. Roeder Jr., The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War Two
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 1.
69. Entry 21.7.1942, Joseph Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, ed. Elke Fröhlich
(Munich: K. G. Saur, 1995), Teil II, Brand, 160, quoted in Nigel Hamilton, The Mantle of Command:
FDR at War 1941–1942 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 317–18.
70. Larry I. Bland, ed., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, 3rd ed.
(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 622.
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military-press relationship during World War II provides excellent intellectual
training for anyone considering the possible and probable challenges the press will
pose in future conflicts.

Alexander G. Lovelace
Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace is a scholar in residence at the Contemporary History
Institute of Ohio University. His first book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and
Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, is being published by the
University Press of Kansas in 2022.
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By Neal G. Jesse
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atching Russia’s buildup of combat power around Ukraine in
January and February this year, I, like many others, presumed that
if Russian forces ever invaded, they would swiftly defeat the
Ukrainian military and readily achieve their objectives. The so-called “correlation of
forces” so greatly favored the Russian military that the outcome of a potential war
in their favor seemed certain. Nearly.

Three months into Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, all such easy judgments
are so far proving wrong. With limited but vital military backing from the United
States and NATO, the Ukrainian armed forces have managed to push the Russian
military to its apparent limit. Russia has suffered heavy personnel losses—
perhaps as much as 10 percent of Russia’s invasion forces have been killed or
wounded if Ukrainian Defense Ministry estimates can be believed. Equipment
and vehicle losses have been substantial, too. More importantly, Russian advances
seem to have been halted, and Ukrainian forces appear to have reclaimed some
previously lost ground. As a bonus, Russia also seems to be losing the information
war as most international opinion is critical of Russia’s aggression.
These unexpected developments have led to many questions. How did Russia
so badly misjudge Ukrainian military strength? Why does the Russian military
seem to be struggling with even the fundamental aspects of combat operations?
Why did Russia invade Ukraine? What is Russian President Vladimir Putin
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thinking? While much media speculation has focused on these questions,
even informed voices, such as those of former US and NATO senior
commanders, have yet to provide satisfactory answers. As strategists and
military professionals, we must find these answers. Such insight will provide
Ukraine and NATO an edge in the current war; it may also provide critical
advantages in future conflicts with Russia. Barring a radical change in
Russia’s national leadership, the West should reasonably expect the primary
challenge to European security to continue to come from Russia.
Knowing one’s enemy is such a basic concept in strategy it becomes easy
to forget. Dealing with one’s issues and the myriad preparations for war can
be all-consuming, leaving little time to look outward beyond them. Because
understanding the enemy is exceptionally difficult, intelligence preparation of
the environment fixates on more readily measured material and technical factors
such as combat power. Even strategic assessments are woefully lacking in their
examination of enemy strategy, thinking, and motivation. These assessments rely
on simplistic rubrics such as DIME or ends, ways, and means. They often forget
careful consideration of history, psychology, or the moral and spiritual factors
driving the human choice to wage war. This oversight is not surprising given
how fraught these areas are with subjectivity and the risk of misinterpretation.
Even “understanding the enemy” as a concept itself is misunderstood. It is
a mistake to think the aim is to predict how an enemy will behave in a given
situation. Not even the enemy can predict this about themselves. Instead, it is
about knowing their habits and weaknesses to understand better how they are
vulnerable. It is about appreciating their motivations, so the limits of their will
are made clearer. These things suggest points for an attack that will be more
effective in damaging the enemy and changing their behavior. Understanding the
enemy is also a pathway to understanding oneself because it frees us from our
limited perspectives. All this is the starting point for understanding the kind of
war on which we are embarking.
How Russia understands war is the focus of Oscar Jonsson’s The Russian
Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace. This short yet
detailed book provides a comprehensive examination of the modern evolution
of Russian military theory and strategy. Jonsson, a Swedish security policy
researcher, delivers a startling assessment that Russian political and security
leaders have developed a fundamentally different appreciation of war than that
of the West. In essence, Jonsson claims Russia believes the actual nature of war,
not just its character, has changed. He provides a convincing analysis of Russian
military writings from pre-Soviet years through today that shows Russian leaders
and strategists have rejected the classical view that war is defined by armed
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violence. He reinforces this conclusion quite convincingly with evidence from
Russian government strategic documents and statements from leaders such as
Putin and General Valery Gerasimov, the current and long-serving chief of the
Russian General Staff.
Jonsson corrects the common misperception in the West that Gerasimov’s
popular works, especially certain speeches from 2013 and 2014, constitute a
doctrine or that they describe how Russia should conduct its wars. Instead,
Jonsson asserts Gerasimov is describing from the Russian point of view how
the United States and the West subvert legitimate rule in countries to generate
uprisings and eventually impose liberal democratic systems. Jonsson clarifies that
this notion well predates Gerasimov’s statements by citing several others who
previously have written about this topic (especially General Makhmut Gareyev,
former president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences). This body of
Russian military thought concludes the West has mastered information and
psychological warfare to such an extent that these operations are now as effective
as armed violence in overthrowing governments. Hence, the very nature of war has
changed from one defined by armed violence extending from policy to one of a
policy of subversion, essentially constituting violence against the government
and people of a target nation. As Jonsson puts it succinctly, this new Russian
understanding of war is “a shift with a larger focus to the political goal of war
rather than its means (the armed violence)” (154).
Jonsson then illustrates how Russia has also shifted its views on the new
means of this redefined war. He contends Russia has assessed the “color
revolution,” as a supposedly popular democratic uprising, as the preferred method
of the West to topple legitimate governments it opposes. Jonsson dedicates an
entire chapter to the Russian analysis of color revolutions and the methods the
West allegedly uses to foster them. At its core, a color revolution is a product
of information warfare—liberal democratic ideas trampling traditional societal
values and cultures to create “controlled chaos” in the target state. These effects are
supported by various financial, social, training, and media measures to drive the
color revolution forward. The supporters of the revolution are convinced (mainly
due to influence from nongovernmental organizations and the media) that their
actions are spontaneous and natural. Supporters also engage in their brand of
fascism and become irregular forces imposing conformity and attacking anyone
with traditional views. In effect, Russia believes the West employs “reflexive
control” against these countries.
This summary of Jonsson’s assessment of Russian views of US and Western
strategies might sound strange to anyone used to hearing Russia uses these
same methods in its operations against others, especially in Georgia and Ukraine
in recent years. Jonsson makes an important point that could use further
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attention—that Russia is describing itself but projecting onto others to
legitimize its view. Jonsson notes the Soviet government commonly employed
this practice (75). Still, the book is eye-opening and provides relevant insights
into the war in Ukraine this review will return to later.
Where Jonsson tends to focus on the why behind Russian strategy,
Neal Jesse centers more on the how of Russian strategy in Learning from
Russia’s Recent Wars: Why, Where, and When Russia Might Strike Next. Jesse’s
book is similarly concise but still impressively detailed even in the breadth
of topics it covers. He opens with a brief comparison of political science
theories to explain Russian foreign policy. His conclusions are barebones: Russia
seeks to rebuild its military while creating a buffer zone of friendly countries
to increase its influence as it strives to return to great-power status.
More expansive are Jesse’s recounting and analysis of Russian aggression in the
post–Soviet era from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine (the 2014 intervention).
Assessments of Russian key capabilities, especially cyber and nonconventional
means, thoroughly describe how Russia has subverted and aggressively coerced its
smaller Eastern European and Baltic neighbors. Not surprisingly, these methods
mirror Russia’s view of Western-generated color revolutions. A key difference is
that Russia has used its forces in conventional and unconventional ways to support
the supposedly popular resistance movements in the target nations.
Jesse also includes an entire chapter on Russian efforts to rebuild its
military. Like many others, he points to the war in Georgia as a major impetus
to reform and notes many reforms were well underway prior to 2008. He
asserts that Russian leadership was already wary of NATO’s intentions even by
the mid-1990s and realized the shortcomings of its military because of its
performance in the Chechen wars. So, while its military shortcomings were
evident in Georgia (and again in Ukraine in 2014), Russia has actually been
attempting to improve its armed forces for nearly the past 25 years. Jesse
concludes Russia still has a long way to go with these reforms, which have
been hampered by Western economic sanctions since the 2014 intervention in
Ukraine and the deeply ingrained corruption of the Russian defense industry.
Impressively, Jesse arrives at conclusions about the situation in Ukraine
in 2020 (when the book was published) that are very relevant to the Russian
decision to go to war there today. He assesses that despite some success from
Russian efforts to destabilize the Ukrainian government, Ukraine responded
reasonably well and stabilized the security situation even in its Eastern oblasts.
As a result, the state of the pro-Russian position in Ukraine has not improved
substantially since the 2014 intervention. Further, Jesse asserts that Russia would
be motivated to act more overtly if an opportunity (such as with Crimea) or a
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need arose (for example, continued Ukrainian tilting toward the EU and NATO).
He correctly judges the “Russian threat to Ukraine is the most obvious and the
most constant” of all the potential threats to other nations (158).
Both authors’ combined analyses and conclusions provide a beneficial
understanding of Russian views on war, in general, and the motivations for its
war on Ukraine, in particular. Jonsson and Jesse describe Russian thinking as
more holistic than American or Western thinking. While the United States
tends to view individual components separately and then aggregate them into a
larger system, Russia considers all constituent elements inherently connected in
a synthesized whole. This belief predisposes Russia to perceive the United States
and the West have developed a new, integrated form of warfare that combines
information and armed means and fundamentally changes the nature of war.
Reinforcing this view is the Russian assessment that the West uses this form
of warfare in a campaign ultimately aimed at ending the Russian nation as it
exists today. Both authors note Russia accuses NATO of reneging on alleged
promises not to expand its membership following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, especially to include former Soviet republics. It also perceives the United
States readily violates international law and nations’ sovereignty when it suits its
security interests. Russia further believes the color revolutions in Europe (and the
Arab Spring) were crises manufactured by the West intended to oust legitimate
governments and propagate liberal democratic beliefs antithetical to traditional
spiritual and moral values held in those countries.
As Jonsson and Jesse point out, this belief makes sense because Russian leaders
perceive that “soft power” and influence are tools of the state and thus cannot be
spontaneous or naturally occurring. Russia views the color revolutions as fascist
movements that purposefully aim to oppress the rights of ethnic Russians and
Russian-speaking peoples—and fracture the Russkiy Mir (the Russian World or
core Russian culture). Russia even perceives the United States has interfered in
its elections. It certainly recalls the US, UK, and French intervention in its civil
war in support of the White, anti-Bolshevik army. In essence, Russia believes
the United States and the West are at war with it today, even if that war is
undeclared and involves primarily unarmed offensives.
This worldview makes most any action permissible because that action
would necessarily be defensive. And this is how Russia frames its actions today
in Ukraine—a special military operation first intended to defend the Russian
people in Ukraine from a repressive, illegitimate government and, ultimately, as
a step to protect Russia from the West’s campaign against it. Further, Russia has
traditionally viewed Ukraine as central to its history and at the heart of the concept
of Novorossiya (or New Russia), a claimed crown jewel of the Russian nation.
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More practically, many factors make Ukraine especially important to Russia.
Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe (its sheer size puts the Russian
military’s struggles there in perspective—Ukraine is nearly as large as Texas in
land area). Ukraine sits on the Black Sea and borders four NATO member states.
About three-quarters of Russian gas exports to Europe flow through Ukraine.
Ukraine is a major player in the global agro-economy, producing about 12 percent
of the world’s wheat and about 17 percent of its corn. Lastly, Russian shipyards
cannot manufacture aircraft carriers. All of Russia’s carriers were built in Ukraine,
including the only one in service today (the Admiral Kuznetsov).
Jonsson and Jesse’s enlightening books make Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine
appear logical given all these considerations. Controlling Ukraine is essential
to defending the Russian people and the Russian state from the West’s war.
Russian efforts to control Ukraine have effectively stalled since the 2014
intervention, and Russian measures to destabilize Ukraine have not prevented
it from tilting closer to both NATO and the EU. Resistance groups there never
coalesced into a viable threat to the Ukrainian government. Russian pledges of
support to these groups likely also created pressure on Russia to uphold their
promises. Otherwise, Russia risked creating the perception it was not truly
serious about the claimed fascist threat to the Russian people. While seizing
Crimea was an important achievement, the region remained cut off practically
from Russia. Finally, Russia’s access to the Black Sea was still greatly restricted.
In sum, Russia had few good options to improve its position in Ukraine.
Continuing to do more of what it had been doing since 2014 must have seemed
like a dead end, and disengaging was completely incompatible with its worldview
and rhetoric.
Additionally, the risk of a US or NATO military intervention in response to
a Russian invasion must have seemed remote, given the West’s previously muted
response to Russian operations in Georgia, Syria, Crimea, and Ukraine. Finally,
Russia likely judged the resistance potential of the Ukrainian military to be low,
given its uneven performance against an unorganized band of resistance fighters
who did not have the combat power of the Russian military. And, at any rate,
with no decisive intervention from the United States and NATO expected, even a
highly capable Ukrainian defense would eventually be overwhelmed.
Both books are solid works that lift the fog shrouding Russian views on war
and its strategy in Ukraine. While neither book can predict Russian actions, each
volume will help readers better understand Russian motivations and the scope of
its will to wage war—a valuable insight as strategists work out how to deal with
Russian aggression.
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F

ew strategic thinkers were as prolific as the late Colin S. Gray. His pen
touched the entire gamut of strategic thought—from nuclear strategy to
strategic culture to sea power to geopolitics. Future scholars, perhaps this
author, will need to consolidate Gray’s life work into the ultimate companion guide to
his strategic thought. In the recent Winter issue of this journal, Lukas Milevski tipped
his hand at doing just that with “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray.”
He argues, “Gray’s conception of grand strategy emphasizes the agential context of
military strategy” and notes Gray’s view “contradicts the mainstream interpretation
particularly favored in the United States, in which grand strategy is identified as the
master of policy.”1 While Milevski argues these points with superb clarity, I write here
to highlight two critical areas of Gray’s thought Milevski omitted in his otherwise
comprehensive analysis.
The first, and perhaps more serious omission, concerns a matter of first principles.
Since grand strategy is synonymous with statecraft, this strategy must consider the
nature of the world order it plans to operate within. This consideration is where Gray
strayed from “mainstream” international relations thought. Current international
relations students have concentrated their study on the Waltz/Wendt debate of
international politics, which pits “neorealism” versus “constructivism.” Yet, Gray was
not a neorealist, and he disdained constructivism. Indeed, Gray referred to Waltz’s
Theory of International Politics as “a book which demonstrates that being elegantly
parsimonious in theory building offers insufficient compensation for being wrong.”2
He was perhaps the most vocal defender of classical realism, claiming that “flawed
though the principal texts of classical realism may be, when compared with more

1. Lukas Milevski, “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (Winter 2021–22):
81–94, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/8/.
2. Colin Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the Past—with GPS,” Review of International Studies 25,
no. 5 (December 1999): 161–82.
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contemporary would-be master/mistress-works, they have an overriding virtue.
To risk the vernacular, they got the big things right enough.”3
Given his embrace of classical realism, Gray had sweeping thoughts on the
international system:
As a neoclassical realist I insist that the game of polities (or security
communities) does not change from age to age, let alone from decade to
decade. I will stop just short of claiming that the game cannot change,
but only by way of a token nod in the direction of never saying never.
Paradoxically, perhaps, this stance is not a conservative one. It is alert
to the facts of cumulative, sometimes apparently non-linear, change
in the character of international relations, including international
strategic relations. It denies only the likelihood of change in the nature
of those relations.4

Given his embrace of realism and the classic realist works, Gray did not
support, for example, global governance as seen in his Another Bloody Century.
He also did not endorse global governance in his thoughts on grand strategy
(more on this below). This is not a small omission. Instead, it stems logically
from Gray’s understanding of world politics.
While Milevski synthesized Gray’s thoughts on grand strategy, his analysis
lacks the foundation upon which it rests. I contend one cannot understand Gray’s
conception of grand strategy by starting with his thoughts on strategy, as Milevski
does. Instead, this conception must begin with Gray’s fearless embrace and moving
reverence to the great works and scholars of classical realism highlighted so well in
the article, “Clausewitz Rules, OK?”5 Yet, Milevski skips this step entirely, which
leaves readers with a watered-down version of Gray’s thoughts on grand strategy.
Milevski’s second omission, as jarring as the first, is not mentioning Gray’s one
book on grand strategy, The Sheriff. In this short book, Gray outlines his thoughts
on what American grand strategy should look like as the “sheriff of the world
order.” He deals with the elusive concept of “world order,” noting it is “neither
self-enforcing nor is it comprehensively enforceable” and “every such ‘order’
requires a sheriff, or some other agent of discipline.” He also links this notion of
what American grand strategy should look like to his conception of international
politics, and he makes this point throughout the book (for example, see pages 37
and 55). Furthermore, Gray, from his realist perspective of world politics, sees
nongovernmental organizations and multinational organizations (like the UN)
as having no use in protecting the current world orders. Milevski also features
3. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules.”
4. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules.”
5. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules.”
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Gray’s essay, “Harry S. Truman and the Forming of American Grand Strategy in
the Cold War, 1945–1953,” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy,
and War that analyzes the grand strategy of Harry Truman. While the essay is
incredibly valuable to understanding Gray’s thoughts on grand strategy, it does not
carry the same weight as The Sheriff. 6
Perhaps Milevski did not mention The Sheriff since he wanted to only
discuss matters of theory. Yet, Gray was fond of quoting Bernard Brodie’s quip
that “strategic theory is a theory of action.”7 That Gray’s presentation of a grand
strategic “theory of action” is missing from Milevski’s essay beggars belief.

Phillip Dolitsky
Phillip Dolitsky is a master’s student at the School of International Service at
American University.

6. Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2004).
7. Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy, no. 5 (Winter 1971): 151–61,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1147725.
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P

hillip Dolitsky identifies what he believes to be two significant omissions
in my exploration of Colin Gray’s grand strategic thought—
ignoring Gray’s classical realist perspective on international affairs and
neglecting The Sheriff as an example of how he would design a grand strategic theory
for action. Neither is substantive.

The classical realist perspective is essentially irrelevant; it is an international
relations identification, meaningless to the field of strategic studies. Academically and
practically, strategy is international relations-agnostic. Although many practitioners
might argue the two assumptions, that conflict and war are inevitable in principle—
distinct from saying particular wars are inevitable in practice—and that military
power remains relevant reflect a realist perspective, this is not the historical experience
of the field or real-world practice. Historically, representatives of all persuasions
(realists, liberals, fascists, Marxists, and many others) have thought about
strategy and, except for absolute pacifists, have also practiced strategy. The cute
paradigmatic/ideological distinctions of international relations collapse in the
real world of strategic practice. In this context, the degree to which Gray invoked
classical realism is at least as much to translate the fundamentals of his perspective
to nonstrategic studies, essentially an international relations audience, as it is a
statement of ideational identity.
Dolitsky, with unnecessary force, suggests it “beggars belief ” that I ignored
The Sheriff as an example of Gray’s grand strategic theory of action. Yet, The Sheriff
is not a book about grand strategy or statecraft. It engages topics related to defense
planning, strategy, and defense policy, tied together with a vision of American
engagement with the world (the titular sheriff ). American academics misguidedly
(and typically) consider grand vision to be grand strategy, but in actuality, none of
the four themes presented in The Sheriff, individually or together, comprise grand
strategy. The book does not engage with either nonmilitary issues or nonmilitary
power except in a token manner. It pertains to grand strategy only to the extent
that defense planning, strategy, defense policy, and visions of one’s role in the world
interact with statecraft. The Sheriff lacks the necessary breadth to be considered an
exploration of grand strategic or statecraft theory of action.
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Fundamentally, Gray did not write about statecraft or grand strategy as such;
he wrote about military strategy and defense, usually explicitly acknowledging
the grand strategic or statecraft context. Since he never substantially engaged
with nonmilitary power, Gray never wrote, nor could he write, a theory of
grand strategy or a grand strategic (let alone statecraft) theory for action.
This fact is not a slight against Gray. Virtually every scholar who has sought to
employ the concept of grand strategy has failed to engage with its full conceptual
and practical breadth, reflecting how hard it is to theorize grand strategy.
As a result, Gray did not compare the instrumental values of military and
nonmilitary power—except to identify a degree of fungibility. Although perhaps
relevant to statecraft as a concept, the paradigmatic debates of international
relations (which essentially concern the relative values of various forms of power)
hardly play a part in Gray’s grand strategic thought.

Lukas Milevski
Dr. Lukas Milevski is an assistant professor at the Institute of History
at Leiden University. He is the author of The West’s East: Contemporary
Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018) and The Evolution of Modern Grand
Strategic Thought (2016).
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A

merican-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq have made clear over the last two decades that
interoperability is a crucial alliance capability. Effective coalition
military operations are made possible by common defense concepts,
doctrine, tactics, procedures, and materiel. Achieving these
interoperability objectives, however, has been a singular challenge
of the last 25 years, as Central and Eastern European allies have
sought to qualify for, join, and contribute effectively to the alliance.

New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2017

312 pages
Defense reform has been a critical tool for achieving
$135.00
interoperability across Central and Eastern Europe. Broadly,
defense reforms focused initially on adopting Western democratic defense
governance (what might be considered intellectual interoperability) and,
subsequently, on developing other interoperability objectives. Unfortunately,
these reforms have either failed or achieved only minimal success. According to
Thomas-Durell Young in Anatomy of Post-Communist Defense Institutions, Central
and Eastern European governments have been challenged deeply in their ability
to build and maintain capable, interoperable military forces. In fact, the military
capabilities of most allies have withered over the last quarter century, even as
efforts to build them up have accelerated over the same period.

Why? Young argues the key reason is the inability of Western officials to
acknowledge and appreciate the “malignant persistence of totalitarian norms” in
Central and Eastern European countries (7). In other words, even though the
formal structures of communism fell in the early 1990s, the thought patterns,
psychological outlooks, and behavioral habits characteristic to a totalitarian state
persisted far longer.
In the defense realm, this persistence has resulted in the retention of military
concepts contradictory to Western ideas. The blame for the subsequent failure
of most defense reforms, as far as Young assigns it, falls largely on the West. He
contends Western officials fundamentally misjudged the state of professionalism
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in Central and Eastern European militaries and mistakenly viewed the reform
of former communist armed forces as a military problem. As a result, most of the
West’s defense reform efforts focused on an overly technical approach geared
toward training at the tactical level.
If Young is correct, a generation of Western officials on both sides of the
Atlantic fundamentally misjudged the nature of post-Soviet, post–Warsaw
Pact, post-Tito societies, governments, and defense enterprises across Central
and Eastern Europe, resulting in wasted decades and billions of misspent
dollars, pounds, marks, and euros. This damning assessment deserves deep
analysis, both to determine whether Western officials really were as ignorant as
Young alleges and to identify accurately the key causal variable(s) behind the
defense reform failures.
Interestingly, Young presents evidence to support the notion Western officials
really did understand the shortcomings of and hurdles facing Central and
Eastern European military establishments. Leaked NATO defense assessments—
available to every Allied delegation in Brussels—and firsthand accounts of senior
Western military officials and experts portray a clear but limited awareness,
stemming from latent communist-era thinking and practices, of the challenges
faced by the Central and Eastern European defense enterprise (48, 49–52).
Young contends, after 1990, the West subsequently made no concerted effort
to understand the “cultural conditions” in Central and Eastern Europe (53).
If Western officials indeed were aware of persistent totalitarian norms, readers
have to wonder if they cared, or if they were overconfident in the ability of
Western-promoted defense reform efforts to succeed nonetheless.
At its heart, the book is about change in military organizations, a subject
that has seen significant attention from academics and practitioners over the last
several decades, particularly since Barry R. Posen’s foundational The Sources of
Military Doctrine (1984). While Young does include a brief survey of literature—
he specifically references academics Leslie Eliason, Theo Farrell, Emily Goldman,
Edgar Schein, and Terry Terriff—he focuses on his preferred explanatory variable:
cultural norms. For example, Young compares the explanatory power of cultural
norms to that of technology or of politics and strategy (explanatory tools posited
by other scholars). In this way, Young seeks neither to test theory nor refine
existing theoretical tools.
Instead, Anatomy offers a trove of evidence cataloging the transformation
of defense establishments across former Soviet and Warsaw Pact republics and
successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Young’s expertise and wide-ranging,
in-depth research shine here, allowing comparative analysis between and within
the three regions. He analyzes the countries of each region, covering defense
institutions, policy frameworks, defense planning techniques, national-level
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commands, military decision-making processes, operational concepts, logistical
support capabilities, and professional standards. The result is a comprehensive
overview of defense reform across nearly all of Central and Eastern Europe.
A second major strength is Young’s attention to practical and reasonable
recommendations—assuming readers agree the primary reason for the reform
efforts’ limited success is the West’s inability or unwillingness to consider
persistent totalitarian cultural norms. From broad recommendations—such as
promoting emphasis on achieving defense outcomes—to more regional- and
country-specific recommendations, policymakers and security experts will find
much utility in the book.
These recommendations naturally beg the question, do defense reform
outcomes make a difference in allied and partner military operations downrange?
Maybe not: even Young acknowledges, in some cases, impressive operational
outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan were not necessarily thwarted by lack of reform
progress (68). Nonetheless, Young pulls no punches in noting many NATO
allies in Central and Eastern Europe remain security liabilities, consuming more
security than they produce (179). Considering Russia’s current hybrid operations
and the continuing imperative of equitable burden sharing, NATO needs all allies
rowing in the same direction. Young’s impressively detailed and well-researched
book offers guidelines on how to achieve this synchronicity.
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Biography

The Blind Strategist:
John Boyd and the American Art of War
By Stephen Robinson
Reviewed by Colonel Jonathan Klug, US Army, assistant professor, Department
of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

I

n The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War,
Stephen Robinson unrelentingly attacks the military theory
of the brilliant yet controversial John Boyd and argues “Boyd
never applied the discipline of an historian to his research, he
was a blind strategist trapped in the darkness of fraudulent
history guided by the confirmation bias inherent within the
logic of his grail quest” (301). The majority of the book is consequently an examination of the poor use or outright falsification
of the history that underpins Boyd’s work, as well as the work
of his supporters. Through this study, however, Robinson does a
superb job providing a historiography of maneuver warfare.

Dunedin, New Zealand:
Exisle Publishing, 2021
360 pages
$35.99

For readers unfamiliar with Boyd, he was a highly influential US Air Force
fighter pilot and military theorist in the second half of the twentieth century. He
flew combat missions during the Korean War and his real influence began after
the war when developing his military theory. His most important contribution
was the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. OODA loops are tactical
decision cycles, and the side that completes these decision cycles faster than their
opponent will win the engagement. This theory led Boyd to write the Air Force
fighter doctrine, and he subsequently was instrumental in developing the F-16
and the F/A-18. In addition, Boyd expanded the idea of the OODA loop and
getting “inside your opponent’s decision cycle” from a simple tactical version to
a more robust operational version—the birth of what Boyd and his supporters
would call maneuver warfare (15).
In his first chapter, Robinson explores the emergence of maneuver warfare but
claims it is “a temple built on sand” (16). He proceeds systematically in 10 chapters
to describe the history on which Boyd based maneuver warfare. Highlights
include the blatantly fabricated history of the self-promoting Liddell Hart, the
Wehrmacht generals’ post-war efforts to distance themselves from Hitler and their
failure during World War II, the mythology surrounding German stormtroopers
and blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare and the defense of NATO, the absence of
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maneuver warfare in the Gulf War (1991), and much more. Robinson conducted
comprehensive research to support these chapters, demonstrated by an extensive
bibliography and frequent footnotes. Overall, Robinson claims “maneuver warfare,
was founded upon mythology, but this became apparent only after professional
historians exposed the historical fraud concocted by German generals and Liddell
Hart” (300).
Robinson does fine work exposing the issues with the history Boyd and others
used, yet there are aspects of maneuver warfare that remain useful. Robinson
depicts Boyd’s final OODA loop—which includes feedback loops and is useful for
the operational level—but does not explore the broader version of the OODA loop
in detail. Other aspects of maneuver warfare remain valuable and underpin the
United States Marine Corps warfighting operational concept. This information
raises the question of what exactly is an operational concept. In the 2001 Army
magazine article, “That Elusive Operational Concept,” David A. Fastabend
defined an operational concept as “an image of combat: a concise visualization
that portrays the strategic requirement, the adversary and his capabilities, and the
scenario by which that adversary will be overcome to accomplish the strategic
requirement. It is a governing idealization that addresses those activities necessary
to link tactical activities in a purposeful way to address the goals of strategy” (51,
no. 6). While Boyd and his supporters would likely argue maneuver warfare was
more than an operational concept, aspects of maneuver warfare still have merit as a
visualization or set of guiding principles for successfully conducting warfare.
In the cover blurbs, scholarly experts in military theory claim Stephen
Robinson’s book is a “must-read” and “Boyd’s advocates will not want to read, but
should” (back cover). They are right—military professionals and historians alike
should read this book and consider it deeply. Robinson makes a solid case that
the history Boyd and his supporters used to support their work was based on
falsehoods and even purposeful fabrications by Hart. This historical issue should
give anyone considering maneuver warfare cause to reflect if our existing doctrine
is built on flawed historical data. Although Robinson effectively hammers the
historical underpinnings of Boyd and maneuver warfare, aspects of maneuver
warfare are ideals military forces can and should attempt to achieve given
appropriate circumstances. The Blind Strategist is an excellent catalyst for thought
and debate.
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China Risen?
Studying Chinese Global Power
By Shaun Breslin
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald Krieger, US Army Forces Command

T

here is a cottage industry of books and articles on China
written by academics, independent researchers, and think
tanks, with more published every month. Shaun Breslin’s China
Risen? Studying Chinese Global Power, assesses China’s rising
global power while evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its
international objectives. Breslin is novel here, using Chinese
sources—including academic journals considered obscure even
within China—to present the vast and complex opinions within
the country. His approach is instructive and parts the complex
veil of its internal politics ever so slightly (225). Readers
walk away understanding the characteristics of geopolitical
discussions within China.

Bristol, UK: Bristol
University Press, 2021
316 pages
$35.99

In six chapters, Breslin evaluates China’s global blueprint and depicts the
country’s internal politics, grand strategy, ideological language, and soft power
quest. Some scholars have indicated China, despite its vast economic resources,
is still a partial power. While this point is still disputed, Breslin convincingly
makes a case that “whatever the threshold for being a global power is China
has already crossed it”—the transformation of the Chinese state is nothing short
of miraculous (3).
Breslin examines various aspects of China’s growing influence via hard
economic power, normative power, and soft-power ambitions. Over the past
few years, its quest for soft power through the popular Confucius Institutes has
generated controversy in the United States and Europe. Breslin suggests China’s
growing influence cannot be attributed to a single source of power, given the
myriad of circumstances and contemporary geopolitics. China’s leaders still
struggle to understand that soft power emanates from culture and industry and is
not wielded like hard-power economic instruments. Breslin admits his book omits
one key aspect of growing Chinese power via the military, but this topic is best
treated independently.
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Many analysts note China is a threat to American national security, citing its
Huawei 5G program or aspirations in the South China Sea. More often than not,
the threat is less clear-cut. There are many perspectives on the issue; Breslin writes:
“To be sure, it is not always clear what China is being identified as a threat to;
perhaps a different type of threat to different things for different people” (229).
The headlines surrounding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), implied to be
an example of Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy,” is another example that captures the
distortion around Chinese intentions (231).
While evidence shows several countries involved in BRI face loan repayment
issues, this discovery is still not proof of a deliberate policy. Breslin suggests there
are many actors in China who often act in ways that run counter to the objectives
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and “assuming a deliberate debt-trap
diplomacy strategy results in a focus on the wrong drivers and at times the
wrong actors” (231).
Complicating the narrative are China’s opaque lending practices, which
noticeably do not conform to Western lending practices. Within China, financial
support to developing nations is viewed as a way to secure national objectives, such
as ensuring access to vital natural resources like copper, iron, gold, and manganese
from Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Many state-owned enterprises
determine whether commercial activity is designed for profit or for securing
natural resources to support Chinese interests (130).
China is not the only influential global actor exerting influence in developing
countries, though the point is often missed. The nations of the Pacific Islands,
which typically have high debt levels, are an example. While China is the primary
lender for Tonga and Japan, other multilateral institutions serve as the primary
sources of loans and aid to other Pacific island countries. Breslin writes, “[i]f we are
worried about the causes and consequences of debt in these countries, then China
is part of the story and any potential solution. But not all of it” (233). Readers can
apply this template to the world, including many of China’s BRI partners. While
the CCP sets economic performance objectives and tightly controls the economy,
its new financial system is not the familiar neoliberal capitalism. In the video, “Is
China creating a new type of economic system?,” Barry Naughton dubs China’s
new system “capitalism with steerage” (University of Massachusetts Workshop,
2021). While the CCP touts slogans and single-focused objectives, many actors
pursue commercial profit-based agendas that at times conflict with state objectives,
creating dysfunctional outcomes with national policies (90). It would have been
helpful for Breslin to cover this newly emerging scholarship and research.
For the past several decades, countries have been quietly pushing back against
an American-led Western world order but have lacked the economic clout to back
up these challenges. China’s growing influence makes it the exception. Breslin
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admits, “[m]aybe just not being the West is enough to make China’s world view
attractive” (236). In the growing Sino-US challenge, there is ample room for a new
perspective. Breslin’s detailed analysis debunks the idea the world is shifting to a
global order fashioned by the CCP. A more realistic understanding of Chinese
intentions underscores a multipolar world where China’s objectives and decisions
increasingly influence the geopolitical landscape. The new world order will be
complex and challenging for any single country to lead or dominate (239–40).
Leaders in the West and the rest of the world must accept China’s new role and
influence in global affairs, despite disagreements with CCP leadership. Demonizing
China and misreading its intentions will only generate misunderstandings and
saber-rattling counterproductive in the new international order. A well-needed
addition to all bookshelves, China Risen is an asset to scholarship on China and
should be required reading for all senior military and civilian leaders involved in
crafting US policy.

Stronger:
Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age
of Competitive Interdependence
By Ryan Hass
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, distinguished fellow for China,
United States Institute of Peace

R

yan Hass—a central figure in early twenty-first century
US-China relations—has been engaged in the relationship
for two decades, active both in the trenches and at the apex of
power. He has written an insightful and illuminating book on
the subject, with insights and analysis informed by his firsthand
experiences from postings at the US embassy in Beijing and the
National Security Council as the China point person.

New Haven, CT:
In an era where the most enduring multidimensional Yale University
Press, 2021
240
pages
external national security challenge facing the United States is
$27.50
China, almost everyone seems to be an expert. Many of these
self-styled experts have penned books purporting to provide
key insights or uncover secret schemes. Of all the available tomes, Stronger is a
volume every national security professional should read. Why? First, the book—
written by an expert in the field—is a succinct primer for anyone seeking to
understand contemporary China policy. Hass has produced a masterful overview
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with authoritative analysis and sensible recommendations. He explains how
Washington and Beijing reached the current state of contention and confrontation
and reviews—in sufficient but not mind-numbing detail—all the critical issues,
including economics, technology, human rights, and military matters. Second, all
serious China policy players in the US government will have read it. Stronger is
likely the one book your boss has read or at least skimmed. Anyone who wants to be
effective in their job should be conversant with the analyses and recommendations
Hass outlines. Of course, not everyone will agree with what Hass writes.
The fundamental assumption of Stronger is “the old policy playbook for
managing U.S.-China relations no longer holds answers . . .” (5). According to Hass,
bilateral relations have evolved into a condition of “competitive interdependence”
whereby “[n]either country is capable of imposing its will on the other at
acceptable cost or risk, and yet both countries hold preferences and priorities that
place them at sharp odds with each other” (4). What policy prescription does
Hass recommend? He contends: “To compete effectively with China, America’s
leaders should focus on fostering greater national cohesion, restoring America’s
international prestige, and preserving its historically unmatched network of
alliance relationships” (9).
My main quibble with Stronger is the author’s excessive optimism about
America’s ability to negotiate skillfully the challenge of competing with China.
Hass asserts Beijing faces “the hardest governance challenge on the planet”
and contrasts this problem with the multiple factors that should give the United
States the clear advantage (192). Yet, Hass may significantly underestimate the
array and magnitude of domestic challenges confronting the United States.
In other words, America’s governance challenge may be as difficult as China’s.
Quibble aside, Hass rightly identifies the precondition for a successful US strategy
toward China—Washington must get it right at home.
Hass provides the best overview and analysis of contemporary US-China
relations I have seen in many years. In particular, uniformed and civilian
professionals of the US defense establishment should peruse the thoughtful and
thorough chapter five titled “Mitigating Risks of Conflict” (126). The Pentagon,
Hass suggests, will face difficult choices as it seeks “to align its capabilities with
its ambitions in an era of growing fiscal restraints” (153). Penned in unpretentious
and jargon-free prose, Stronger will appeal to a wide audience including national
security practitioners, policy wonks, educators, students, and anyone wrestling
with the long-term challenge China presents to the United States.
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Middle East

Negotiating Survival: Civilian-Insurgent Relations in Afghanistan
By Ashley Jackson
Reviewed by Dr. Heather S. Gregg, research professor of military strategy and
policy, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the
Taliban’s takeover of the country in August 2021 caught
almost everyone off guard. Ashley Jackson, a scholar of armed
conflicts with over a decade of experience in Afghanistan,
has a provocative explanation for these dramatic events: “An
essential part of understanding the Taliban’s once-improbable
resurrection and ascent lay in their relationships with civilians”
(4). Specifically, in Negotiating Survival: Civilian-Insurgent New York: Oxford University
Press, 2021
Relations in Afghanistan, Jackson documents through 418
328 pages
interviews with civilians and members of the Taliban across
$45.00
15 provinces that, beginning around 2017, Afghan communities
and members of the Taliban began to actively negotiate and cut deals with one
another as a survival strategy. The end result of these negotiation was what Jackson
calls a Taliban “parallel bureaucracy replete with governors, courts, tax collectors
and even school monitors” (4). These shadow governments helped pave the way
for the Taliban’s rapid takeover of the country once it successfully negotiated the
complete withdrawal of the US military by the end of August 2021.
To more broadly explain this process of civilian-insurgent bargaining, Jackson
develops a framework that focuses on three variables: interests, including
civilians’ desire for survival and insurgents’ need for legitimacy and organizational
survival; leverage, including the use of coercion and violence, persuasion (the
story or narrative), and incentives, such as social services and other goods; and
social capital, which she defines as “not relationships and norms alone but the
new options and abilities that arise from them” (38). Through the combination of
these three broad variables, insurgents and the population navigate a complicated
relationship that recognizes each group’s needs and mutual dependency. Within
this theory, Jackson notes a few important caveats that shape these negotiations.
Critically, insurgents have far more power and leverage at the negotiation table
than do populations. Furthermore, insurgents who want political legitimacy are
more willing to negotiate than those that do not. She also contends that the more
senior and cohesive the insurgent group, the more likely it can successfully make
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and keep its agreements with the population and, similarly, the more unified a
community, the more likely it can bargain and negotiate with insurgents. Finally,
in most cases insurgents and the population do not easily have the option to walk
away from negotiations, unlike in business deals. It is this complicated mixture
of incentives, threats, and the dynamic relationship built between insurgents and
populations that produce reciprocal arrangements that are, at least in some ways,
mutually beneficial.
Jackson applies this framework specifically to Afghanistan to explain why the
U.S. led military strategy failed. Through her interviews and time spent in several
key provinces, she identifies where counterinsurgent forces failed to understand
the complex ways in which the Taliban worked with the population for their own
political survival and struck mutually beneficial agreements. She argues that “the
Taliban has been consistently underestimated by their opponents, in part because
their opponents focused almost exclusively on the Taliban’s acts of violence
and terror,” and discounted the many ways in which they collaborated with the
population for their compliance (213). She further notes that western strategists
assumed that an Islamic movement would be unyielding in its ideological aims
and, therefore, their eradication was the only option. By contrast, she finds that
pragmatism trumped ideology in Afghanistan, allowing for deviation from
maxims and dogma. Ultimately, she concludes that the Taliban succeeded in
attaining the population’s compliance through iterative negotiations over time and
that “ . . . compliance is not ‘won’ in a decisive victory. Rather it is mediated and
maintained through continual negotiation” (215). Jackson notes that bargaining
and negotiations worked particularly well for the Taliban in areas where it had
a degree of control and where military confrontation was minimal. Under these
conditions, the Taliban used negotiations with the population to consolidate
its gains. It also had greater responsibility to deliver goods and services to the
population, giving the population had some leverage with which to negotiate. In
areas that were militarily contested, the relationship between the population and
insurgents was less dynamic.
Jackson’s book is essential readings for scholars and practitioners who wish to
better understand the central role that populations play in shaping insurgencies
and their outcomes. Rather than assume that populations are passive bystanders
in an armed conflict, Jackson identifies the agency that they have and seeks to
understand the conditions under which populations, including women, can and do
negotiate with insurgents to shape their future. Alongside agency Jackson further
includes the role that emotions play in armed conflicts and negotiations, which is
another critical yet under-investigated topic in war studies.
Jackson’s research demonstrates that discounting or ignoring the role that
populations play in counterinsurgencies will most likely result in strategic failure.
She summarizes, “The neglect of civilian agency and behavior has fundamentally
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impaired our understanding of how wars are fought and won or lost” (212).
This observation is particularly important when considering the priorities that
the U.S. military and its allies had in Afghanistan, including their focus on
building Afghan security forces, elections and the structure of the government
for building a viable state. Ultimately, while highly measurable pursuits, these
counterinsurgency strategies may not be successful if they do not include actively
include the population and recognize their role as active participants in the war
and its outcome.

Airpower in the War against ISIS
By Benjamin S. Lambeth
Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, chief of analysis and research,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

N

o one is a more respected or versatile commentator
about contemporary airpower than Benjamin Lambeth,
a nonresident senior fellow with the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments following a 37-year career at the
RAND Corporation. He has written books about American
air operations in Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO’s air
war for Kosovo, and Israeli air operations against Hezbollah.
His latest work, Airpower in the War against ISIS, examines
Annapolis, MD:
Operation Inherent Resolve over a four-year period, 2014–18, as Naval Institute Press, 2021
352 pages
US Central Command (CENTCOM) fought the Islamic State
$55.00
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As usual with his work, he provides
much to ponder for practitioners of airpower and leaders who want to apply it.
Lambeth pulls no punches. He begins by excoriating the Obama administration
for leaving Iraq in 2011 and permitting the conditions that led to the rise of ISIS.
After two years of increasing terrorist provocations and expanding incursions
resulting in the fall of Mosul, President Barack Obama finally authorized
Operation Inherent Resolve. Lambeth characterizes the air strikes in 2014 as
“half-hearted” and lacking serious purpose, typified by “unproductive gradualism
and misplaced targeting emphasis” (11). This initial “fundamental misjudgment”
of the character of the conflict by CENTCOM leadership produced a “needlessly
prolonged and costly air war” (218). By contrast, once the Trump administration
came into office in 2017, President Donald Trump authorized Secretary of
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Defense James Mattis to expand and intensify the air campaign, resulting in the
crushing of ISIS in little more than a year.
Lambeth is especially critical of restrictive rules of engagement that seemed
more concerned with limiting collateral damage than hurting ISIS. He argues
the campaign should not have been envisioned as counterinsurgency, with a focus
on winning hearts and minds, but instead ISIS should have been considered a
protostate meriting the application of more decisive force. He also argues then
CENTCOM Commander General Lloyd J. Austin III—and his chosen US Army
commander for the Operation Inherent Resolve Joint Task Force—misdiagnosed
their mission as primarily a ground war, and the campaign would have been better
served with an airman in charge of at least the initial phase of the operation.
Lambeth’s grasp of tactical details is impressive and less controversial. Air
operations to liberate Mosul and Al-Raqqah receive considerable attention, as does
the mission that killed jihadist leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He describes the
performance of various aircraft and weapons used during the campaign, including
the first combat sorties of the F-22 Raptor and new intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems.
The section about the Russian intervention in Syria is particularly insightful.
He describes the provocations and airspace challenges that ensued, along with a
number of combat actions. In one February 2018 incident, Russian mercenaries
and allies attacked an American special operations forces outpost. Americans
retaliated with punishing air strikes that killed as many as 200 Russian personnel—
but also led to the inadvertent bombing of Syrian government troops, revealing
human error has still not been eliminated from increasingly complex targeting
procedures. For both sides, the incident was “a windfall opportunity for reciprocal
learning” (175). The Russians were able to watch American air warfighting up
close and compare aircraft. In turn, US observers analyzed their aerial counterparts
for changes in air doctrine and employment. Though the Russians employed new
precision technologies, their air operations still had more in common with World
War II–era frontal aviation support than more dynamic American targeting.
Airpower in the War against ISIS is definitely a book of the COVID-19 era.
Its extensive documentation relies primarily on media reports and e-mails
to work around travel and access restrictions. Its greatest strength is also its
greatest weakness. Lambeth presents the airman’s view of Operation Inherent
Resolve in great detail, based on an impressive number of e-mail messages and
manuscript reviews ranging from senior US Air Force noncommissioned officers
to American and Australian Air Force generals. Lambeth’s analysis of the broader
aspects of American policy and the campaign would have benefited greatly from
a Joint and interagency approach that better examined other viewpoints for those
actions he criticizes. Some Iraqi commentary would also have been useful. While
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the book comes across as rather parochial, it is bound to be acknowledged as the
seminal work on the contributions of airpower in the war against ISIS, just as the
title promises.
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Urban Warfare

Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century
by Anthony King
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, principal, Innovative Defense Research

A

nthony King’s Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century
is an unusual book and a challenge to review. King seeks to
provide a new analytic approach to urban warfare, one providing a
“sociology of urban warfare” endeavoring “to transcend [previous]
disciplinary limitations by analyzing the interplay between
cities, weaponry, and forces in order to unite social and military
sciences.” The ultimate outcome is less successful in that regard
than as a presentation of the challenges and conditions inherent Medford, MA: Polity Press,
2021
when combat visits urban environments backed by impressive
288 pages
research spanning a broad spectrum of historical contingencies.
$69.95
While King provides fewer revelations for longtime students
of urban operations, he presents a potential resource for readers less familiar with
city fighting. As such, the book could complement Louis A. DiMarco’s Concrete
Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq (2012), Roger J. Spiller’s Sharp Corners:
Urban Operations at Century’s End (2000), other resources addressing specific urban
battles or other-than-combat urban disasters, and the many studies published
over the past 30 years that focus on specific aspects of urban undertakings.
The book lives up to King’s promise to take a force size-centric versus
environment-centric analytic approach. Its first half sets the stage writ large,
reaching deep into the past before reviewing what comprises a city from both
academic and pragmatic perspectives. Threats posed by irregular forces, the
evolution of the urban guerrilla, and the influence of city size and structure
on combat operations establish a foundation for chapters addressing military
capabilities in terms of “Air,” “Fire[s],” “Swarms,” “Partners,” and “Rumour”
(considers information and information operations in terms of conflicts in cities).
A final chapter, “Armageddon,” briefly contemplates the future of urban combat.
The strength of King’s offering is unquestionably his depth of research and fine
pen in presenting fighting during operations in Syria, Marawi on the Philippine
island of Mindanao, and Iraq’s Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul in addition to
many more distantly past operations. Belfast, Marawi, and Mosul receive special
attention to good effect. Even longtime students of urban operations will find
the occasional revelation rarely—if ever—found in previous publications. King
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wisely avoids the oversimplification of presenting cities as organisms, an analogy
that quickly breaks down in light of the inherent complexity of urban areas.
Interestingly, and perhaps deliberately as a way of sidestepping a related technical
discussion despite its relevance to social theory, the potentially illuminating
characterization of large urban areas as ecosystems is also foregone.
King rejects viewing cities in terms of their flows. Instead he suggests a
more appropriate approach is to appreciate them as consisting of groups and
interactions between them. Here his effort to convince regarding the applicability
of a sociological approach seems strained. Complexity makes such either-or
depictions of the urban character a hard sell. Comprehending this complexity
requires an inclusive approach when describing: density (also recognized by
King as a key descriptor), social groups and relationships, flows, overarching
system considerations (both internal to the city and in terms of the city as a
component of larger systems). All these terms offer benefits in pursuit of urban
area comprehension; one or two will not suffice to address the comprehension
conundrum fully. Anyone believing they fully grasp all that comprises an
urban area need only wait for a few moments before a city will present a
previously unseen nuance, relationship, challenge, or opportunity. Understanding
urban environments and operations is an unending pursuit rather than a
condition attained.
Use of Urban Warfare as an introductory text could ironically benefit
from King’s sometimes too narrow presentation of existing urban theory and
practice. Complementing his book or excerpts with readings offering alternative
explanations, different approaches, or contrary descriptions would serve as
stimulus for student discussions and written assignments. For example, the King’s
acceptance of what comprises a city as an entity (based on a threshold of 100,000
population or some combination of density and spread) overlooks the considerable
challenge of dealing with dramatically varied definitions of urban area and city
employed by academics, nations, and international bodies. Unhelpfully, the United
Nations has no single definition of urban area, instead using the country-specific
definitions of whatever countries they are operating in at the time.
King’s conclusion that “the congested, multidimensional challenges of urban
operations do not pertain below a dense population of 3,000” need not be incorrect,
but the implication that so fixed a demarcation holds notable significance implies
an operational importance that does not exist. The number, any number, is less
significant than other factors collectively meriting consideration during the
planning and conduct of urban operations. These and other considerations
regarding urban environments and combat in cities (for example, King’s conclusion
that urban warfare is more likely given smaller militaries in much of the world
today or his belief that “a successful information campaign requires networks of
true believers” rather than simply sufficient numbers of the naïve, ignorant, or
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gullible) will surprise readers intimately familiar with urban operations. While
there is much good in this book, readers looking to Urban Warfare as their initial
resource regarding urban warfare should read with a questioning mind and plan to
complement its reading with others’ thinking on the subject.
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Contributor’s Guidelines
Article Submissions
Content Requirements
Scope
Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address strategic issues regarding US
defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards of
research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or instructional recommendations must be
included. For more information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.

Audience
US Army War College graduates, other senior military officers, policymakers, and members of
academia concerned with national security affairs.

Clearance
Members of the US military and employees of the US Department of Defense must provide a
memo from the local Public Affairs Office stating a submission is appropriate for public release
(see AR 360-1, ch. 6).

Concurrent Submissions
Submissions must not be available on the Internet or be under consideration with other
publishers until the author receives notification the submission will not be published or until the
work is published through the US Army War College Press.

Formatting Requirements
Length
Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 20,000 words (15,000-word
main text, 5,000 words in the foreword and executive summary).
Articles: 5,000 words or less.
Commentaries: 2,500 to 3,000 words.
Book reviews: 800 to 1,000 words.

File Type
Text must be provided in a single MS Word document (.doc).
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Visual Aids
Charts, graphs, and photographs may be provided to clarify or amplify the text. Tables must
be presented in the body of the Word document. Microsoft-generated charts and graphs must
be submitted in Excel. And photos must be provided as .jpg images of not more than 9MB
(at 300 dpi). If any table, chart, graph, or photograph has been previously published,
written permission from the copyright holder to republish the content must be included with
the submission.

Citations
Use the Chicago Manual of Style format to document sources. Indicate all quoted material by
quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent
with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy
explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited.

Submission Requirements
Address
usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

Include
For each contributor, provide the following information: full name, mailing address, phone number,
e-mail address, areas of expertise, and a brief biography or curriculum vitae.
Attach all files, including graphics.
For book reviews, include the author, editor, or translator’s name, the book’s title, the publisher,
and the publication date.
Abstract requirements, approximately 200 words, including the following information:
a. What is the thesis/main argument of the piece in one sentence?
b. How does this piece differ from what has already been published on the topic?
c. What methodology and sources are/will be used?
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Movement Techniques Training in Ukraine
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